Shepard v. Wapello County, Iowa

Citation303 F.Supp.2d 1004
Decision Date31 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. 4:02-CV-30260.,4:02-CV-30260.
PartiesKevin SHEPARD, Plaintiff, v. WAPELLO COUNTY, IOWA and Wapello County Sheriff Donald Kirkendall, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

The above resisted motion is before the Court (# 57). It is determined on the motion papers. LR 7.1(c).

I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND PRCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kevin Shepard was fired by Wapello County Sheriff Donald Kirkendall from Shepard's job as the Assistant Jail Administrator of the Wapello County, Iowa Jail. Sam Craven was the Chief Jail Administrator. Shepard claimed he was fired for providing information to Sheriff Kirkendall about alleged misconduct of Craven in connection with the transport of prisoner Patricia McKim and for making statements to County Supervisor Jerry Parker regarding the inadequacy of the Sheriffs budget for overtime hours. Shepard brought three causes of action. First, he claimed his discharge for providing information about Craven's alleged misconduct was wrongful because it violated Iowa public policy. His employer, Wapello County, was the sole defendant on this claim. See Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Iowa 2001) (citing Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988)); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282-84 (Iowa 2000). Second, he claimed Sheriff Kirkendall violated Iowa's "whistleblower" law which prevents reprisal against an employee of a political subdivision for disclosing information to a public official concerning violations of law or rule, abuse of authority, or dangers to public health or safety. Iowa Code § 70A.29(1), (3). Kirkendall was the sole defendant on this claim. Lastly, Shepard claimed that both Wapello County and Sheriff Kirkendall retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment free speech right in providing information about Craven's alleged misconduct and complaining about the budget to Supervisor Parker. The budget issue was involved only in this last claim, and both Wapello County and Kirkendall were defendants. The First Amendment claim was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The case was assigned to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). It came on before the Court and a jury for trial on July 28, 2003. On August 1, 2003 the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants on all three counts. It found damages in the total amount of $378,027 consisting of $88,027 for past lost wages and benefits, $40,000 for future lost wages and benefits, $200,000 for past mental or emotional pain and suffering and $50,000 for future mental or emotional pain and suffering. The Court submitted future lost wages and benefits on the state and federal statutory claims on an advisory basis. Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c). In memorandum findings entered August 4, 2003, the Court adopted the jury's future lost wages and benefits finding as an appropriate front pay award on the statutory claims. Judgment for the amounts found by the jury was entered on August 1, 2003. The present motion for judgment as a matter of law or for new trial was filed on August 7, 2003.

Though the grounds for judgment as a matter of law and new trial are somewhat intermixed in defendants' motion papers, it appears judgment as a matter of law is based on the contentions: (1) Sheriff Kirkendall is entitled to qualified immunity, a defense which goes to the § 1983 claim (and would by extension, result in judgment for the county); (2) the county is not liable on the § 1983 claim because the Sheriff's discharge decision did not represent county policy giving rise to municipal liability; (3) with respect to the § 1983 claim concerning the budget issue the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sheriff Kirkendall was aware of the substance of the conversation between Supervisor Parker and Shepard; and (4) there was a failure of proof on the state statutory whistleblower claim.

Defendants reassert a number of complaints about the Court's instructions and evidentiary rulings, and argue that the damage award for emotional pain and suffering is excessive. These are all potential grounds on which to base a new trial. In addition, defendants argue that a new trial should be granted because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

II.

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Legal Standard

Defendants appropriately raised all of the grounds on which they seek judgment as a matter of law in their Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) trial motions. Accordingly, these issues are properly before the Court. Id. 50(b).

Defendants' JAML issues raise both questions of law and fact. To the extent the issues incorporate questions about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the factual basis for the verdict, defendants must satisfy a high standard:

Judgment as a matter of law is proper "[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached" so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party.

Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1997)); see Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir.2003) (also quoting Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220); Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th C ir.2002). In applying this standard, all of the facts are to be looked at in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir.2002). "[T]he court must assume as proven all facts that the nonmoving party's evidence tended to show, give [him] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in [his] favor." Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220; see Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.2002). Defendants must demonstrate that all of the evidence points in their direction and "is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation sustaining" Shepard's claims. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc, 214 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Cir.2000); see Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 727 (8th Cir.2003). The Court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in considering a JAML motion. Garcia, 348 F.3d at 727 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

Factual Background

To understand the JAML issues, it is appropriate to first review the factual background of the case. What follows generally presents the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Shepard was hired as a correctional officer at the Wapello County jail in November 1997. The jail is operated by the Sheriff's department. Shepard eventually rose to the position of Assistant Jail Administrator when Wapello County opened a new law center and correctional facility in November 2000. As noted, Sam Craven was the Chief Jail Administrator. Shepard reported to Craven and Craven, in turn, reported to Sheriff Kirkendall.

By his own admission, Shepard tended to be loud, demonstrative, frequently used vulgar language, and was given to gesticulating in his interactions with others at work. He was the type of person who gave his opinions freely and forcefully. Still, he was a capable employee as evidenced by the position he occupied at the time of his discharge.

Craven had an altercation with an inmate in the course of which he suffered a serious back injury. He had surgery in April 2000 and was off work for an extensive period of time. Shepard took over the functions of his job. For a time it was doubtful whether Craven would return. Shepard hoped he would not and, it was apparent from the testimony, wanted to succeed Craven. Shepard thought he was better at the job. He testified he was more consistent in dealing with the correctional officers, backed the correctional officers up in their dealings with inmates (unlike Craven who tended to tell people what they wanted to hear), and overall was a better manager.

Craven did return to the job in August 2000. His relationship with Shepard deteriorated from that point. Craven was still experiencing problems with pain, was taking medication, and was frequently absent from work because of his medical condition. Shepard testified Craven seemed preoccupied with his back, admitted he was affected by the medication he was taking, tended to fall asleep, and generally neglected his duties. Shepard told the Sheriff what he thought about Craven's job performance and, according to Shepard, the Sheriff admitted Craven was struggling. Craven was aware of Shepard's comments to the Sheriff. He in turn complained to the Sheriff about Shepard, who he now disliked. He told the Sheriff (with some reason) he thought Shepard was out to get him and that he could not work with Shepard. Shepard testified Sheriff Kirkendall expressed his frustration with the situation, saying to Shepard something like "you guys don't like each other and I don't know what to do about it.

In the midst of this state of affairs there arrived, in May 2001, the strange tale of the transport of prisoner Patricia McKim in August 1998. McKim had been serving time in Arizona. At the conclusion of her sentence, she was turned over to Iowa authorities to be extradited to Iowa to answer to pending charges, the most serious burglary. Craven and correctional officer Katie Leinhauser (now Courtney) traveled in August 1998 by train to Tucson, Arizona to pick her up.

In early 2001 McKim was working at a refrigeration company with Shawn Smithart. She confided in Smithart about some unusual happenings during the 1998 extradition trip. Smithart passed the...

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