Shepherd v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 30 March 1888
• Citation: 13 A. 617,43 N.J.E. 627
• Parties: SHEPHERD v. NIXON.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

13 A. 617

43 N.J.E. 627

SHEPHERD

v. NIXON.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 30, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from court of chancery.

The case in chancery is reported in the name of Nixon v. Walter, 41 N. J. Eq. 103, 3 Atl. Rep. 385.

D. J. Pancoast, for appellant. S. H. Grey, for respondent.

DEPUE, J. The legal title to lands is in controversy in this suit. Both parties claim legal title to the strip of land in dispute. The bill was filed under the act entitled "An act to compel the determination of claims to real estate in certain cases, and to quiet the title to the same." Revision, 1189. This statute confers on the equity court jurisdiction where the complainant is in peaceable possession of the lands, claiming to own the same, and his title thereto, or to any part thereof, is denied or disputed. Under this stattute, possession in fact, as distinguished from that constructive possession which in ejectment suits arises in virtue of the legal title, is essential to the jurisdiction of the court. The bill contains the necessary jurisdictional averment of possession. But the defendant having in his answer made denial of possession by the complainant, it was incumbent on the complainant to establish that fact by proof. There being no proof upon that subject, I agree with the chancellor that the suit, for that reason, cannot be maintained under the statute. I also agree with the chancellor that this act was designed for the relief of a class of persons who, being in peaceable possession, had no means of contesting the adverse claim by a suit in due course of law. Powell v. Mayo, 24 N. J. Eq. 178; Jersey City v. Lembeck, 31 N. J. Eq. 255-272; Improvement Co. v. Trustees, 37 N. J. Eq. 266. The litigation was retained in the equity court as a bill quia timet, irrespective of the statute. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit in that aspect is resisted by the appellant.

Suits in chancery to quiet title or remove a cloud are sometimes suits quia timet, and sometimes bills of peace. The distinction between those two modes of procedure is not always observed, nor will it be necessary to discuss that subject in this instance. The infirmity in this suit is fundamental. Both parties claim the legal title to the premises, and the legal remedy is adequate. The foundation of the jurisdiction of the equity court is the inability of the complainant to obtain relief by an action at law, or the inadequacy of the legal remedy. Hence it is the settled law that where the estate is legal in its nature, and the remedy at law is adequate, and full and complete justice can be done thereby, the party will be left to his legal remedy. The exception to this rule is where the case presents some special ground for equitable interposition, such as fraud, accident, or mistake, requiring the setting aside or reformation of deeds or instruments of conveyance. If these elements be wanting, a bill to establish the complainant's title is an ejectment bill pure and simple; and, if the situation of the parties be such that the complainant may have an action at law to establish his title, his remedy is in a court of law. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1399, and note; Sedg. & W. Tr. Titles Land, §§ 163-170; Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483, 484; Bailey v. Briggs, 56 N. Y. 407-415; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Lewis v. Cooks, 23 Wall. 466-470; Crane v. Conklin, 1 N. J. Eq. 346-352; Railroad Co. v. Stewart, 18 SF. J. Eq. 489; Haythorn v. Margerem, 7 N. J. Eq. 324-342; Philhower v. Todd, 11 N. J. Eq. 55; Jersey City v. Lembeck, 31 N. J. Eq. 255-272; Improvement Co. v. Trenton, 37 N. J. Eq. 267; Stew. Dig. p. 376, § 56.

The action of ejectment under the act of 1855, (Revision 326,) has greatly circumscribed the necessity of resort to equity to establish or quiet titles. By that act all fictions theretofore used in actions of ejectment were abolished. The suit is required to be commenced by summons in the name of the person claiming the premises in question as plaintiff, and describing the premises with such certainty as will distinctly apprise the defendant of their description and situation, so that from such description possession thereof may be delivered; and the declaration shall contain the additional averment of the time when the plaintiff's right to the possession accrued. Section 3 of the act provides that the defendant in the action shall be the person in possession, if the premises are occupied, or some person exercising ownership on the premises, or claiming title thereto, in case they are unoccupied. And by section 4 the plaintiff is allowed to join as a defendant with the person in possession any other person who, as landlord, remainder-man, reversioner, or otherwise, may claim title adversely to the plaintiff. Section 22 provides that any person made a defendant who is not in actual possession of the premises at the commencement of the action may appear at anytime before the time for pleading has expired, and disclaim all right or title in or to the premises; and thereupon such disclaimer, if allowed by a court or a judge, shall be entered upon the record, and the defendant shall have judgment that he recover his costs of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall, as against such defendant, be...