Shinn v. Greeness, No. 1:02CV00757 (M.D.N.C. 11/18/2003), 1:02CV00757.
| Decision Date | 18 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:02CV00757.,1:02CV00757. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | GORDON SHINN and CONNIE SHINN, Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER S. GREENESS, ANNA BECK, ROGER TOWNSEND, and ELLA TOWNSEND, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Anna Beck's and Roger and Ella Townsend's Motions to Dismiss [Documents #33 & #35] and Plaintiffs Gordon and Connie Shinn's Motion for Leave to Amend the [First] Amended Complaint [Document #56].
On April 29, 2001, Plaintiff Gordon Shinn was involved in a wreck with a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Christopher Greeness, a citizen of Texas. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 9-12 [Document #21].) The wreck occurred on 1-77 in Surry County, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Shinns allege that, due to the wreck, Mr. Shinn has suffered costly and painful injuries (Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 16-20), his wife Connie Shinn has incurred costs related to her husband's injuries and has been "deprived of his society, service, comfort, companionship, and affection" (Id. ¶¶ 22-24), and Mr. Shinn's car was damaged. (Id. ¶ 21.) At the time of the wreck, the Shinns were residents of Florida but are now residents of Virginia. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) On September 11, 2002, Plaintiffs sued Greeness in this Court for negligent and reckless operation of the tractor-trailer. (Compl.)
On April 15, 2003, Plaintiffs moved to Amend their Complaint to add as defendants Anna Beck ("Beck") and Roger and Ella Townsend ("the Townsends"). (Mot. for Leave to Amend [Document #14].) Anna Beck, d/b/a Zippway Transport, was the authorized motor carrier whose cargo Greeness was transporting at the rime of the wreck. (Pls.' Resp. Br. to Defs.' Joint Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mots, to Dismiss [First] Am. Compl.1 at 3.) Anna Beck is a citizen and resident of Texas. Zippway Transport has its principal place of business in Texas. (Aff. of Anna M. Beck ¶¶ 1-2.) Roger and Ella Townsend are the only executive officers of R & E Townsend Trucking, Inc. (Joint Aff. of Roger G. Townsend & Ella R. Townsend ¶ 2.) They owned the tractor Greeness was driving at the time of the wreck and contracted with Greeness for him to drive that tractor. The Townsends are citizens and residents of Georgia. R&E Townsend Trucking, Inc. is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. (Joint Aff. of Roger G. Townsend & Ella R. Townsend ¶¶ 1-2.)
Specifically, on April 15, 2003, Plaintiffs sought to amend their original Complaint to add the following allegations against Beck and the Townsends:
25. [sic] At the time [of the wreck,] Defendants, Anna Beck, Roger Townsend and Ella Townsend, DBA Zippway Transport were the owners of the tractor operated by the Defendant Christopher Greeness.
25. [sic] At the time [of the wreck,] the Defendant Christopher Greeness was acting as the agent, actual, implied or apparent or in the alternative as the employee of the Defendants Anna Beck, Roger Townsend, and Ella Townsend DBA Zippway Transport.
On May 29, 2003, United States Magistrate Judge Russell A. Eliason granted Plaintiffs' first Motion to Amend [Document #20] and Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint [Document #21] on that date. Beck and the Townsends then filed Motions to Dismiss [Documents #33 & #35] for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs oppose the Motions filed by both Beck and the Townsends. Subsequent to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the [First] Amended Complaint [Document #56]. In their Proposed Second Amended Complaint [Document #56], Plaintiffs' proposed amendments seek to allege additional facts and add additional causes of action against each party. (Proposed Second Am. Compl.) Plaintiffs also seek to add R&E Townsend Trucking, Inc. and Plaintiffs' own insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as additional parties. (Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66-70.) All Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the [First] Amended Complaint. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are DENIED and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the [First] Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
The Court will first address Beck's and the Townsends' Motions to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. As this Court has previously held in Regent Lighting Corp. v. Galaxy Electrical Manufacturing. Inc., 933 F. Supp. 507 (M.D.N.C. 1996), when a court's personal jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Ck. 2003) ). In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court may rule on the basis of the motion papers, supporting legal memoranda, relevant allegations of the complaint, and the affidavits, postpone the decision to permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. See Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Ck. 1989); Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Dockery, 886 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (M.D.N.C. 1995). If the court, as in the present case, rules on the motion without an evidentiary hearing, then the plaintiff need only prove a prima facie case of jurisdiction. See Carefirst of Md., 334 F.3d at 396 (citing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d at 676). "In deciding whether the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in the plaintiff's favor." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993); accord Carefirst of Md., 334 F.3d at 396. Although the court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof in the plaintiff's favor, the court may look at both the plaintiff's and the defendant's proof (i.e., the pleadings, legal memoranda, and affidavits) when drawing these inferences. Mylan Labs., 2 F.3d at 62.
When addressing a question of personal jurisdiction, the court engages in a two-step inquiry. Ellicott Mach. Corp., Inc. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir. 1993). First, the court must determine whether the applicable long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.; Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1064 (4th Ck. 1982). Next, the court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Ellicott Mach. Corp., 995 F.2d at 477; Vishay Intertechnology, 696 F.2d at 1064.
North Carolina's long-arm statute, North Carolina General Statutes section 1-75.4, was enacted "to make available to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due process." Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977). Since the North Carolina legislature designed the long-arm statute to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by due process, the two-step inquiry merges into one question: whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Ellicott Mach. Corp., 995 F.2d at 477; Hanes Cos., Inc. v. Ronson, 712 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
A state's sovereignty over persons, property, and activities extends only within the state's geographical borders; therefore, a state's laws have no application in another state, except as permitted by that state or by comity. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1994). In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). "Minimum contacts" means "that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). A single act or contract which creates a "substantial connection" to the forum state can support jurisdiction. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Minimum contacts requires that "there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
Personal jurisdiction may be either specific or general. Slaughter v. Life Connection of Ohio, 907 F. Supp. 929, 933 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Specific jurisdiction is established where the forum state asserts personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit "arising out of or related to" that defendant's contacts with the state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia. S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 8, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). General jurisdiction exists where the claim does not have any relation to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Slaughter, 907 F. Supp. at 933. In order to establish general jurisdiction, due process requires that the defendant's contacts with the forum state be "systematic and continuous." Id.
To determine the reach of personal jurisdiction, the Fourth...
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