Shepherd v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:14-cv-01901-DAD-BAM,1:14-cv-01901-DAD-BAM |
| Parties | JUSTIN SHEPHERD, Plaintiff, v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. A hearing on the motion was held on July 5, 2016. Attorneys Anthony Sperber and Kurt Dreger appeared at that hearing on behalf of plaintiff and attorney Leila Narvid appeared for the defendant. The court has considered the parties' briefs and arguments. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant defendant's motion in part and deny it in part.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Plaintiff was hired by Kohl's to work as a material handler at its distribution center in Patterson, California in June 2006. As part of his hiring, he signed a written agreement which included a provision which stated he was an at-will employee. Plaintiff had generally positive attendance and performance reviews, and was promoted to assistant shift supervisor in 2007. Plaintiff experienced some negative performance reviews during 2010 and early 2011. In August 2011, plaintiff was diagnosed with acute and chronic anxiety and received a recommendation for medical marijuana. Plaintiff did not disclose that recommendation for, or his use of, medical marijuana to his employer. In 2012, defendant updated its personnel policies to include exceptions to its drug testing and substance abuse policies, stating (as described further below) that employees in certain states, including California, who had a valid medical marijuana recommendation would not be discriminated against on that basis in hiring, termination, or other employment actions. Plaintiff testifies he reviewed those policies and relied on them in electing to continue using medical marijuana to treat his anxiety and to cease looking for a new job.
On January 14, 2014, plaintiff strained his back at work while unloading cargo from a trailer. His supervisor advised him to go to U.S. HealthWorks, which is defendant's health care provider for worker's compensation purposes. There is some dispute about whether plaintiff was told he would be required to take a drug test in order for treatment to be provided. Ultimately, he signed a form consenting to a drug test. Two days later, on January 16, 2014, plaintiff received a call from U.S. HealthWorks advising him he had tested positive for trace amounts of marijuana metabolites. Plaintiff knew he had used marijuana while off-duty several days prior to the injury and that metabolites of the drug remained in one's system for some time, and was therefore unsurprised by the test results.
Five days after the call from U.S. HealthWorks, on January 21, 2014, plaintiff was called into a meeting with Maurice Barrera and Irma Ochoa, respectively the local operations manager and human resources manager for defendant. Barrera and Ochoa asked plaintiff about his drug test results. Plaintiff advised them he used medical marijuana to treat his anxiety. Plaintiff showed Barrera and Ochoa the recommendation for his medicinal marijuana, which he had in his locker at work. At the end of the meeting, Barrera and Ochoa suspended plaintiff from work.
The next day, on January 22, 2014, plaintiff left a voicemail for Elizabeth Barnick, a corporate human resources director and Ochoa's superior. Barnick returned plaintiff's call on January 23, 2014, and was apparently unreceptive to any assertions that plaintiff was not under the influence at work, and only used marijuana in conjunction with his valid diagnosis for anxiety, stating, "You should have chosen a different medication." On January 24, 2014, Ochoaleft plaintiff a voicemail, saying he was terminated from employment, effective immediately, with no further explanation. Shortly thereafter, he received an "associate counseling form" from defendant, which asserted he had violated three of the company's guidelines: (1) he reported to work in a condition unfit to perform his duties or under the influence of a controlled substance; (2) he violated a safety rule pertaining to specific work areas; and (3) he acted "in conflict with the interest of Kohl's." (Doc. No. 54 at 7.) This suit followed.
This case was removed here on diversity grounds from Stanislaus County Superior Court on December 1, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff's second amended complaint states seven state law causes of action: (1) disability discrimination in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"); (2) failure to engage in an interactive process in violation of the FEHA; (3) failure to reasonably accommodate in violation of the FEHA; (4) invasion of privacy in violation of the California Constitution; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) breach of implied contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (7) defamation. (Doc. No. 44.) Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 6, 2016. (Doc. No. 46.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 21, 2016. (Doc. No. 52.) Defendant filed its reply on June 28, 2016. (Doc. No. 56.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In summary judgment practice, the moving party "initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by showing that such materials "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support thefact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, "the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied." Id. at 323.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth attrial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted).
"In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact," the court draws "all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party." Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's first three causes of action...
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