Shelton v. Duke University Health System, COA05-1113.
Decision Date | 01 August 2006 |
Docket Number | No. COA05-1113.,COA05-1113. |
Citation | 633 S.E.2d 113 |
Parties | Deniece SHELTON, individually and on behalf of a class of all persons similarly situated v. DUKE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. d/b/a Raleigh Community Hospital, d/b/a Duke Health Raleigh Hospital, d/b/a Duke University Hospital, d/b/a Duke University Medical Center and d/b/a Durham Regional Hospital. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Wallace & Graham, P.A., by Mona Lisa Wallace, John S. Hughes, and Cathy A. Williams, Salisbury and Shipman & Wright, L.L.P., by Gary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, Wilmington, for plaintiff-appellant.
Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., by John M. Simpson, Frederick Robinson, and Stephen M. McNabb, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff sought treatment at Raleigh Community Hospital1, which is owned by Duke University Health System, in July of 2002. Plaintiff did not have health insurance sufficient to cover all her medical expenses. Prior to obtaining treatment, plaintiff signed a consent form entitled "Consent and Conditions of Treatment." Under a section titled "Payment Agreement," the consent form included the following language: "The undersigned individually obligates himself to the payment of the Hospital account incurred by the patient in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the Hospital at the time of patient's discharge." Plaintiff alleges that she was never provided with any information explaining or listing the "regular rates" of the hospital. Plaintiff further alleges that, unbeknownst to her at the time she signed the contract, defendant was charging greatly reduced rates to patients who had full insurance coverage through either government or private insurance programs.
Subsequent to her discharge from the hospital, plaintiff received medical bills totaling $7891.00 for services rendered by defendant. Plaintiff paid these bills in full prior to filing suit in this matter.
Plaintiff filed this action on 14 February 2005, on behalf of herself and a class of persons similarly situated. Plaintiff's complaint included causes of action for breach of contract; unjust enrichment; unfair and deceptive trade practices; and declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on 15 April 2005. The trial court granted defendant's motion, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice by order entered 11 July 2005. Plaintiff appeals.
In plaintiff's first argument, she contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims for breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and declaratory and injunctive relief. We disagree.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss made pursuant to . . . Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. "The system of notice pleading affords a sufficiently liberal construction of complaints so that few fail to survive a motion to dismiss." Accordingly, when entertaining "a motion to dismiss, the trial court must take the complaint's allegations as true and determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory."
Lea v. Grier, 156 N.C.App. 503, 507, 577 S.E.2d 411, 414-15 (2003) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues the following in support of her contract claim: 1) The Consent and Conditions of Treatment form which she signed failed to contain a definite price term; 2) because no definite price term was agreed upon, the law infers a "reasonable rate" as the contract price for the services rendered; and 3) the rates defendant charged plaintiff for its services were unreasonable, and the charging of unreasonable rates constituted a breach of the contract. Plaintiff's contract claim fails if the relevant language of the consent form was sufficiently definite to inform plaintiff of the price term. Contract interpretation is a matter of law, and the standard of review for this Court is de novo. Internet East, Inc. v. Duro Communs., Inc., 146 N.C.App. 401, 405, 553 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2001).
The relevant language from the Consent and Conditions of Treatment form reads as follows: "The undersigned individually obligates himself to the payment of the Hospital account incurred by the patient in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the Hospital at the time of patient's discharge." We first note that nowhere in plaintiff's complaint does she contend that the rates she was charged were not the "regular rates" of the hospital, she merely contends that these rates were "unreasonable". Therefore, the question of whether plaintiff was charged the "regular rates" is not before us on appeal.
The next question is whether the "regular rates" language in the agreement was sufficiently definite to allow a meeting of the minds on the price term. Elliott v. Duke University, Inc., 66 N.C.App. 590, 596, 311 S.E.2d 632, 636 (1984) (). Plaintiff contends that the hospital keeps a list of the rates it charges the uninsured (or under-insured) in a document called the "charge master". Plaintiff further alleges that she was not provided with this document before she signed the consent form. Plaintiff makes no allegation that she attempted to gain access to the "charge master" to ascertain the regular rates and was denied access to this "charge master" by defendant.
"The heart of a contract is the intention of the parties, which is to be ascertained from the expressions used, the subject matter, the end in view, the purpose sought, and the situation of the parties at the time." When a contract is in writing and free from any ambiguity which would require resort to extrinsic evidence, or the consideration of disputed fact, the intention of the parties is a question of law. The court determines the effect of their agreement by declaring its legal meaning.
A contract, however, encompasses not only its express provisions but also all such implied provisions as are necessary to effect the intention of the parties unless express terms prevent such inclusion. "The court will be prepared to imply a term if there arises from the language of the contract itself, and the circumstances under which it is entered into, an inference that the parties must have intended the stipulation in question." The doctrine of implication of unexpressed terms has been succinctly stated as follows:
Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 409-11, 200 S.E.2d 622,...
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