Shields v. State, 3--775A132

• Decision Date: 25 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 3--775A132,3--775A132
• Citation: 348 N.E.2d 36,169 Ind.App. 238
• Parties: Daniel Lee SHIELDS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 36

348 N.E.2d 36

169 Ind.App. 238

Daniel Lee SHIELDS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 3--775A132.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

May 25, 1976.

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Defendant-appellant Daniel Lee Shields was charged by affidavit of the offense of first degree burglary. ¹ Upon his plea of guilty as charged, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found the defendant guilty of the offense of first degree burglary and sentenced him to the custody of the Board of Managers of the Indiana State Reformatory for a period of not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years. Appellant did not file an appeal.

Approximately one year later, appellant filed his petition for post-conviction relief. After hearing thereon, the trial court entered it findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied appellant's petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant subsequently perfected the present appeal.

In reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief, this court must be mindful that such a proceeding is in the nature of a civil action. Hoskins v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 291, 294, 302 N.E.2d 499, 500. Where a petitioner for such relief has been unsuccessful in the trial court, he stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and must demonstrate on appeal that such judgment is contrary to law. Pettit v. State (1974), Ind.App., 310 N.E.2d 81. Thus, such an appellant must show that the evidence before the trial court was without conflict and led to but one conclusion, and that the trier of fact reached a contrary conclusion. Souerdike v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 204, 206, 108 N.E.2d 136; Marshall v. Ahrendt (1975), Ind.App., 332 N.E.2d 223.

On appeal, appellant first contends that he was not afforded adequate effective representation by his trial counsel. He recognizes that our courts have held that there is a presumption that an attorney has fully discharged his duty to his client, and that it requires strong and convincing proof to overcome such presumption. Robbins v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 273, 278, 274 N.E.2d 255. Thus, a petitioner must show that the actions, or inactions, of his trial counsel made the proceedings a sham or mockery of justice and shocking to the conscience of the court. Haddock v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 593, 298 N.E.2d 418. In determining whether a petitioner has overcome the presumption of competent counsel, this court must look to the totality of circumstances in each case. Payne v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 221, 301 N.E.2d 514; Blackburn v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686.

Appellant was the sole witness at the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Because of appellant's interest in the outcome of the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, his testimony at such hearing must be subjected to careful scrutiny both by the trial court and this court on appeal. Hunter v. Dowd (7th Cir. 1952), 198 F.2d 13.

The facts and inferences therefrom most favorable to the appellee State which were established by appellant's testimony are that he consulted briefly with his attorney before entering his guilty plea, that he had no knowledge of any witnesses or evidence to offer in his defense, that another charge was pending against him, and that his trial counsel bargained a dismissal or such second charge of first degree burglary in exchange for appellant's guilty plea to the charge here at...