Shivell v. Municipal Court, Santa Ana-Orange Judicial Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1961
• Citation: 10 Cal.Rptr. 283,188 Cal.App.2d 333
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arthur SHIVELL, Petitioner and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT, SANTA ANAORANGE JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent and Respondent. Civ. 6624.

Page 283

10 Cal.Rptr. 283

188 Cal.App.2d 333

Arthur SHIVELL, Petitioner and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT, SANTA ANAORANGE JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent and Respondent.

Civ. 6624.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Jan. 19, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1961.

Arthur Shivell, Saugus, in pro. per., for appellant.

Stephen K. Tamura, County Counsel, Orange County, and Angelo J. Palmieri, Asst. County Counsel, Santa Ana, for respondent.

GRIFFIN, Presiding Justice.

On February 5, 1960, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Santa Ana-Orange Judicial District, charging appellant with three counts of violating the Vehicle Code. Count 1 charged him with speeding, a violation of Vehicle Code, § 22408, reading:

'Whenever a passenger vehicle regardless of weight or commercial motor vehicle weighing less than 4,000 pounds is drawing any vehicle the maximum speed shall not at any time exceed 45 miles per hour subject to other and more restrictive limits set forth in this code.'

Counts 2 and 3 were subsequently dismissed. Appellant's demurrer to count 1 raised the question of the jurisdiction of the court, claiming the section was unconstitutional. Trial on that count was set for hearing. Appellant subsequently secured an alternative writ of prohibition from the superior court, ordering the municipal court to show cause why it should not be restrained from proceeding. The petition challenged the constitutionality of Vehicle Code, § 22408. After hearing, the petition for the writ was denied. Several motions were thereafter made, as well as a motion for a new trial, which were denied. Appellant, on his appeal, re-argues the question of the constitutionality of this section when considered in connection with Vehicle Code, § 22406, which provides:

'Any motor truck or truck tractor having three or four axles or any motor truck or truck tractor with any trailer or semi trailer, or any combination thereof, shall not be driven on any highway at a speed in excess 45 miles per hous except that a maximum speed limit of 50 miles per hour shall apply to such vehicles on highways of four or more lanes.' (Emphasis ours.)

It is claimed that the classifications attempted to be established in both of these sections of the Vehicle Code are not founded upon reasonable, natural, intrinsic and substantial differences between the vehicle described therein and considerations involved in the sections constituting the basic speed law and the declaration of intent of the Legislature, as set forth in Vehicle Code, §§ 22350 and 22358.5. Citing such authority as Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal.2d 136, 222 P.2d 879; Accounting Corp. of America v. State Board of Accountancy, 34 Cal.2d 186, 208 P.2d 984; Kelly v. City of San Diego, 63 Cal.App.2d 638, 147 P.2d 127; People v. Sullivan, 60 Cal.App.2d 539, 141 P.2d 230; Ex parte Richardson, 170 Cal. 68, 148 P. 213.

In this respect, it is also argued that Vehicle Code, § 22406, supra, permits a higher speed to the most heavily loaded vehicles on the road, so long as the drawing vehicle weighs 4,000 pounds, in a combination consisting, for example, of a truck-tractor, semi-trailer and trailer, wherein the truck-tractor weighed only 4,000 pounds and the two trailers, together, loaded, have a gross weight of 72,000 pounds. Yet section 22408 classifies a vehicle of 3,975 pounds as unsafe at the same speeds when drawing a trailer and load which, combined, weigh less than 1,000 pounds. The claim is that this is unreasonable on its face and an unjust classification, and that if there is any relationship between the weight of the drawing vehicle and safety, then the drawing vehicle which out-weights the load that it is drawing is certainly safer and less likely to be whipped about by its load than the combinations of vehicles permitted to move at higher speeds, under section 22406; that the classifications based solely on weight of the drawing behicle, and upon the arbitrary classification 'passenger vehicle' are arbitrary, unreasonable and objectionable in the constitutional sense. It is then argued that this section in question provides for an 'absolute' speed limit based upon arbitrary classifications of a vehicle, without regard to whether or not the speed may be, in fact, safe, reasonable and prudent. Appellant points out that Vehicle Code, § 22358 and other related sections do provide for reduction in speed limits based on some finding determining what shall constitute safe and reasonable conditions, and in this connection it is maintained that the definition of a passenger vehicle, as contained in Vehicle Code, § 465, is not sufficient classification to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to classification so as to authorize a different restriction of speed limit from motor trucks or truck-tractors mentioned in Vehicle Code, § 22406.

We must approach the determination of these questions under time-honored rules that within its constitutional limits the legislative power is absolute. It is the duty of the courts only to pass upon the validity of legislation, tested by the applicable provisions of the Constitution. People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547. Legislation will not be held unconstitutional unless clearly in violation of the fundamental law. Reclamation Board v. Chambers, 46 Cal.App. 476, 189 P. 479. Where the power to legislate exists, the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediency of a law enacted pursuant to that power. Lelande v. Lowery, 26 Cal.2d 224, 157 P.2d 639, 175 A.L.R. 1109. No legislative act may be nullified because, in the opinion of the court, it was or might have been the result of improper considerations. People v. Tanner, 3 Cal.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324. All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. Before the Judiciary can declare that an act is in conflict with the Constitution, such conflict must be clear, positive, abrupt and unquestionable. Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal.2d 343, 79...