Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 27 February 1956
• Docket Number: No. 150,150
• Citation: 350 U.S. 318,76 S.Ct. 386,100 L.Ed. 364
• Parties: W. A. SHIELDS, Petitioner, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

350 U.S. 318

76 S.Ct. 386

100 L.Ed. 364

W. A. SHIELDS, Petitioner,

v ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 150.

Argued Jan. 19, 1956.

Decided Feb. 27, 1956.

Mr. Truman M. Hobbs, Montgomery, Ala., for petitioner.

Mr. Norman C. Shepard, Wilmington, N.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, an independent contractor in the business of unloading gasoline, was instructed by the consignee to unload a tank car of gasoline which had been hauled by respondent Atlantic Coast Line and which was located at the time on a siding in respondent's freight yards. In order to release the gasoline through a hose attached to the bottom of the car, it was necessary to go to the dome on top of the car, remove the dome cap, and open a valve inside the dome. While petitioner and his helper were engaged in opening the valve, the board on which they were standing broke and petitioner fell, sustaining injuries. There is no dispute that the board was defective. It was a wooden board over seven feet long attached to the side of the tank near the top just below the dome by means of two triangular steel braces extending from the side of the tank at either end of the board.

The question presented here is whether this device, which for convenience we shall call a dome running board, is a safety appliance within the meaning of §§ 2 and 3 of the Safety Appliance Act of 1910. Act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, §§ 2 and 3, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. §§ 11 and 12, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 11, 12.

Petitioner brought suit in the District Court, alleging in one count of his amended complaint absolute liability for a violation of the Act and in a second count common-law negligence. The jury returned a general verdict in his favor. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence count alone, holding that the trial court erred in instructing that the dome running board was a safety appliance. 220 F.2d 242.¹ We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions raised as to the proper interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act. 350 U.S. 819, 76 S.Ct. 61.

Section 2 of the Safety Appliance Act of 1910 provides in part:

'* * * all cars requiring secure ladders and secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards * * *.'

Section 3 provides:

'That within six months from the passage of this Act the Interstate Commerce Commission, after hearing, shall designate the number, dimensions, location, and manner of application of the appliances provided for by section two * * * and thereafter said number, location, dimensions, and manner of application as designated by said commission shall remain as the standards of equipment to be used on all cars subject to the provisions of this Act, unless changed by an order of said Interstate Commerce Commission * * * and failure to comply with any such requirement of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be subject to a like penalty as failure to comply with any requirement of this Act * * *.'²

Under the authority of § 3, the Commission in 1911 promulgated regulations still in force providing in detail for one running board running around the perimeter, or at least the full length of the sides, of tank cars.³ Such a board enables a trainman to walk the length of a tank car between cars adjoining it on either end. The regulations make no mention whatever by any name of dome running boards. Petitioner nevertheless contends that the dome running board is a required running board affording him protection under § 2.

The obvious purpose of a dome running board is to provide a secure flooring for those who must perform operations in connection with the tank car dome. Clearly the dome running board has major importance in loading and unloading operations. But a railroad man of over twenty-five years' experience testified that it also may be used to stand on in order to pass hand signals or repair minor troubles occurring while the train is en route. The dome running board is an integrated part of the exterior equipment of a tank car;⁴ it functions as a permanently attached outside 'floor' near the dome of the car. The testimony showed that railroad men, including respondent's employees often refer to the dome running board as a running board. We hold that it comes within the meaning of the term 'running boards' as used in § 2.

The fact that in Commission in its 1911 regulations under § 3 has not specified uniform standards for dome running boards is not a binding administrative determination that they are not running boards for the purposes of § 2. The reason for the omission is apparently the Commission's view that only appliances affording safety while the train is moving need be standardized. But there is no showing that the regulations purport to exhaust by implication each category of statutory appliances listed in § 2. Omission of dome running boards of itself shows no more than that the Commission has not standardized all possible running boards within § 2. Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401, 45 S.Ct. 163, 69 L.Ed. 350, is consistent with our view. There the Court itself interpreted the language in § 2 requiring grab irons 'on their roofs' of 'cars having ladders' to apply only to cars having roofs. It then pointed to the Commission's failure to standardize a grab iron over a standardized ladder on a tender without a roof only as a supporting 'practical construction' of the section. Moreover, the Commission in that case, having standardized the ladder, had no alternative but to interpret the statutory word 'roofs' by either standardizing a grab iron or not standardizing it. Here no such practical construction is implied by the failure to standardize.

Even if the dome running board be properly characterized as a running board, respondent contends that, since § 2 refers to 'cars requiring * * * secure running boards,' the Commission's failure to standardize dome running boards under § 3 constitutes an administrative determination that they are not required within the meaning of § 2. The purpose of § 3 was to provide uniformity in the location and characteristics of those appliances upon which railroad men, working 'always, in haste, and often in darkness and storm,' must 'instinctively' rely in the hazards of their employment. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Williams, 242 U.S. 462, 466, 37 S.Ct. 128, 129, 61 L.Ed. 437.⁵ Effectuation of such a purpose would require standardization of running boards which extend the length of train cars. But considerations of administrative expertise railroad men, working 'always in haste, applicable to the effectuation of the purpose of § 2. The purpose of the latter section was 'to convert the general legal duty of exercising ordinary care to provide' safety appliances on cars 'requiring (them) for their proper use' into a 'statutory, an absolute and imperative duty, of making them 'secure." Illinois Central R. Co. v. Williams, supra. The purpose of § 3 is to standardize the appliances required by § 2. But it does not follow that appliances necessary and furnished for the safe use of the car, although not standardized under § 3, are not within the sweep of § 2. Clearly, those who work on train cars may necessarily have to rely on the security of a dome running board, although the purposes of that appliance may not require any unhesitating reliance on its uniform characteristics.

In the Williams case, supra, this Court held that the Commission's statutory power to postpone the effective date of its standardization regulations under § 3 did not suspend the railroad's duty under § 2 to make appliances secure. There was no question that the appliance in Williams was required, but the teaching of the case is that Commission action under § 3 does not exhaust the commands of § 2. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Carson, 9 Cir., 169 F.2d 734, holding a railroad liable under § 2 for defects in an independent wooden club used to help turn a brake wheel where the wheel itself complied with the Commission's regulations, which made no mention of the club. We conclude that failure of the Commission to standardize the dome running board need not mean that it was not a required running board under § 2. To hold otherwise would relieve railroads from the absolute duty under § 2 to make safety appliances secure whenever new appliances are adopted which have not yet been standardized by the Commission.

Both the respondent and the manufacturer of the tank car considered that the dome running board was required for the proper use of the car. The railroad industry itself has recognized that tank cars require secure dome running boards. The Association of American Railroads safety appliance standards, largely identical to the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations, contain detailed uniform specifications for dome running boards,⁶ and compliance with those safety standards is required for interchange of cars between lines. ⁷ Petitioner used the dome running board, not simply because it happened to be there, but also because it had to be there for him to perform his duties safely, and performance of his duties was essential to the operation of the tank car. At best, appliances standardized in Commission regulations represent the minimum of safety equipment, and there is no prohibition of additional safety appliances. If a dome running board is provided by the railroad or the makers of the car and used by the railroad as an appliance necessary for the use of the car, it must be a safe board as required by § 2. Cf. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 37, 36 S.Ct. 482, 483, 60 L.Ed. 874.

The Commission, in a brief filed here, contends that only appliances designed to insure safety while the train is in movement are within § 2, and, therefore, a dome running board cannot be a statutory running board. No case is cited to support this construction. Nothing in the language of § 2 itself or in its...