Shelton v. State
| Decision Date | 12 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A0115,A94A0115 |
| Citation | 214 Ga.App. 166,447 S.E.2d 115 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SHELTON v. The STATE. |
C. Alan Mullinax, Stone Mountain, for appellant.
Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Sol., Richard E. Thomas, Asst. Sol., for appellee.
Following a trial by jury, the appellant, Joseph Shelton, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1). 1 His motion for new trial was subsequently denied, and this appeal followed.
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict shows that at approximately 10:50 p.m. on January 6, 1992, Shelton was seen driving a Chevrolet Camaro in a parking lot of a Gwinnett County apartment complex. Shelton drove the vehicle into the rear of a truck parked in the parking lot, resulting in heavy damage to the truck and forcing the truck over an adjacent curb. After assessing the damage to the vehicle, Shelton left the scene in the vehicle, leaving an injured passenger, Paul Woodall, who later fled on foot to an apartment within the complex. Officer Beining of the Gwinnett County Police Department was summoned to the scene and during his investigation, was given a description of both the driver and passenger. A check of the vehicle's license plate number, which was supplied by a witness, revealed that Shelton was the registrant of the vehicle.
When Officer Beining located Woodall and Shelton in their apartment within the complex at approximately 1:00 a.m., Woodall was extremely intoxicated and had a fresh lip injury as described by an eyewitness. Although Woodall denied knowledge of the incident, he was subsequently identified by an eyewitness as the passenger in the suspect vehicle, and arrested. Shelton was also in the apartment and was intoxicated and appeared to have been awakened from sleep. A strong odor of alcohol emanated from his person, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he had a fresh injury to his right arm. In an effort to confirm whether Shelton was the driver of the vehicle, the officer began questioning him but did not advise him of his Miranda rights prior to questioning. Officer Beining testified at the motion to suppress hearing that Shelton was not told that he was not free to leave, was not placed in handcuffs, and his access to leave was not blocked. Shelton did not present any evidence to rebut this testimony at the hearing.
Shelton denied driving his vehicle that night and initially informed the officer that he had stayed at home drinking and became inebriated while at home. Upon further questioning, Shelton changed his story and admitted that he had been drinking with some friends, including Woodall, at a night club and a restaurant, but he could not say which friend drove that evening. He further stated that upon his arrival at home at approximately 10:30 p.m., he went to bed. Shelton accompanied the officer outside to the police car where he was identified by an eyewitness as the driver of the Camaro at the time of the collision and was arrested. When the Camaro was subsequently located by another officer, the windshield was cracked and an empty beer container and three unopened beer containers were found in the vehicle. An intoximeter test administered at 2:32 a.m. revealed that Shelton had a blood-alcohol content of .19 grams.
1. Shelton asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his pre-Miranda statement made to the investigating officer in which he admitted that he had been drinking before the collision. Although Shelton was questioned in his apartment and on the stairs leading from the apartment prior to his arrest, (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 812, 813(2), 432 S.E.2d 211 (1993).
2. Next, Shelton argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver. Specifically, Shelton asserts that the prosecution failed to present any evidence that he was intoxicated or manifested any signs of intoxication while driving his vehicle at the time of the incident. We disagre...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Merritt v. State, A07A0947.
...testimony that elderly female passenger drove while he drank bourbon and Coca-Cola). 15. (Punctuation omitted.) Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 168(2), 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994), citing Menendez v. Jewett, 196 Ga.App. 565, 569(5), 396 S.E.2d 294 16. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 499, 503(1)(......
- Jacobs v. State, A16A1115
-
Miller v. State, A98A2076.
...concur. 1. 180 Ga.App. 723, 725(4), 350 S.E.2d 314 (1986). 2. 191 Ga.App. 87, 89(3), 381 S.E.2d 45 (1989). 3. Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 168(2), 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994). 4. The majority of courts in other states which have been presented with the question have held that their vehicula......
-
State v. Shephard, A01A0390.
... ... We conclude that the trial court's ruling was not clearly erroneous ... The state relies on Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994); however, that case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Shelton, police officers questioned a DUI suspect at his home before advising him of his Miranda rights. We held that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the pre-Miranda ... ...