Shockley v. Jones

• Decision Date: 26 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3024,86-3024
• Parties: Kenneth R. SHOCKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary Spinner JONES and Terry McLain, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1068

823 F.2d 1068

8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 171

Kenneth R. SHOCKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary Spinner JONES and Terry McLain, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-3024.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 20, 1987.

Decided June 26, 1987.

Christopher P. Ryan, Strodel, Kingery & Durree, Assoc., Peoria, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

William Frazier, Atty. Gen. Office, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth Shockley appeals from the district court's dismissal, sua sponte, of his complaint on the eve of trial. The district court dismissed the complaint on two alternative grounds: lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We agree that the complaint failed to state a claim, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In January, 1975, Shockley was involved in an accident which left him a paraplegic. Six years later, in May, 1981, Shockley was hospitalized for pressure sores on his left and right buttocks. Upon his discharge from the hospital in July, he was told that for future skin maintenance he would need a roho cushion, an eggcrate mattress, an inspection mirror, and a shower chair.

After a conviction for deceptive practices, Shockley arrived at Logan Correctional Center in Lincoln, Illinois, in September, 1981. He was examined by the prison physician, who prescribed catheter supplies and an eggcrate mattress for him. In addition to these items, Shockley requested a shower chair and an inspection mirror. Defendant Jones, the prison medical director, ordered catheter supplies for Shockley, but refused to order any other items.

In late September, Shockley was provided with a shower chair with a special cushion. However, before he received the chair, Shockley had already fallen twice in the shower while attempting to transfer from a regular chair to his wheelchair. As a result of these falls, Shockley noticed broken skin on his left buttock, and requested help from defendant Terry McLain, a nurse. McLain did not examine Shockley, but gave him some gauze and paper tape for self-bandaging.

Shockley's injuries failed to heal, and in early October, 1981, he was hospitalized with the diagnosis of "neurogenic ulcer of the left buttock with abscess formation and drainage." After his discharge from the hospital, medical director Jones ordered an eggcrate mattress for Shockley. However, despite his requests, Shockley failed to receive the twice-daily dressing changes necessary to promote the healing of his skin ulcer. In December, 1981, Shockley was again hospitalized, and this time he underwent several surgical procedures, including the removal of "substantial amounts of bone." Shockley alleges that he is now disabled to a greater degree than he was when he was committed to Logan Correctional Center.

In August, 1983, Shockley filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Jones, McLain, and Dr. Dean Hauter, the prison physician. Shockley's federal claim was based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and the Eighth Amendment; in several pendent claims, he alleged Illinois common law negligence. In his complaint, Shockley named the defendants as individuals, but he stated that at all relevant times each defendant had acted in his or her "official capacity." The defendants alleged in their answers that Shockley had failed to make out an Eighth Amendment claim, because the complaint did not state sufficient facts to show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The defendants also alleged immunity from suit based on the good faith performance of their official duties.

Defendant Hauter moved for summary judgment in June, 1985, and he was later dismissed from the case upon stipulation of all the parties. The case was reassigned to Judge Mills (the third judge to be assigned the case) in late 1985, and the trial date was eventually reset for the November 1986 jury call, which was to begin on November 10, 1986. On November 12, 1986, the district court, without notice or a hearing, dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Shockley appealed to this court.

On appeal, Shockley argues that the district court had jurisdiction over his claim and that his complaint stated a cause of action. Shockley also objects to the fact that the district court, sua sponte, dismissed his complaint just before trial without notice or a hearing. We agree that the district court's actions in this regard were inappropriate, but nevertheless affirm the district court's judgment.

II.

We first consider whether the district court was correct in holding that it had no jurisdiction over Shockley's complaint. We conclude that the court did have jurisdiction. ¹

The district court dismissed this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it believed that Shockley's suit was actually a suit against the state of Illinois. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a citizen may not sue a state for money damages without its consent. See Papasan v. Allain, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2939, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). ² Because the state of Illinois did not consent to suit in the statute creating the Illinois Department of Corrections, Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 38, paragraphs 1001-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1986), Shockley's claim is barred if the real defendant in this case is Illinois.

Whether the district court's conclusion was correct depends on whether Shockley sued Jones and McLain in their individual or official capacities. A suit for damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Papasan, 106 S.Ct. at 2940; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). But a suit for damages against a state official in his or her individual capacity--meaning that the plaintiff seeks to establish personal liability against the defendant for acts he or she personally committed under color of state law--is not a suit against the state, and thus the Eleventh Amendment is not an obstacle to recovery. See Papasan, 106 S.Ct. at 2940 n. 11; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1684, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

As the Supreme Court has noted, the distinction between individual and official capacity actions "apparently continues to confuse lawyers and confound lower courts." Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. This court has attempted to dispel some of the confusion by creating the presumption that a Sec. 1983 claim against a public official is an official capacity suit. See Kolar v. County of Sangamon, 756 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir.1985). In finding that the suit at issue here was an official capacity suit, and hence barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the district court relied on the Kolar presumption. The district court also relied on its reading of the complaint and other pleadings filed in this case. The complaint describes each defendant as having acted in his or her "official capacity under color of state law." In addition, Shockley's response to defendants' motion in limine states, "[A]s the court is well aware, the Section 1983 count involves allegations that the defendants were acting in their official capacity as employees of the State of Illinois." Based on these statements, and on the Kolar presumption, the district court concluded that this was an official capacity suit, and dismissed the action.

We note initially that the references in the complaint to the defendants having acted in their "official capacity" are ambiguous. That a defendant acted in his or her official capacity does not necessarily mean that the defendant is being sued in that capacity. In this case, the purpose of the somewhat inartful phrase "official capacity" seems rather to have been to buttress Shockley's allegation that Jones and McLain acted under color of state law.

Although we share the district court's frustration with ambiguous pleadings, we disagree with its conclusion in this case. As we have cautioned, the Kolar presumption "cannot be conclusive in a system such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create, in which the complaint does not fix the plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to the evidence." Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). Rather, a court must look to the manner in which the parties have treated this suit. In this case, the record shows that the litigants, and at least one of the three judges successively assigned to the case, treated Shockley's suit as an individual capacity suit.

Our conclusion is supported by several factors. First, the pleadings that the parties filed during their dispute as to whether the pendent state claims should be dismissed show that both Shockley and the judge then assigned to the case treated the suit as an individual capacity suit. After the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the pendent state claims, Shockley argued in his response to the defendants' motion for reconsideration that the defendants' liability, if established at trial, would arise out of their individual acts and omissions, and that any judgment would be rendered against the defendants individually. Judge Ackerman accepted this argument, ruling that the pendent state claims were against the defendants individually rather than against the state. Because the pendent state claims were based on exactly the same conduct as the Sec. 1983 claim, it would be anomalous to suppose that the federal claim was an official capacity claim but that the state claims were not.

Second, Shockley's motion in limine, and his response to the defendants' motion in limine, both assert that the action was against the individuals and not the state....