SHELTON v. State of Miss., 2009-KA-00694-COA

• Decision Date: 21 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-KA-00694-COA,2009-KA-00695-COA.,2009-KA-00694-COA
• Citation: 45 So.3d 1203
• Parties: Reginald SHELTON, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. Calvin P. Shelton, Appellant v. State of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

45 So.3d 1203

Reginald SHELTON, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

Calvin P. Shelton, Appellant

v.State of Mississippi, Appellee.

Nos. 2009-KA-00694-COA, 2009-KA-00695-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 16, 2010.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 2010.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 21, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Wm. Andy Sumrall, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Stephanie Breland Wood, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

ROBERTS, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. A jury sitting before the Madison County Circuit Court found Calvin Shelton and Reginald Shelton guilty of possession of more than five kilograms of marijuana. The circuit court sentenced each of the Sheltons to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections followed by five years of post-release supervision. Aggrieved, the Sheltons appeal and raise four issues. In the interest of judicial economy, we have consolidated their appeals. First, the Sheltons claim the circuit court erred when it denied their motions to suppress the evidence. Second, the Sheltons claim the circuit court erred when it allowed the prosecution to submit the evidence without a proper chain of custody. Third, the Sheltons claim the circuit court erred when it denied their proffered jury instruction on the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Finally, the Sheltons claim that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On February 20, 2006, Calvin and his brother, Reginald, were traveling through Madison County as they made their way home to Atlanta, Georgia. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Calvin, driving a rental car south on I-55, encountered Deputy Robert Sanders of the Madison County Sheriff's Department's Interstate Crime Enforcement Unit. Deputy Sanders had parked his patrol car on the side of the interstate near Gluckstadt, Mississippi. When the Sheltons passed Deputy Sanders's patrol car, Deputy Sanders pulled out onto the interstate and followed. Deputy Sanders later testified that he followed the Sheltons to “monitor their travel.”

¶ 3. According to Deputy Sanders, the Sheltons twice “fail[ed] to maintain a single lane [in that the] vehicle was observed weaving off to the shoulder of the road to the center lane.” Deputy Sanders elaborated that the Sheltons “crossed onto the fog line, then back over to the center line.” Deputy Sanders stopped Calvin. According to Deputy Sanders, he had planned to verify that the driver was not intoxicated or too tired to drive, and then give the driver a ticket for careless driving.

¶ 4. Deputy Sanders later testified that he did not know that he had stopped a rental car until he saw a bar code sticker on the window of the rental car. Deputy Sanders asked the driver of the rental car, Calvin, to get out of the car and walk to the back of it with his driver's license and the rental agreement. Calvin complied and gave Deputy Sanders a valid Georgia driver's license and a valid rental agreement. However, Deputy Sanders testified that the Sheltons did not make eye contact with him. He also testified that they rummaged through some papers when he asked them to present their rental agreement. Deputy Sanders perceived the Sheltons as being nervous.

¶ 5. Deputy Sanders asked Calvin about the details of his and Reginald's trip. Calvin told Deputy Sanders that he and Reginald were driving home to Atlanta and that they had been to a wedding in New Mexico. Deputy Sanders performed a pat-down examination of Calvin and felt a bulge in Calvin's pocket. Deputy Sanders asked Calvin what he had felt. Calvin replied that the bulge was “a couple of dollars.” ¹ In reality, the “couple of dollars” turned out to be $2,674. Calvin explained that he earned the money by working. Deputy Sanders also asked Calvin whether he had previously been arrested. Calvin responded that he had been arrested before.

¶ 6. Deputy Sanders then approached the passenger side of the rental car and spoke to Reginald. Calvin remained at the rear of the rental car. Deputy Sanders asked Reginald about his and Calvin's trip. Like Calvin, Reginald told Deputy Sanders that he and Calvin were driving home from New Mexico. However, Reginald's story was slightly different than Calvin's. Reginald did not say that he and Calvin had been to a wedding. Instead, Reginald told Deputy Sanders that he and Calvin had been visiting friends. According to Deputy Sanders, Reginald avoided making eye contact with him.

¶ 7. Deputy Sanders returned to the rear of the Sheltons' car and asked Calvin whether he would consent to a search of the rental car. Calvin declined to consent. Although he did not receive consent to search the rental car, Deputy Sanders retrieved a drug-detecting dog from his own patrol car. Deputy Sanders walked the dog around the outside of the Sheltons' rental car. The dog “alerted” by the trunk and indicated that it smelled narcotics. Deputy Sanders opened the trunk of the rental car and found a duffle bag inside the trunk. When Deputy Sanders opened the duffle bag, he found a large quantity of marijuana. Calvin and Reginald were arrested and indicted. As previously mentioned, their attempts to suppress the evidence against them were unsuccessful, and they were found guilty of possession of more than five kilograms of marijuana. Aggrieved, Calvin and Reginald appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

¶ 8. The Sheltons filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence. The circuit court denied their motion. Calvin and Reginald claim the circuit court erred.

¶ 9. “The standard of review regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion.” Lattimer v. State, 952 So.2d 206, 215 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). “Abuse of discretion will only be found where a defendant shows clear prejudice resulting from an undue lack of constraint on the prosecution or undue constraint on the defense.” Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court has clarified the appropriate standard of review in the event of such arguments, stating that:

The principal components of a determination of [whether there was] reasonable suspicion or probable cause [justifying a traffic stop] will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.

Gonzalez v. State, 963 So.2d 1138, 1141 (¶ 10) (Miss.2007) (quoting

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). “[T]he ‘first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact.’ ” Id. “Thus, historical facts are reviewed only for clear error, while determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657) (footnote omitted).

¶ 10. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3 Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution provide that an individual has the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Dies v. State, 926 So.2d 910, 917-18 (¶ 21) (Miss.2006). “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons' within the meaning of this provision.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (citations omitted). Evidence, however relevant and trustworthy, obtained from an illegal arrest or detention is inadmissible at trial. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that:

Unless the marijuana was discovered during a legal search, it may not be seized. If it was illegally seized, it may not be admitted into evidence. It is therefore important to examine the legality of the particular intrusions which enabled the police to see this marijuana to determine if these intrusions were outside the legitimate scope of the police's authority.

Gonzalez, 963 So.2d at 1140 (¶ 9) (quoting Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 785 (Miss.1988)).

¶ 11. There are several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of warrantless searches. Id. at 1141 (¶ 12). The exception central to this case is the exception for non-custodial investigatory stops, also known as Terry stops. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “The United States Supreme Court has noted that swift and necessary actions by officers ‘must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Gonzalez, 963 So.2d at 1141 (¶ 13) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). “To stop and temporarily detain is not an arrest, and the cases hold that given reasonable circumstances an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest.” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against [the following] objective standard: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 1141-42. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

¶ 12. There is a two-fold test to determine whether a law enforcement officer's search and seizure were reasonable: “(1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 1142 (¶ 14) (citation omitted). “[T]o satisfy the first prong, the law enforcement officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken...