Shields v. State

• Decision Date: 31 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 287,287
• Citation: 257 Md. 384,263 A.2d 565
• Parties: Robert Edward SHIELDS v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 384

257 Md. 384

263 A.2d 565

Robert Edward SHIELDS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 287.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 31, 1970.

Arthur Dale Leach, Hyattsville (Paulson, Leach & Wilkinson, Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellant.

Francis X. Pugh, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., and James E. Kenkel, State's Atty. and Deputy State's Atty., Respectively, for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant, Robert Edward Shields, and his attorney have made a valiant attempt to prevent his extradition to Ohio. He is charged there with having in his possession burglar's tools and having on six occasions forced entry into coin-receiving devices in telephone booths. The incidents in question it is said took place on October 1, 1968. The Governor of Maryland issued a warrant of rendition. Shields sued out the writ of habeas corpus testing the validity of his detention. After a hearing in the Circuit Court for Rpince George's County, Judge Meloy remanded Shields to custody. We shall affirm the action of Judge Meloy.

Although he does not characterize them under these headings, the contentions of Shields may be set forth and summarized as follows: (1) Shields 'proved beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence' that he was not in the demanding state on October 1 but was in Maryland; (2) the evidence against Shields was insufficient since there was a conflict between the witnesses; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit Shields' witnesses to present impeachment testimony relative to prior inconsistent testimony given by a state's witness; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to permit Shields on cross-examination to ask the names of the eye witnesses of Shields' alleged presence in the State of Ohio on the critical date; (5) double jeopardy; and (6) that the fugitive warrant had expired by its terms.

I.

Shields went to great lengths in an attempt to establish his presence in the State of Maryland at the time of the alleged crime, including testimony from the same attorney who represented him at the hearing before the Governor's representative, the habeas corpus hearing and in this Court. Although in other circumstances the evidence presented might be convincing, Shields cannot be said to have met the test which would entitle him to release because he was positively identified by two witnesses as the person they saw in two different telephone booths in Cleveland on the day in question.

Our latest pronouncement in this field is to be found in Solomon v. Warden, etc., 256 Md. 297, 260 A.2d 68 (1969), where Judge McWilliams said for the Court:

'The issuance of a warrant of rendition by the Governor of the asylum state raises a presumption that the accused is the fugitive wanted and it is sufficient to justify his arrest, detention and delivery to the demanding state. See, e. g., Johnson v. Warden (etc.), 244 Md. 384, 388, 223 A.2d 584 (1966); Koprivich v. Warden (etc.), 234 Md. 465, 468-469, 200 A.2d 49 (1964), and the cases therein cited. In order to rebut the presumption the accused must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged offense or that he was not the person named in the warrant, and upon proof of the one or the other he is entitled to be released. Id. Moreover, in this kind of habeas corpus proceeding '(t)he guilt or innocence of the accused may not be inquired into * * * except as it may be involved in identifying the person * * * charged with the crime.' Code, Art. 41, § 34 (1965 Repl. Vol.). It should be noted also that the presumption must be rebutted by 'overwhelming' evidence, Mason v. Warden (etc.), 203 Md. 659, 661, 99 A.2d 739 (1953), thus '(m)ere contradictory evidence on the question of presence in or absence from the state demanding the accused is not sufficient * * *.' Koprivich v. Warden (etc.), supra, 234 Md. at 469, 200 A.2d at 52.' Id. at 300-301, 260 A.2d at 70. (emphasis in original)

Cases in this state holding to the doctrine that mere contradictory evidence on the question of presence in or absense from the state demanding the accused is not sufficient are numerous and no useful purpose would be served in reviewing them. Perhaps one of the best examples is State ex rel. Channell v. Murphy, 202 Md. 650, 96 A.2d 473, cert. den. 346 U.S. 824, 74 S.Ct. 40, 98 L.Ed. 349 (1953), where the accused contended that he had conclusively shown that he was in Maryland rather than in California (the demanding state) at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. The crimes were committed on November 30 and December 1, 1952. The accused produced eight witnesses to establish the fact that he was in Baltimore on November 29, November 30 and December 1. To establish his presence in California the state produced an eye witness. It also produced a handwriting expert who identified registration cards in California made at a relevant time. Judge (now Chief Judge) Hammond in the opinion for the Court in that case said:

'Judge Collins, in State ex rel. Zack v. Kriss, (195 Md. 559, 74 A.2d 25 (1950)), summed up the authorities as follows, after saying that the evidence was merely contradictory as to whether the applicant was absent from the State: 'It is not the equivalent of an undisputed fact. This is not the proper proceeding to try the question of alibi. It has not been clearly and satisfactorily shown beyond a reasonable doubt, to overcome the otherwise controlling presumption, that the appellant is not a fugitive from Pennsylvania. The record here before us discloses 'only a conflict of evidence'. The evidence to overcome the presumption must be overwhelming.' We find that this language is fully applicable under the facts of the instant case.' Id. 202 Md. at 654-655, 96 A.2d at 475.

In South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292 (1933), the ratio was twelve witnesses who placed the accused in the demanding state at the time of the crime to twenty who placed him in the asylum state. The Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered the release of the petitioner. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, saying:

'Stated otherwise, he should not have been released unless it appeared beyond reasonable doubt that he was without the state of South Carolina when the alleged offense was committed and, consequently, could not be a fugitive from her justice.

'The record discloses only a conflict of evidence; the requirement which we have indicated has not been met; and the challenged judgment must be reversed.' Id. at 422, 53 S.Ct. at 671.

The Court in that case also said at page 419, 53 S.Ct. at page 670, 'The record presents an irreconcilable conflict of evidence. It is not possible to say with certainty where the truth lies.'

The testimony adduced by Shields did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in Ohio at the time of the occurrence of the alleged crime-and we cannot 'say with certainty where the truth lies.'

II.

The attempt of Shields to have us determine the credibility of the witnesses by ruling that certain alleged inconsistencies in the evidence of the state's witnesses makes their testimony unworthy of belief is simply an effort to have us abrogate the longstanding rule that a mere conflict in testimony is not sufficient to warrant release of the accused. Suffice it to say, however, that no conflicts were presented which make the testimony so inherently improbable as to be unworthy of belief.

III.

It is apparent that Shields, in his contention that the trial judge erred in not permitting him to present testimony to impeach prior testimony of a state's witness, misunderstands the extradition process.

We have already quoted from Solomon v. Warden, etc., supra, where Judge McWilliams referred to the presumption arising from the issuance of a warrant of rendition and to the fact that the guilt or innocense of the accused is not inquired into in this kind of habeas corpus proceeding.

The normal rules of evidence and procedure do not apply in an extradition hearing. United States ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 558 (2nd Cir. 1967), citing Johnson v. Warden, etc., 244 Md. 384, 389, 223 A.2d 584 (1966). Frequently such hearings proceed on affidavits where the opportunity to confront, cross-examine and impeach obviously is not present.

In Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917), Mr. Justice Clarke gave a bit of the history of and the philosophy behind our extradition laws:

'The provision of the Federal Constitution quoted (Art. IV, § 2), with the change of only two words, first appears in the Articles of Confederation of 1781, where it was used to describe and to continue in effect the practice of the New England Colonies with respect to the extradition of criminals. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L.Ed. 717. The language was not used to express the law of extradition as usually prevailing among independent nations but to provide a summary executive proceeding by the use of which the closely associated States of the Union could promptly aid one another in bringing to trial persons accused of crime by preventing their finding in one State an asylum against the processes of justice of another. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549. Such a provision was necessary to prevent the very general requirement of the state constitutions that persons accused of crime shall be tried in the county or district in which the crime shall have been committed from becoming a shield for the guilty rather than a defense for the innocent, which it was intended to be. Its design was and is, in effect, to eliminate, for this purpose, the boundaries of States, so that each may reach out and bring to speedy trial offenders against...