Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, Inc.
Decision Date | 10 December 1941 |
Citation | 43 F. Supp. 184 |
Parties | SHILKRET v. MUSICRAFT RECORDS, Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Philip Isaacs, of New York City, for plaintiff.
Sabin, Pomerance, Snitow & Puner, of New York City, for defendant.
Defendant has moved under Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A. following section 723c, for an order dismissing the complaint upon the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The action is one for alleged copyright infringement. The complaint alleges that prior to April 18, 1941, the plaintiff composed a new arrangement of "Southern Roses Waltz" by Johann Strauss. It is further alleged that the composition having never been printed or published in this or any foreign country was A copy of the certificate of copyright registration as issued by the Register of Copyrights to Jack Shilkret under seal of the Library of Congress is set forth in the complaint.
The complaint also alleges that by virtue of the foregoing all proprietary rights to said composition are vested in the plaintiff, including the right to mechanically reproduce the same. The complaint also states: "Eighth: That the defendant, with full knowledge of the fact that plaintiff was the author and composer of the aforesaid new arrangement of the musical composition entitled Southern Roses Waltz by Johann Strauss, and with full knowledge of the copyright, and with full knowledge of the rights of the plaintiff and without knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, did copy the music of the arrangement of the aforesaid musical composition in the composition entitled Southern Roses Waltz by Johann Strauss, in that the defendant did mechanically reproduce the said musical composition entitled Southern Roses Waltz by Johann Strauss in the form of sound records and did further manufacture, sell and otherwise deal in numerous copies of the said sound recordings in the form of phonograph records and that the said defendant did sell and otherwise deal in numerous copies of said sound recordings in the form of phonograph records."
It is alleged that the conduct of the defendant results in an infringement of plaintiff's copyright and that the defendant is thereby benefiting from plaintiff's "labor and artistic efforts". Plaintiff alleges that unless defendant is restrained such conduct "will utterly destroy the value of plaintiff's copyright".
Section 11 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 11, provides as follows:
Defendant contends Section 1(e) in extending copyright protection to mechanical reproductions expressly limits its application to published compositions and no protection whatever is extended to holders of copyrights of unpublished musical works against alleged infringement by mechanical reproduction.
The Act states:
Defendant asserts that as plaintiff's work was not "published" and the complaint so alleges, plaintiff cannot invoke the benefits of Section 1, subd. (e), supra. The plaintiff contends that a sufficient publication was had by the depositing of a copy of his arrangement with the copyright office, when the copyright was registered under Section 11.
It is conceded by both plaintiff and defendant that Section 1, subd. (e), supra, was designed to overcome the lack of protection theretofore afforded an author against the mechanical reproduction of a copyrighted musical work, in view of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655, 14 Ann.Cas. 628, decided February 1908. For that reason, defendant insists that a strict interpretation must be placed upon Section 1, subd. (e). On the other hand, plaintiff argues that the provisions of the Copyright Act should be reasonably construed in order to effectuate the congressional intent of granting a limited monopoly to the creator of a copyrightable work. Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 59 S.Ct. 397, 83 L. Ed. 470. But the question remains: What was the congressional intent as expressed in Section 1(e)?
The deposit of a copy of plaintiff's musical work with claim of copyright is sufficient for the validity of the copyright under Section 11 of the Act.
In Patterson v. Century Productions, Inc., 2 Cir., 93 F.2d 489, 491, Judge...
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Dieckhaus v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation
...incident to a statutory copyright accrue with such deposit (Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 7 Cir., 157 F. 186; Shilkret v. Musicraft Records, D.C., 43 F.Supp. 184) and that the author's common-law copyright is thereafter dead since the author is deemed to have made an election between......