Sherman v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,29 |
| Citation | 421 A.2d 80,288 Md. 636 |
| Parties | Robert SHERMAN v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Towson, for appellant.
Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.
The appellant, Robert Sherman, a member of the Maryland bar since 1965, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for the unlawful and willful use of his client's funds in violation of Maryland Code , Art. 10, Section 44. He argues on appeal that reversible error was committed when, contrary to Maryland Rule 758 a, the presiding judge permitted the jurors to have with them in the jury room during their deliberations the five count indictment exhibiting two counts on which the court had earlier entered judgments of acquittal. Since we agree that ignoring the injunction of Rule 758 a requires that appellant's conviction be vacated, we will reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 1
Mr. Sherman was indicted on August 9, 1979, for five offenses arising from the alleged unauthorized personal use of funds entrusted to his care belonging to Ms. Helen Kushnick, a client of the appellant since 1972 and the complainant in this case. In abbreviated form, the Baltimore City Grand Jury by indictment charged Mr. Sherman with: Count One-larceny after trust (Md. Code , Art. 27 § 353) (repealed prospectively by Laws of 1978, ch. 849, § 4); Count Two-fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary (Md. Code , Art. 27, § 132; and three counts relating to willfully commingling his own funds with those of his client or using his client's funds for purposes other than those for which the moneys were entrusted to him, each in violation of Art. 10, § 44. 2 During the trial of the appellant on this indictment, Judge J. Harold Grady granted motions for judgment of acquittal as to the larceny after trust charge (first count), and one of the charges alleging a violation of Art. 10, § 44 (third count). The judge then allowed the jury, over appellant's objection, to take with it into the jury room the indictment which contained the five counts, including the two which had been earlier dismissed. Though the appellant was acquitted by the jury of two of the remaining charges, he was found guilty of Count Five, the unlawful and willful use of Ms. Kushnick's funds. Mr. Sherman noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but in advance of consideration of the matter by that court, we granted certiorari.
In explaining why we agree with the appellant that providing the jury during its deliberations with the entire indictment, including the two dismissed counts, constitutes not only error but reversible error, the appropriate starting point is Maryland Rule 758 a, which the appellant contends, and the appellee now concedes, was contravened by the trial court. That rule reads:
a. Items Taken to Jury Room
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may, with the approval of the court, take into the jury room all exhibits which have been admitted into evidence and charging documents which reflect only the charges upon which the jury is to deliberate, subject only to the safeguards imposed by the court for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors. (Emphasis added).
The State, as it must, recognizes the failure here to comply with the unambiguous dictate of Rule 758 a, but nevertheless attempts to parry Mr. Sherman's claim that he is entitled to a new trial by a two-prong counterattack. First, the Attorney General contends that the matter is not properly before this Court for review because the issue was not preserved for appellate consideration; and second, assuming that it is, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We address these assertions in the order presented.
Factually, the record discloses that immediately before closing arguments to the jury were to commence, Judge Grady invited counsel to the bench and the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: By virtue of certain rulings of something on the record, the jury will consider counts two, four and five of the Indictment. In order to direct their attention to those counts, I have prepared a verdict sheet which reads counts two, fraudulent misappropriation by fiduciary, and under that I have guilty-not guilty; count four, unlawful commingling of counsel and client's funds, guilty-not guilty. Count five, unlawful use of client's funds, guilty-not guilty. I intend to submit this document to the jury, and the purpose of numbering the counts is to direct their attention to the counts that they are considering.
MR. MURPHY (Counsel for Mr. Sherman): I have no objection to labeling but I object to the count itself being submitted to the jury, and I object to the procedure used because I don't like the idea the court has stricken certain counts, and so forth. I think to submit this issue for a determination without reference to the fact they are deliberating only as to two, four and five, and you have taken care of certain other counts.
From this, the State argues that "(a)lthough counsel may have had the " indictment" in mind when he made the objection, that is not what he said," and that Mr. Murphy's continual reference to "count," rather than "indictment," was insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Frankly, we do not comprehend the thrust of the Attorney General's argument, for whether appellant objected to the submission to the jury of the indictment as a whole, on the one hand, or the inclusion of the dismissed counts, on the other, makes no difference in our view. While we do agree that the articulation of the objection was not a paragon of clarity and it would have been preferable to have specifically referred to the Rule, we have no difficulty discerning the precise nature of the appellant's contention, which was in the trial court, as it remains before this Court, that the submission of the "stricken counts" to the jury was improper. 3
Having determined that the issue is properly before us, we now turn to the State's substantive contention-that submitting to the jury the entire indictment for consideration during its deliberations constitutes harmless error. In Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976), in reexamining the doctrine of harmless error to be applied in Maryland in light of the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), this Court concluded:
that when an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed "harmless" and a reversal is mandated. (Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976); see also Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 155-159, 406 A.2d 415, 421-23 (1979); Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 150-154, 355 A.2d 455, 463-65 (1976).)
The State attempts to buttress its contention that submitting the indictment to the jury, replete with the two counts on which motions for judgment of acquittal had been granted, was harmless by referring us to various cautionary comments of the trial judge made to the jury. In particular, appellee emphasizes Judge Grady's admonishment that "charges are not evidence" and that "the fact that criminal charges have been brought against the defendant ... raises no presumption whatsoever of guilt on his part." 4 Although we in no way denigrate the use of the cautionary instructions, which in some circumstances will render an error harmless, the unequivocal command of the Rule 758 a admits of no such cure. Prior to the adoption of this rule, effective July 1, 1977, that which was to be taken by the jury for use in their deliberations was left to the discretion of the trial court. See former Maryland Rules 757 and 558, Md. Code (1957, 1977 Repl. Vol.), Volume 9B; Raimondi v. State, 265 Md. 229, 230-231, 288 A.2d 882, 884 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 293, 34 L.Ed. 219 (1972); Darby v. State, 3 Md.App. 407, 410-411, 239 A.2d 584, 587-88 (1967), cert. denied, 251 Md. 748 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105, 89 S.Ct. 911, 21 L.Ed.2d 801 (1969). However in adopting Rule 758 a, this Court acceded to the recommendation of our Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure that the potential prejudice arising from the submission to a jury of counts that have earlier been eliminated was sufficient to warrant a change from the prior practice. Thus, the rule provides in mandatory terms that no dead counts of a charging document be before the jury during its final deliberations. Whether the practice under the rule since its adoption has demonstrated a lack of need for such a stringent requirement we do not here consider, but observe that as long as it is a part of the law, it is not a guide to the practice of law but a precise rubric established to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice and is to be read and followed. See Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 463, 408 A.2d 1302, 1317 (1979) and cases cited therein. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive, in view of the secret character of jury deliberations, how it is possible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the dead counts played no part in the deliberations of the jury and its determination of guilt under the fifth count. Consequently, we vacate the conviction, and order a new trial of the appellant on the fifth count of the indictment.
JUDGMENT OF CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE FIFTH COUNT OF...
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