Shoaf v. Shoaf

• Decision Date: 15 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 8,8
• Citation: 192 S.E.2d 299,282 N.C. 287
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Peggy SHOAF v. Ted B. SHOAF.

Page 299

192 S.E.2d 299

282 N.C. 287

Peggy SHOAF v. Ted B. SHOAF.

No. 8.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 15, 1972.

Riddle & Shackelford, by Robert E. Riddle, Asheville, for plaintiff appellee.

Williams, Morris & Golding, by James N. Golding, Asheville, for defendant appellant.

HIGGINS, Justice.

This single question of law is presented for decision: Since the effective date of G.S. § 48A, does a father's legal liability for the support of his son born on January 13, 1953, continue until the son becomes twenty-one years of age, by reason of a consent judgment dated June 11, 1970, providing that 'payments for child support shall continue until such time as said minor child reaches his majority or is otherwise emancipated?'

When parents of minor children invoke the jurisdiction of the court on matters involving separation, support, custody, etc., the children become wards of the court. The court thereafter has authority to force the parent to discharge the legal obligation to support a minor child until he reaches legal age. After separation, followed by action for divorce in which a complaint has been filed or a writ of habeas corpus has issued, authority to provide for the custody of children vests in the court in which the divorce proceeding is pending. "Jurisdiction rests in this (trial) court so long as the action is pending and it is pending for this purpose until the death of one of the parties', or the youngest child born of the marriage Reaches the age of maturity, (emphasis added) whichever event shall first occur. (Citing many cases.)' Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71. The authority of the court to require support for a normal child ceases when the legal obligation to support no longer exists. The parents' duty to support, as well as the right to control and to receive its wages, cease upon emancipation. Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C. 453, 139 S.E.2d 732; Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31.

The custody of minor children during their infancy cannot be controlled finally. 'Changed conditions will always justify inquiry by the courts in the interest and welfare of the children, and decrees may be entered as often as the facts justify.' In re Herring, 268 N.C. 434, 150 S.E.2d 775; In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204. Hence neither the parent nor the infant has any vested right in a support order which would extend the payments beyond the age of emancipation. In Layton v. Layton, supra, this Court, in discussing a consent order to support a minor, said that nothing indicates the father bound himself to do anything beyond his legal liability to support his son.

'The rule is settled beyond a doubt that majority or minority is a status rather than a fixed or vested right and that the legislature has full power to fix and change the age of majority.' Valley National Bank v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 159 P.2d 292.

Change from minority to majority in legal effect means that legal disabilities designed to protect the child are removed. 'The removal of the disabilities does not result in the creation of any new rights, but merely in the termination of certain personal privileges. There is no vested property right in the personal privileges of infancy.' In re Davidson's Will, 223 Minn. 268, 26 N.W.2d 223.

The Legislature alone has power to determine the age at which one reaches his majority, becomes emancipated, and acquires the right to manage his own affairs free from parental control. The legal term 'majority' is defined in 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants, § 1, page 8: 'Majority is the age at which the disabilities of infancy are removed, and hence a person who has reached his majority is entitled to the management of his own affairs and to the enjoyment of civic rights.'

The plaintiff contends, and the court seems to have agreed, that the liability for support is determined as of the date of the contract and continues as a vested right regardless of any change made by the law. The clear wording of the judgment does not require or permit this interpretation. The liability, always subject to change, continues from the time of the order until, according to its terms,...