Sheriff v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 06 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-00115-GZS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
| Parties | ANDREW SHERIFF & MIKE JOHANNES, Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW GARDNER, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Before the Court are the following motions and filings: (1) the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Matthew Gardner and 440 Mount Hope Realty Trust (ECF No. 27); (2) the Motion to Reconsider by Plaintiffs Andrew Sheriff and Mike Johannes (ECF No. 29) and (3) Plaintiffs' Answer (ECF No. 28) to the Court's Order to Show Cause. Upon due consideration, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27), and DENIES the Motion to Reconsider (ECF No 29). As to the Order to Show Cause, having considered Plaintiffs' Answer, the Court now DISMISSES Plaintiff Mike Johannes from the action.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a pleading must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim, [the Court] ‘perform[s] [a] two-step analysis.'” Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015)). First, the Court “must separate the [pleading]'s factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).” Morales-Cruz v. University of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Second, the Court “must determine whether the ‘factual content . . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “This standard is ‘not akin to a “probability requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'” Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 18 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Although evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense, the court may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Rather, “[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability” from the facts. Id. at 13.
In assessing whether a complaint adequately states a claim, the Court considers the “facts and documents that are part of or incorporated into the complaint.” United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). But, the Court may also “supplement those facts with facts ‘gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.'” González v. Vélez, 864 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)). Likewise, when reviewing a pro se pleading a somewhat “less stringent” standard applies, and the Court may consider other filings by the pro se litigant in order to “understand the nature and basis of his claims.” Wall v. Dion, 257 F.Supp.2d 316, 318 (D. Me. 2003) (cleaned up).
On March 27, 2021, Plaintiff Andrew Sheriff (“Buyer”) entered into a purchase and sale agreement (“Agreement”) with Defendant 440 Mount Hope Realty Trust (“Seller”), with Defendant Matthew Gardner as Trustee (“Trustee”), for the property located at 440 Mount Hope Road in Sanford, Maine. (See Ex. A (ECF No. 1-1), PageID # 7.)[1] Defendant King Real Estate (“KRE”) acted as the Seller's Agent. (Id.) Per the terms of the Agreement, the purchase price was $359, 000 and Sheriff paid a $50, 000 “non refundable” deposit to KRE. (See Exs. A & B (ECF Nos. 1-1 & 1-2), PageID #s 7 & 12.) KRE was to hold the deposit “and act as escrow agent until closing, ” which was scheduled for April 21, 2021. (Ex. A, PageID # 7.)
As relevant here, the Agreement provided that the Seller was to correct outstanding code violations as well as perform septic service and repairs “prior to closing.” (Ex. A, PageID # 10.) Despite the April 21, 2021 closing date, it was also noted that: “Buyer would like the 1st floor unit for occupancy now for the buyer [sic] own use.” (Id.)[2]
The Agreement also had several terms governing disputes between the parties. For instance, in the event of the “Seller's failure to fulfill any of Seller's obligations, ” the Buyer was permitted to “employ all legal and equitable remedies, including without limitation, termination of [the] Agreement and return to Buyer of the [deposit].” (Id., PageID # 9.) Additionally, the Agreement had a mediation clause, stating that:
In the lead-up to the closing, Sheriff unsuccessfully attempted to renegotiate the purchase price. In the end, the Seller did not make the agreed-upon repairs to the property and the parties failed to close. (Id., PageID #s 171-73.) Sheriff's deposit was not returned. (Id., PageID #s 172-73.)
A. Procedural History
On April 28, 2021, Sheriff, together with a second pro se plaintiff, Mike Johannes, filed a complaint against the Seller, Trustee, and KRE. . The Amended Complaint identifies Johannes as a “shareholder” with a “14% investment share.” (See Am. Compl., PageID # 169.) Invoking diversity jurisdiction, the Amended Complaint asserts that Sheriff and Johannes are both “of 1290 Woodbury Ave. Portsmouth N.H. 03801, ” whereas Defendants reside in Maine. (Id., PageID #s 169-70.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Seller breached the Agreement by failing to complete repairs to the property, failing to close, and failing to settle or respond to a June 2021 request for mediation. (Id., PageID #s 171-73.) The Amended Complaint also alludes to theories of fraud and unjust enrichment and requests the Court to “quiet title” in Sheriff's favor. (Id., PageID # 175.) As to KRE, the Amended Complaint alleges “[t]here is a theory of ‘tortious interference' by the Seller's Agent, who clearly engineered the whole debacle.” (Id.) However, the only factual allegation regarding KRE is a reference to an email that a KRE broker sent to Sheriff to follow up on a phone conversation. (See id., PageID # 172 & Ex. C (ECF No. 1-3), PageID # 13.) This email, dated April 20, 2021, transmits a counteroffer from the Seller and asserts that Sheriff had occupied the property without legal rights and prevented the completion of the repair work.
In a December 23, 2021 Order, the Court granted KRE's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and ordered Johannes to show good cause why he should be allowed to continue to proceed as a pro se plaintiff in this action.[3] (See generally 12/23/21 Order (ECF No. 26).) The Seller and Trustee subsequently moved to dismiss, also requesting attorney's fees based on Plaintiffs' alleged failure to satisfy the mediation clause. (See generally Defs. Mot. (ECF No. 27).) Plaintiffs, for their part, moved to reconsider the dismissal of KRE from the action. [4]
Under Maine law, Wuestenberg v. Rancourt, 226 A.3d 227, 232 (Me. 2020) (cleaned up). Here, the Court initially construes the Amended Complaint as alleging that the Seller breached the Agreement by failing to effect the repairs listed in the Agreement and close the sale.
Defendants offer two defenses to this alleged breach. First, Defendants assert that their nonperformance is excusable because the fulfillment of the Agreement's terms was “rendered impossible by the act of . . . the other party.” (Defs. Mot., PageID # 218 (quoting Campbell v. Machias Sav. Bank, 865 F.Supp. 26, 35 (D. Me. 1994).) In support of this contention, Defendants direct the Court's attention to the KRE broker's April 20, 2021 email and Plaintiffs' own pleadings. In particular, they note Plaintiffs' statement that: “The Seller contracted to deliver the said real estate property by April 21, 2021 with all required performance completed, yet this proved impossible and unworkable in practice.” (Id., PageID # 218 (citing Am Compl., PageID # 172).) Defendants further assert that their rejected counteroffer offered more value than Plaintiffs presently allege the repairs were worth. (Id., PageID # 219 (citing Am. Compl., PageID # 174).)
To the extent Defendants rely on Plaintiffs' choice of words in the Amended Complaint, given Plaintiffs' lay status, the Court is not prepared to dismiss the claim based on the phrasing of their pleading.[5] See Vieira v. De Souza 22 F.4th 304, 311 (1st Cir. 2022) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial