Shields v. Baker Hughes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CW 03-816.,CW 03-816. |
| Citation | 866 So.2d 338 |
| Parties | Brian T. SHIELDS, et ux. v. BAKER HUGHES, INC., et al. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Richard A. Chopin, Jason P. Foote, Chopin, Wagar, Cole, Richard, Reboul & Kutcher, LLP, Metairie, LA, for Defendants/Applicants, Baker Hughes, Inc., et al.
Elwood C. Stevens, Jr., Attorney at Law, Morgan City, LA, for Plaintiffs/Respondents, Brian T. Shields, Claudette Pereira Shields.
Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and JIMMIE C. PETERS, Judges.
The issue in this application for supervisory writs is whether the spouse of a non-seaman injured offshore worker can recover nonpecuniary loss of consortium damages arising from the worker's injuries. The defendants raised the issue in a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court rejected. We granted the writ application for the sole purpose of calling the matter up for consideration of the issue on the merits. For the following reasons, we now deny the writ application and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The plaintiffs in this matter are Brian T. Shields and his wife, Claudette Pereira Shields. In their suit for damages filed under the general maritime law, the Shields named several defendants,1 including Baker Hughes, Inc.; Baker Atlas, a division of Baker Hughes, Inc.; Baker Hughes Inteq n/k/a Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.; Western Atlas, Inc.; and Western Atlas International, Inc. (referred to collectively as "the Baker Group"). The plaintiffs alleged in their petition that Mr. Shields, a Halliburton Energy Services employee, was injured on March 19, 2000, while working on the "Noble Jim Thompson," a movable offshore drilling unit (drilling unit) located on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana. The accident occurred while Mr. Shields and employees of the Baker Group were involved in connecting a Halliburton sump packer to a tool to be placed in the drilling hole on the drilling unit. The Shields asserted that while the Baker employees were moving the sump packer with the use of an e-line, "suddenly and without warning" the Baker e-line operator caused the sump packer to be moved upward too quickly. The Shields alleged that this action caused Mr. Shields to lose his balance, fall backward, and straddle an I-beam affixed to the rig floor, resulting in injuries to Mr. Shields.
In their suit, Mr. Shields sought general and special damages and Mrs. Shields sought damages for loss of consortium under the general maritime law. Subsequently, the Baker Group filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Mrs. Shields' claim for nonpecuniary loss of consortium damages. The trial court denied the Baker Group's motion, and this writ application followed.
OPINIONLouisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(B) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It is undisputed that Mr. Shields was a non-seaman offshore worker injured in international waters, that he was not an employee of the Baker Group, and that the Baker Group was not the owner of the drilling unit. Thus, the sole issue on review is whether, as a matter of law, the wife of a non-seaman offshore worker injured in international waters is permitted to recover nonpecuniary damages for loss of consortium under the general maritime law against a non-employer defendant.
The Baker Group asserts that such a claim "is clearly prohibited by more than a decade of federal and state jurisprudence following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990)." The Shields assert that
Clearly, the Miles Court has instructed that "there is no recovery for loss of society [a nonpecuniary loss] in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman." Id. at 33, 111 S.Ct. at 326. However, we do not find the reach of Miles to be as pervasive as suggested by the Baker Group.
In Warren v. Sabine Towing & Transportation Co., 01-573 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 831 So.2d 517, writs denied, 02-2926, 02-2927, 02-2936 (La.2/14/03), 836 So.2d 116, 117, this court recently considered the application of Miles in the context of the death of a seaman and the resultant wrongful death claim for nonpecuniary damages against certain non-employer manufacturers. In doing so, we stated:
In Miles, a seaman was killed by a fellow crew member while the ship on which they served was docked. The seaman's mother sued the ship's operators, the charterer, and the ship's owner, alleging negligence under the Jones Act for failure to prevent the assault on her son and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under the general maritime law. She sought damages for loss of society, among other damages.
While recognizing that there is a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, the Miles Court found a limitation on the remedies available under such a cause of action. Specifically, the Court explained that DOHSA, applicable to deaths on the high seas, explicitly forecloses recovery for nonpecuniary loss such as loss of society. Additionally, while acknowledging that the Jones Act does not explicitly limit damages to any particular form, the Court considered FELA (interpreted early on as providing for only pecuniary damages), which Congress incorporated unaltered into the Jones Act, and concluded that "Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages as well." Id. at 32, 111 S.Ct. at 325. Thus, the Court held that "[t]here is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action." Id. Moreover, concerning the plaintiff's cause of action under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness, the Court concluded: "It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault [unseaworthiness claim] than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence [Jones Act claim]." Id. at 32-33, 111 S.Ct. at 326. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there is likewise no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.
Although the decedent in Warren was also a seaman and his widow sought wrongful death nonpecuniary damages, we nevertheless found it necessary to consider the relationship between the decedent and the non-employer/manufacturer defendants in determining the remedies available to the plaintiff. We found crucial in Warren that, "[w]hile [the decedent] was a seaman covered by the Jones Act vis-à-vis his employer, he was not a seaman covered by the Jones Act vis-à-vis the manufacturer-defendants in this case." Id. at 537. We explained:
In the instant case, [the decedent] was clearly a Jones Act seaman for purposes of his employment with [his employer]. However, that is where the similarity with Miles ends. [The widow's] cause of action for wrongful death damages under the Jones Act or the general maritime law for unseaworthiness was no longer extant after her settlement with [the employer]. All that remained after that settlement was a garden-variety wrongful death cause of action under the general maritime law for third-party fault for failure to warn. Miles did not explicitly address the remedies available under such circumstances, nor do we find that it addressed that issue implicitly. Thus, we do not find that Miles precludes the application of state-law wrongful death remedies, including nonpecuniary damages.
Id. at 536 (footnote omitted).
In that case, the cause of action against the non-employer manufacturers occurred in territorial waters. Accordingly, we ultimately determined that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996), allowed application of state-law wrongful death remedies, including nonpecuniary damages, under the specific facts of Warren. As in Warren, at the very least the nature of Mr. Shields' relationship with the Baker Group removes Mrs. Shields' claim for nonpecuniary damages from the preclusive effect of Miles. However, unlike Warren, this cause of action did not arise in territorial waters. Still, in Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So.2d 634, 638 (La.1992),cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819, 113 S.Ct. 65, 121 L.Ed.2d 32 (1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court instructed that "a Louisiana state court should respect Louisiana law unless there is some federal impediment to application of that law contained in federal legislation or a clearly applicable rule in the general maritime law." In fact, the court explained: "As a matter of logic and legally permissible principle, Louisiana may afford a remedy not traditionally found in the maritime law, provided that the remedy neither conflicts with substantive maritime law nor impermissibly interferes with the requirement of uniformity." Id. at 639.
As set forth above, the Jones Act is not implicated vis-à-vis the Baker Group because the Baker Group was not Mr. Shields' employer and because Mr. Shields was not a seaman. Further, the Baker Group was not the owner of the drilling unit such that the Shields' claim against the Baker Group is not for unseaworthiness. Additionally, because this is...
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