Sheppard v. State
Decision Date | 11 April 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 36635,36635,2 |
Citation | 98 S.E.2d 169,95 Ga.App. 507 |
Parties | Ella SHEPPARD v. The STATE |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Blount & Gibson, Waycross, for plaintiff in error.
Dewey Hayes, Solicitor-General, Douglas, for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
1. The indictment in this case alleged that the defendant on trial, being absent at the time of the commission of the crime, did procure, counsel and command two named minors to break and enter a storehouse belonging to the stepfather of one of them, from which they stole certain sums of money, and that said minors have been 'found in a state of delinquency by a court of competent jurisdiction and committed to the Georgia State Training School for boys be reason of the commission of the burglary as aforesaid.' This does not amount to an allegation that the principals have been convicted, since a conviction can result only from a criminal proceeding and proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act (Ga.L.1951, pp. 291, 302) are civil and not criminal in nature. Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32.
2. Special grounds 4 through 7 assign error on the introduction in evidence of documents relating to the juvenile court proceedings. There was no demurrer to the indictment attacking allegations setting forth the facts proved by these documents, and it was accordingly not error to admit these papers as evidence supporting the specific allegations in the indictment, regardless of whether such allegations were good in substance. Hill v. Wallace, 31 Ga.App. 72(2), 119 S.E. 468; Kelly v. Strouse & Bros., 116 Ga. 872(2), 43 S.E. 280. If it was error to admit the original juvenile court papers instead of exemplified copies, such error was harmless, since the records were admitted to be original records. Moody v. Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Appling County, 29 Ga.App. 21(6), 113 S.E. 103. However, original records of the court in which the case is being tried may be admitted in evidence. Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508(4), 43 S.E.2d 539. Code (AnnSupp.) § 24-2403, provides that in counties of the class in which Brantley County falls, and where a juvenile court has not been established, the judge of the superior court 'shall sit as the juvenile court judge' and this 'shall create no new court or judge but shall merely clothe the judge with additional powers.' Accordingaly, no error harmful to movant is shown by the use of original rather than certified copies of the juvenile court proceedings.
3. Where an indictment is not on its face so defective that a motion in arrest of judgment would lie, an objection to it must be in writing. Gilmore v. State, 118 Ga. 299(1), 45 S.E. 226. An oral objection, being ineffective for its purpose, is the equivalent of none at all, and, if no other action be taken, a waiver results.
4. 'An accessory before the fact is one who, though absent when the crime is committed, procures, counsels, or commands another to commit same.' Code, § 26-602. 'An accessory before the fact, except where it is otherwise provided, shall receive the same punishment that is prescribed for the principal in the first degree.' Code, § 26-603. 'An accessory before or after the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished, notwithstanding the principal offender may have been pardoned or otherwise discharged after his conviction or cannot be taken so as to be prosecuted and punished.' Code, § 26-606. The common-law distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal has been abolished in Georgia by the above statutes and both, where subject to the same punishment under the law, are guilty of the same offense, not separate and distinct offenses. One indicted as the perpetrator of the crime may be convicted on evidence showing him to have been an accessory before the fact. Chambers v. State, 194 Ga. 773, 22 S.E.2d 487.
5. Even where one is indicted as accessory before the fact, and even where the principal does not fall within one of the categories mentioned in Code, § 26-606, the trial of the accessory before the fact is not necessarily illegal. Both may be tried at the same time. Powers v. State, 174 Ga. 202, 162 S.E. 275. Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 422, 136 S.E. 448, 455. The conviction of the principal as distinguished from his guilt is not an element of the crime of an accessory, but merely affects the time when or manner in which an accessory can be tried. Cantrell v. State, 141 Ga. 98, 101, 80 S.E. 649; Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 251, 12 S.E.2d 64. Being a mere regulation of procedure, the purpose of...
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Curtis v. State
...ineffective for its purpose, is the equivalent of none at all, and, if no other action be taken, a waiver results.' Sheppard v. State, 95 Ga.App. 507(3), 98 S.E.2d 69, 172. To the same effect see Gilmore v. State, 118 Ga. 299, 45 S.E. 226. Consequently, the question presented by the motion ......
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...evidence in a case, it may be proven by the production of the record itself, and a certified copy is not necessary. Sheppard v. State, 95 Ga.App. 507(2), 98 S.E.2d 169; Sellers v. Page, 127 Ga. 633(5), 56 S.E. 1011; Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508, 514, 43 S.E.2d 539. See also Code § 38-304. None......
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...action be taken, a waiver results.' " Curtis v. State, 102 Ga.App. 790, 792, 118 S.E.2d 264; accord: Gilmore, supra; Sheppard v. State, 95 Ga.App. 507, 508(3), 98 S.E.2d 169. Appellee's oral motion to quash was ineffective for the purpose Judgment reversed. DEEN, McMURRAY and BANKE, P.JJ., ......