Sherman v. Community Consol. School Dist. 21
Decision Date | 12 May 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88 C 9205.,88 C 9205. |
Citation | 714 F. Supp. 932 |
Parties | Robert SHERMAN, for himself and as natural guardian for his son, Richard Sherman, and the Society of Separationists, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 21 OF WHEELING TOWNSHIP, School District Superintendent Lloyd Descarpentrie, and Principal Ferne Garrett, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
The plaintiffs Robert Sherman, for himself and as natural guardian for his son, Richard Sherman, and the Society of Separationists, Inc. bring this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Township, School District Superintendant Lloyd Descarpentrie, and Principal Ferne Garrett violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, ¶ 27-3 (1980). The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The defendants' motion is denied for the following reasons.
When ruling on this motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court will "take the allegations in the complaint to be true and view them, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S.Ct. 1265, 89 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986). A complaint should be dismissed only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts which would entitle plaintiff to relief." Id. In addition, a "court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, and mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute sufficient grounds for a motion to dismiss."1 Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.1988) ( ). Finally, the court notes that "in `complex cases involving fundamental rights and important questions of public policy, such peremptory treatment as dismissal is rarely appropriate.'" DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988), quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 848 F.2d 1396, 1414 (7th Cir. 1988) (Ripple, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The pertinent facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows. Richard Sherman is a first grade student at James Whitcomb Riley Public Elementary School. At 9:05 a.m. Principal Garrett "addresses all classrooms on an intercom system telling them to:
Please rise for the all-school pledge. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
Richard is publically asked to stand, put one hand over his heart, and perform this ceremony. Complaint, ¶ 5. The Shermans, who are practicing atheists, are members of the Society of Separationists. The Society is a Maryland corporation licensed to do business in Illinois. The Society "has played a historical role in Church/State separation, government-coerced observances and other United States Constitutional issues for many years." Id. at ¶ 4.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467 (7th Cir. 1988).
Given the bare bones nature of the complaint, the court is unable to determine whether the Society has standing to pursue claims on behalf of its membership at this juncture. While it is clear that at least two members of the Society, the Shermans, would have standing to sue in their own right,3 they are already doing so. It is not clear whether any other Society members would have standing to sue as a consequence of suffering actual or threatened injuries. Cf. O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir.1982) ( ). In addition, the plaintiffs request, among other things, damages for mental distress and humiliation and punitive damages. This type of relief requires the participation of the individuals who have been harmed. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 333, 97 S.Ct. at 2434 ( ). The plaintiffs will be given twenty-one (21) days from the entry of this order to conform their complaint to this court's ruling. The Society is directed to supplement the amended complaint with factual allegations pertinent to the standing question. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. The court will determine whether the Society has standing to pursue this action on behalf of its members after the amended complaint is filed.
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, ¶ 27-3. "The Establishment Clause ... does not depend upon any showing of direct government compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether these laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court developed a "three-prong test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2577, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987). The Lemon test is as follows:
First, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion.
Id., quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111. The state's action must satisfy each prong of the test. Id.
The court cannot apply the Lemon test when resolving this motion to dismiss because an application of the test would involve the court's consideration of matters outside of the pleadings. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587, 107 S.Ct. at 2579 ( ). However, the failure of the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is all but a foregone conclusion. Several courts have expressly found that the Pledge of Allegiance may be recited in public schools without violating the Establishment Clause. See Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1981) (); Smith v. Denny, 280 F.Supp. 651, 653-54 (E.D.Ca.1968), appeal dismissed, 417 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.1969); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F.Supp. 622, 627 (W.D.Pa.1979), vacated on other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir.1980) (citing Smith). In Smith, the court characterized the Pledge as a "patriotic exercise containing ancillary references to God." Smith, 280 F.Supp. at 653.
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