Shin v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 30 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. B079319,B079319 |
Citation | 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 587,26 Cal.App.4th 542 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dong Suk SHIN et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; KOREA FIRST BANK, Real Party in Interest. |
No appearance, for respondent.
Ervin, Cohen & Jessup, Jacob D. Lee, Steven A. Roseman and Victoria Worth, Beverly Hills, for real party in interest.
INTRODUCTION
Korea First Bank (KFB) obtained a summary adjudication permitting it to obtain a judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment against petitioners Dong Suk Shin, Byung Kook Cheon, and Jung Soon Cheon. Petitioners then applied to this court seeking a writ of mandate to vacate that ruling on the ground that KFB had violated the "one form of action" provision of CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 7261, subdivision (a) by obtaining a prejudgment attachment against Korean real property owned by petitioner Shin. We issued an alternative writ, stayed enforcement of the contested order, and set the matter for hearing. Having heard oral argument and reviewed the parties' pleadings, we grant the requested relief.
On June 14, 1990, in Los Angeles, California, KFB loaned $9,600,000. Petitioners signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on California real property. Petitioners defaulted on the promissory note by failing to make interest payments for August 15, 1991, and each month thereafter. KFB elected to accelerate the note and demanded On May 22, 1992, KFB commenced a judicial action in the Seoul Civil District Court, in Korea, and obtained a prejudgment attachment order which was recorded against real property in Korea owned by petitioner Shin.
payment of the full principal with interest and late charges totaling $10,263,341.66.
On June 2, 1992, KFB filed this action for judicial foreclosure and a deficiency judgment. 2 Petitioners' answer generally denied the allegations of the complaint and alleged several affirmative defenses of no relevance to the issues before this court.
On March 17, 1993, KFB filed a motion for summary adjudication of issues to determine its right to foreclose on the California realty and to obtain a deficiency judgment. The motion was unopposed and granted. On June 8, 1993, KFB applied for a "writ of possession/sale/execution" to begin the foreclosure.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner Shin, with the benefit of new counsel, moved for reconsideration on the grounds he was not fluent in English and had not informed his prior counsel that KFB had placed a lien on his Korean property. The court granted the motion to reconsider, vacated its order for summary adjudication of issues, and permitted petitioners to file opposition to KFB's motion.
Petitioners' opposition consisted of evidence that KFB obtained a court order for a prejudgment attachment against Shin's real property in Korea. Based on that circumstance, petitioners contended that KFB had violated the provisions of section 726, subdivision (a) and effectively had waived its security interest in the California real property. In sum, petitioners' position was predicated on the premise that, by filing in a Korean court to protect its claim, KFB had exposed itself to the sanction imposed on creditors who pursue an "action" in violation of the "one form of action" rule. 3
On reconsideration, the court again granted on September 30, 1993, KFB's motion for summary adjudication finding that KFB's "creation of a claim of lien in Korea against defendant Dong Suk Shin's property located in Korea did not constitute an action in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, § 726."
The primary question before us may be plainly stated as follows: Did KFB violate section 726, subdivision (a) when it obtained from the Seoul Civil District Court a prejudgment attachment order against Shin's property in Korea prior to commencement of the present action for judicial foreclosure?
Section 726, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part as follows: "There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property ... in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." In operation, the "one form of action" rule (4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, § 9:105, p. 348, emphasis added.)
Whether the filing in the Korean court constitutes an "action" within the proscription of section 726, subdivision (a) is governed by the definition of "action within the meaning of section 22." (Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 998, 275 Cal.Rptr. 201, 800 P.2d 557.) Section 22 provides: "An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense."
On that point, KFB and petitioners produced declarations from their respective expert witnesses to explain the procedure and effect of KFB's application to the Korean According to KFB's expert witness, (Emphasis in original.)
court for a prejudgment attachment. Both expert witnesses were experienced and qualified attorneys licensed to practice before all courts of the Republic of Korea. Their declarations are in substantial agreement and confirm that KFB filed in the Seoul Civil District Court to obtain a "Pre-judgment Order of Attachment."
Although the declaration of KFB's expert witness assiduously avoids the term "action," it is clear KFB prosecuted its claim on the debt in a court of justice for the protection of its right to recover its claim evidenced by the $9,600,000 secured promissory note. It is also clear that KFB was required to make only a "minimal showing" that Shin was, in fact, indebted to KFB. Some discrepancy exists between the explanations of the respective experts as to whether KFB may proceed in the pending matter or whether it must follow up with another action to foreclose in the Seoul Civil District Court. That point is of no consequence because either way KFB invoked the jurisdiction of the Korean court to protect its claim with an involuntary lien. In other words, whether the Korean law involves a one-step or two-step process does not change the characterization of KFB's application to the Korean court as an action for judicial relief to protect its claim. The Korean action is literally within the operation of section 22.
KFB contends that the Korean action does not violate the "one form of action" rule because it did not proceed to judgment. (4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 9:105, p. 348, emphasis in original & fns. omitted.) Here, the Korean action has not proceeded to judgment but it has not been dismissed and Shin's property remains encumbered by the attachment. Consequently, KFB's filing of a separate action lies somewhere in between the two extremes and must be evaluated according to existing case law and the policies which underlie California's "one form of action" rule.
KFB's expert witness aptly observes "Dong Suk Shin may have [a] difficult time selling or otherwise disposing of the Korean Property because of KFB's recording of the attachment Lien" and "the practical effect of the lien in the marketplace is such that no person on notice of the lien would likely purchase or lend against the Korean Property." This clearly demonstrates that KFB did more than merely commence an action. By commencement of the action in Korea, it obtained through a judicial proceeding an involuntary lien on additional assets of its borrower in order to increase the collateral over and above the value of the California real property, which was...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Birman v. Loeb
... ... Stanley I. LOEB et al., Defendants and Respondents ... No. B111945 ... Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California ... June 3, 1998 ... Certified for Partial ... Wozab, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1002, 275 Cal.Rptr. 201, 800 P.2d 557; Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 542, 547, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 587.) The meaning of "action" as ... ...
-
National Enterprises, Inc. v. Woods
...and third, because Simon deals with a nonjudicial, not a judicial, foreclosure. Inapposite as well are Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 542, 552-554, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, and Pacific Valley Bank v. Schwenke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 134, 141-146, 234 Cal.Rptr. 298, on which defendant......
-
In re Prestige Ltd. Partnership-Concord
...bank accounts constitutes an "action" under California Code of Civ.Proc. § 726(a), plaintiff cites to Shin v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.App.4th 542, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 587 (1994) (reh'g denied). In Shin, the lender was secured by real property located in California. Before foreclosing on its secu......
-
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Roberts
...with the provisions of this chapter.” (§ 726, subd. (a).) The one form of action is a foreclosure action (Shin v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 542, 545, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 587), in which the creditor must first exhaust the security before seeking any monetary judgment for the deficiency......
-
Mcle Self-study Article: Beware the "security Side Deal" in Multi-debtor Real Estate Secured Obligations: First California Bank v. Mcdonald
...Cal. 4th 400, 407 (2000).22. Pac. Natl Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 997 (1990).23. Code Civ. Proc. § 726(a).24. Shin v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal. App. 4th 542, 545 (1994); Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 600-02 (1975).25. Bank of It., etc. Assn. v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 648 (1933); Bi......