Shelton v. State
| Decision Date | 25 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 31, 1998.,31, 1998. |
| Citation | 744 A.2d 465 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | Steven SHELTON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
Michael W. Modica, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., and William E. Molchen (argued), Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
This 5th day of January, 2000, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On July 6, 1999, appellant filed a motion for reargument, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, of this Court's Opinion dated June 25, 1999.
(2) On July 23, 1999, the State filed an answer to the motion for reargument.
(3) The majority of the Court has determined that the motion for reargument should be denied. Justice Hartnett and Justice Berger would grant reargument.
(4) The Court has determined that the majority opinion and the dissent released on June 25, 1999 should be revised.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(A) The motion for reargument is DENIED.
(B) The Opinion of the Court dated June 25, 1999 is revised with certain changes now found on pages 488, 495-496 and 498 of the revised opinion. The dissent is also revised.
(C) A revised opinion is filed contemporaneously with this Order.
This appeal is from the trial court's decision and order denying postconviction relief in a case where the defendant was sentenced to death. The defendant asserts numerous claims centering around the basic argument that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on the direct appeal. One of his principal challenges in that context is the trial court's ruling that limited his right of allocution in addressing the jury at the penalty phase. This presents a question of first impression and obliges us to explore in some detail the history and modern developments in the law of allocution. We conclude that the trial court committed no error in rejecting all of the defendant's contentions and, therefore, we affirm.1
Defendant below-appellant Steven Shelton appeals from the Superior Court's denial of all the claims raised in his motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In 1993, Shelton and his two codefendants, Nelson Shelton and Jack Foster Outten, Jr., were convicted of the first degree felony murder of Wilson Mannon. All three defendants were sentenced to death in connection with the convictions. Nelson Shelton was executed on March 17, 1995.
With respect to Steven Shelton, the jury voted 8-4 that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. We upheld his conviction on direct appeal,2 in which he had claimed, among other claims, that the Superior Court erred by failing to sever the trials. That claim was rejected.3
Shelton's motion for postconviction relief in the trial court raised a number of claims that he contends justify the reversal of his convictions and sentence of death and require a new trial, a new penalty hearing, or both. Shelton's claims are as follows: (1) numerous defects existed with regard to the testimony of Christine Gibbons, the State's main witness against Shelton; (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prevent and to object timely to the testimony of Lisa Bedwell, who commented on the stand that Shelton had been in prison; (3) Shelton was prejudiced by a joint penalty hearing with Nelson and Outten and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to sever the hearing and to raise adequately the issue on direct appeal; (4) the court erred in limiting Shelton's right to allocution and that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the court's limitation at trial and on direct appeal; (5) during the penalty hearing the prosecutor made an improper comment concerning Shelton's failure to express remorse in allocution, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue and to request a curative instruction and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on appeal; (6) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase by failing to prepare for the penalty hearing and to investigate adequately mitigating evidence, by failing to have Shelton examined by a psychiatrist and to present such findings at the penalty hearing, and by failing to present to the jury school and Family Court records containing mitigating evidence; and (7) the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing Shelton's motion for postconviction relief without granting an evidentiary hearing. The trial court rejected all of Shelton's claims, holding that they were either procedurally barred or without merit.
Shelton contends that the Superior Court either erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in denying the relief requested in connection with the seven claims stated above. We agree with the well-reasoned decision of the Superior Court, and hold that the Superior Court neither erred as a matter of law nor abused its discretion.
A full statement of the facts relevant to the instant appeal is contained in Shelton I4 and Shelton II.5 Only a brief summary is necessary for purposes of this appeal.
On January 11, 1992, Outten, Nelson and Steven Shelton, and Christine Gibbons, spent the day drinking heavily at various locations. Nelson and Steven Shelton were brothers. Outten was their cousin. Gibbons was Nelson's girlfriend. Their last stop brought the group to a bar they called the "Green Door." While inside, Gibbons struck up a conversation with the victim, Wilson Mannon, at the bar. Mannon bought Gibbons drinks and the two danced.
After last call at 1:00 a.m., Mannon, Outten, Gibbons, and the Sheltons left the Green Door. Nelson drove them in his car to an isolated street in Wilmington where the three defendants pulled Mannon from the car and beat him severely. These beatings caused Mannon's death. Over the course of the investigation and trial, Gibbons gave multiple accounts of what occurred that night.
Gibbons initially testified as follows: Nelson and Outten stepped out of the car and either they pulled Mannon out or he came out on his own. Steven went behind the car to be sick. Outten and Nelson then began punching Mannon in the face. Nelson retrieved a ballpeen hammer from the trunk of his car and hit Mannon in the back of the head, causing him to fall. Nelson told Outten to "finish it." Outten then picked up an object that Gibbons described as a sink and struck Mannon ten or more times between his nose and the top of his head, crushing his skull. After Outten finished, Steven returned and asked what had happened. Steven nudged Mannon's body. All three defendants then passed around Mannon's wallet and robbed him of his money and jewelry.
After her initial testimony, Gibbons requested to retake the stand because she had lied during her previous testimony. The court permitted her to recant any prior testimony. Gibbons' new testimony was essentially the same, except she directly implicated Steven in the beating. This time, Gibbons testified she saw Steven with the hammer. She said she saw Steven kick and punch Mannon many times in the face. According to Gibbons, all three defendants went through Mannon's pockets and touched his wallet and jewelry. Gibbons believed Steven took Mannon's necklace.
Gibbons testified that Steven told her to say he had gone off into the woods at the time of the murder. Gibbons stated that she earlier had given different versions of the story because she was confused. Gibbons also explained that it would not be fair just blaming Nelson and Outten when Steven also had a part in the murder.
In addition to Gibbons' testimony, the forensic and other physical evidence implicated Steven in the murder. After a jury trial, the court convicted and sentenced all three defendants to death.
The additional facts pertinent to this appeal relate to the details concerning Gibbons' testimony and the events at trial. These facts and other facts relating to Steven's trial theories, postconviction theories, and the effectiveness of trial counsel are developed hereinafter under the individual headings of Steven's contentions to which they relate.
Shelton argues that the Superior Court denied him a fair trial because the State engaged in misconduct by threatening and intimidating Gibbons to retake the stand and recant portions of her testimony. He also alleges that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated when he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Gibbons, the prosecutors, Gibbons' attorney and Detective William Brown to explore the circumstances surrounding the recall of Gibbons and her subsequent recantation. Shelton couches these two arguments in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, he argues he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because Gibbons was intoxicated during part of her testimony.
Shelton argues that the prosecutors improperly threatened and intimidated Gibbons into recanting parts of her previous testimony and implicating Shelton in Mannon's murder. Trial counsel failed to raise a specific objection to this issue at trial. Shelton now argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Gibbons' testimony when the State recalled her to the stand and in failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial intimidation. He also claims appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court's decision on an application for postconviction relief.6 Questions of law are...
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