Thomas v. Walton

• Decision Date: 19 September 2006
• Docket Number: Civil No. 02-969-GPM.
• Citation: 461 F.Supp.2d 786
• Parties: Wade THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. Twyla WALTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

461 F.Supp.2d 786

Wade THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. Twyla WALTON, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 02-969-GPM.

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

September 19, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Wade Thomas, Tamms, IL, pro se.

Christopher L. Higgerson, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Springfield, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 57) brought by Defendants Kenneth Bartley, Jeff Bundren, Terry Caliper, Tim Cook, David Folsom, Paul Hilliard, Mike McClelland, Bret Neighbors, Eric Plott, Frank Rice, Sam Riley, James Russell, Curt Sawyer, Jon Schram,¹ James Studer, Edward Wagoner, Henry Waller, and Derk Wright. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wade Thomas, an inmate at the closed maximum security facility at the Tamms Correctional Center ("Tamms") in Tamms, Illinois, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights by Defendants Bartley, Bundren, Caliper, Cook, Folsom, Hilliard, McClelland, Neighbors, Plott, Rice, Riley, Russell, Sawyer, Schram, Studer, Wagoner, Waller, and Wright, all of whom are correctional personnel at Tamms. At issue here are Count 1, Count 2, Count 3, Count 5, Count 7, Count 8, and Count 14 of Thomas's operative complaint (Doc. 38). Count 1 alleges that Russell, Sawyer, Schram, and Waller violated Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights by spraying him with a chemical agent during an inspection of Thomas's cell on September 6, 2000. Count 2 alleges that on September 25, 2000, Bartley and Wright violated Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights by confining him in a dirty cell for over a month. Count 3 alleges that Riley and Wagoner violated Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights by denying him proper psychiatric care after a suicide attempt by Thomas on November 21, 2000. Count 5 alleges that Bundren, Cook, Hilliard, Neighbors, and Studer violated Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment on December 31, 2000, and that Thomas was denied medical care for the injuries he allegedly suffered during this incident by Caliper until January 10, 2001, in violation of Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights. Count 7 alleges that Hilliard violated Thomas's First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for complaining about the assault by correctional staff that Thomas allegedly suffered on December 31, 2000. Count 8 alleges that on three successive days in April 2001 McClelland violated Thomas's First Amendment rights by retaliating against Thomas for complaining about the conditions of his confinement by refusing to serve Thomas his evening meal tray. Finally, Count 14 alleges that Folsom, Neighbors, Plott, Rice, Sawyer, and Studer violated Thomas's Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to excessive force on June 9, 2001.

Russell, Sawyer, Schram, and Waller request summary judgment as to the excessive force claim asserted against them in Count 1 of Thomas's complaint on the grounds that there is no genuine issue for trial as to the claim. Riley and Wagoner likewise seek summary judgment as to the claim of deliberate indifference to Thomas's serious medical needs asserted against them in Count 3 of Thomas's complaint, citing the absence of a genuine issue for trial, as does Caliper with respect to the deliberate indifference claim asserted in Count 5 of the complaint. Hilliard seeks summary judgment as to the retaliation claim asserted against him in Count 7 of Thomas's complaint on the grounds that there is no genuine issue for trial. All eighteen Defendants seek summary judgment as to Thomas's claims against them on the grounds of qualified immunity. Finally, Defendants, all of whom are sued in both their individual and official capacities, request summary judgment as to Thomas's official capacity claims against them.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must review the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1995); Enquip, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corp., 655 F.2d 115 118 (7th Cir.1981). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, because these are tasks for a factfinder. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1126, 1138 (7th Cir.1994). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994).

B. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

1. Excessive Force (Count 1)

As discussed, Count 1 of Thomas's complaint alleges that Russell, Sawyer, Schram, and Waller used excessive force against Thomas by spraying him with a chemical agent without warning. The evidence of record shows that during an inspection of Thomas's cell on September 6, 2000, he refused an order to submit to a strip search. See Doc. 57, Ex. A, Deposition of Wade Thomas ("Thomas Depo") at 12-13. When a tactical unit was called to Thomas's cell, he then refused three orders to submit to handcuffing, whereupon he was sprayed once or twice in the face with a chemical agent. See id. at 13-14. Thomas then submitted to handcuffing. See id. at 14. Thomas testified that, although he was permitted to flush his eyes with water two minutes after the incident and was given a shower, his eyes continued to burn for about two hours. See id. at 14-16.

When a plaintiff brings an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is whether prison officials used force "in a good-faith manner to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). See also Thomas v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir.1994); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir.1994). In undertaking this inquiry, several factors are relevant to a court's analysis, including "the need for the application of the force, the amount of force applied, the threat an officer reasonably perceived, the effort made to temper the severity of the force used, and the extent of the injury that force caused to an inmate." Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir.2004) (citing DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir.1999)). Cf. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078. "Infliction of pain that is `totally without penological justification' is per se malicious." Fillmore, 358 F.3d at 504 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)).

With regard to the use of chemical agents, "it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace or other chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain." Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984). See also Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 999 (7th Cir.1980) (stating that the "use of chemical agents such as tear gas and mace by prison officials to subdue individual prisoners, rather than to quell large disturbances, should be more restricted."). In Soto the court explained,

The Supreme Court has never held, nor have we or any other court of appeals, so far as we can determine, that the use of tear gas or a chemical agent is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment whether an inmate is locked in his cell or not. What we, and other courts have held, is that the appropriateness of the use must be determined by the facts and circumstances of the case.... The use of mace, tear gas or other chemical agent of the like nature when reasonably necessary to prevent riots or escape or to subdue recalcitrant prisoners does not constitute cruel and inhuman punishment.

744 F.2d at 1270. In an excessive force case, an inmate's disciplinary history, as well as the fact that an incident involving alleged excessive force concerned an inmate in segregation at a maximum security institution, are relevant to the issue of the appropriateness of the force used. See Young v. Rabideau, 821 F.2d 373, 381-82 (7th Cir.1987); West v. Love, 776 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cir.1985).

On this record there is no credible evidence suggesting that Russell, Sawyer, Schram, and Waller acted maliciously and sadistically to cause Thomas harm in the face of his repeated refusals to obey direct orders, and the evidence does not show that a chemical agent was used in a quantity greater than necessary to subdue Thomas, assure the safety of the officers present, and secure the prisoner's compliance with an officer's orders. See Piggie v. Parke, No. 3:96-CV-458RP, 1997 WL 284796, at *1, *4 (N.D.Ind. Apr.25, 1997) (an inmate's refusal to comply with direct orders to give up a mirror justified the use of a chemical agent). "When an order is given to an inmate there are only so many choices available to the correctional officer. If it is an order that requires action by the institution, and the inmate cannot be persuaded to obey the order, some means must be used to compel compliance, such as a chemical agent or physical force.... Orders given must be obeyed. Inmates cannot be permitted to...