Sherrod v. State
| Decision Date | 24 July 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-3462,90-3462 |
| Citation | 582 So.2d 814 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Seabron SHERROD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 582 So.2d 814, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1917 |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Seabron Sherrod appeals the trial court's denial of his motions for mistrial. We reverse.
Sherrod asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial which were based on the repeated improper comments by a prosecution witness and the prosecutor. The improper comments by the prosecution witness, police officer Detter, were that (1) the place of arrest was a high crime, high prostitution area; (2) the place of arrest is a bad area, it is a bad area for drugs; (3) he "hit this area quite often;" and (4) that he proceeded to the alley quickly since often there is a lookout on the corner. The improper comments by the prosecutor occurred during closing argument when he alluded to the criminal character of the neighborhood. According to Sherrod, these improper comments identifying the location of arrest as a high crime area unduly prejudiced him.
In Gillion v. State, 573 So.2d 810 (Fla.1991), the Supreme Court held that under some circumstances, the mere identification of a location as a high crime area can unduly prejudice a defendant who is arrested there, but it is not always unduly prejudicial. Whether undue prejudice exists depends on the facts of each case. Id.
Under a similar factual situation this court in Beneby v. State, 354 So.2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) held that the trial court reversibly erred in denying appellant's motions for mistrial. The resolution of Beneby was approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Gillion, supra. We conclude, therefore, that the only inference drawn from the witness' testimony and the prosecutor's comments was patently prejudicial to Sherrod. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sherrod's motions for mistrial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED for a new trial.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lelieve v. State
...comments that the defendant was arrested in a high-crime area are often prejudicial and constitute reversible error, Sherrod v. State, 582 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), the supreme court has held that such comments do not per se warrant reversal. Gillion v. State, 573 So.2d 810 (Fla.1991).......
-
Goodwin v. State
...has failed to demonstrate such an error. We distinguish Wheeler v. State, 690 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Sherrod v. State, 582 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), Hutchinson v. State, 580 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), Black v. State, 545 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and Beneby v. State, ......
-
Wheeler v. State, 96-1199
...prejudice exists depends on the facts of each case." Id. at 812. Following Gillion, our court reversed a conviction in Sherrod v. State, 582 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), where the police officer had referred to the area of arrest as a "high crime, high prostitution area." The improper tes......
-
Latimore v. State, 4D01-1789.
...by police witnesses combined to unduly prejudice the defendant with their "guilt by association" implications. 3. Sherrod v. State, 582 So.2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Dorsey v. State, 639 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Lowder v. State, 589 So.2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA ...