Shifflett v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 334,334
• Parties: Phillip Morris SHIFFLETT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 227

4 Md.App. 227

242 A.2d 182

Phillip Morris SHIFFLETT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 334.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 29, 1968.

Carville M. Downes, Towson, Arthur S. Alperstein, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant.

William E. Brannan, Asst.Atty.Gen., Baltimore, Francis B. Burch, Atty.Gen., Baltimore, Samuel A. Green, Jr., State's Atty. for Baltimore County, John J. Lucas, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore County, Towson, on the brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Appellant was indicted in Baltimore County for the crime of (1) common law escape, and (2) escape in violation of Section 139 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code (1967 Repl. Vol.) which makes it a felony for any person 'legally detained and confined in the penitentiary, or jail, or house of correction, or reformatory, or station house, or any other place of confinement, in this State, * * *' to escape therefrom. He was found guilty generally by the court sitting without a jury and sentenced to two years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction.

The evidence adduced at the trial showed that appellant was lawfully confined under sentence in the Baltimore County jail on September 8, 1967; that on that day, he was 'a trustee' of the jail and had, since September 5 been working at the office of the Chief Clerk of the Baltimore County magistrate's court; and that he left this assignment on September 8, 1967, did not thereafter return to the County jail, and was apprehended by the police four days later in Baltimore City.

While appellant makes no contention with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for common law escape, he contends that the escape conviction based on the statute, Section 139 of Article 27 of the Code, was improper since he did not escape from the Baltimore County jail, but from the office of the Chief Clerk of the Baltimore County magistrate's court, this not being a place of confinement within the meaning of the statute. We find no merit in this argument. The jail is expressly included as a place of confinement under the statute. As appellant was lawfully under sentence and committed to the jail, the fact that he was physically beyond its confines when he escaped does not immunize him from prosecution under the statute. See Fabian v. State, 3 Md.App. 270, 280, 239 A.2d 100, at footnote 5, collecting authorities to the effect that no distinction exists between an escape from within prison walls and one effected when the prisoner, in legal custody, was physically outside the prison area.

Nor is there merit in appellant's contention that he could only be indicted for escaping under Section 714 or 725 of Article 27 of the Code. These statutes apply to persons escaping while on the convict road force and are manifestly inapplicable. See Taylor v. State, 299 Md. 128, 182 A.2d 52; Casey v. State, 198 Md. 645, 80 A.2d 896; Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A.2d 843.

Appellant next contends that his two-year sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the State and Federal constitutions. By way of underpinning this argument, he claims that he was on a 'work release' program at the time of his escape; that under Section 645K of Article 27 of the Code persons sentenced to a county jail may be placed on a work release program; and that under Section 645-O of that Article, the only sanction provided for violating 'the conditions laid down for his conduct, custody and employment' is that he may be required to serve the balance of his sentence in...