Sherman v. Mulloy

• Decision Date: 30 June 1899
• Citation: 54 N.E. 345,174 Mass. 41
• Parties: SHERMAN et al. v. MULLOY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

174 Mass. 41

54 N.E. 345

SHERMAN et al. v. MULLOY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 30, 1899

COUNSEL

Francis

W. Adams, for plaintiffs.

Albert P. Worthen, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

On May 24, 1897, the plaintiffs were dealers in building material doing business under the name of the Roxbury Planing & Moulding Company. One Coffin, a contractor and builder, with whom they had had some previous dealings, applied to them for stock or material to be used in his business. They refused to deliver it to him upon credit, unless he furnished them with satisfactory security. He went away, and subsequently returned on the same day, and gave them as security a paper signed by the defendant as follows: "Boston, May 24 1897. Rox. Plng. & Mldg. Co.--Dear Sir: I, the undersigned agree to be holden for stock delivered to A.E. Coffin to the amount of two hundred dollars ($200), and agree to pay the same James Mulloy." Thereupon the plaintiffs furnished him with goods from time to time up to November 15th of the same year, amounting to about $900, and received payment on account of the sales, such that at the date of the writ there remained due them a balance of $271. At the time of signing the guaranty the defendant was indebted to Coffin to an amount exceeding $200, and about August 21, 1897, being shown by Coffin receipts of the plaintiffs which showed payments to them of sums amounting to more than $200 for goods sold after the delivery of the guaranty, he paid Coffin what he owed him. The only question in the case is whether the instrument was a continuing guaranty, or whether it ceased to be binding as soon as the plaintiffs had furnished Coffin goods to the amount of $200, and had received pay therefor. The answer to the question depends upon the meaning of the instrument, according to ordinary rules of interpretation. Does the paper indicate an intention on the part of the defendant that the plaintiffs should sell goods to Coffin from time to time until notified to stop, receiving payments that might be made, and that the defendant should be liable for the balance to an amount not exceeding $200, or does it indicate merely an intention to authorize a sale of goods to an amount not exceeding $200 in all, with the guaranty as security? The language of the guaranty is such that its meaning is not clear. It seems to us the more natural construction to decide that the defendant agrees to be holden, and agrees to pay, "for stock delivered to ...