Shoemaker v. City of Howell
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-15135 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
| Parties | DAVID SHOEMAKER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HOWELL, Defendant. |
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff
OPINION AND ORDERThis matter is before the Court on a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal from Defendant City of Howell [dkt. 38] and Plaintiff David Shoemaker's Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order [dkt. 43]. Defendant's Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal is fully briefed. Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from a Judge or Order, and Plaintiff did not reply. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties' papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted, without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order are DENIED.
On October 31, 2012, Plaintiff David Shoemaker ("Plaintiff") filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting that this Court find City of Howell's (the "City") Ordinance § 622.02 unconstitutional as a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights [dkt. 25]. On November 12, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, striking down Ordinance § 622.02 as an unconstitutional violation of Plaintiff's 14th Amendment due process rights [dkt 34]. The Court entered judgment (the "Judgment") in favor of Plaintiff that same day [dkt. 35]. The City filed notice of appeal the next day, November 13, 2013 [dkt 36].
The pending motions in this matter deal with the Court's entry of judgment. On November 21, 2013, the City filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal [dkt. 38]. The City contends this Court's November 12, 2013, Opinion and Order finding in favor of Plaintiff was incorrect, and that a stay of the Judgment should be granted pending the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision. On January 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order [dkt. 43]. In his motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court should reopen this matter because "the clerk closed the case (and the matter was appealed) before Plaintiff had any chance to move for costs and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988." Dkt. # 43, p. 1. As such, Plaintiff asserts this Court should "correct" the clerical mistake that occurred, so that Plaintiff may move to recover attorney fees in this matter.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the method by which a party may seek a stay of a judgment rendered by a federal district court. Rule 8 provides:
Motion for Stay. (1) Initial Motion in the District Court. A party must ordinarily move first in the district court for the following relief: (A) a stay of the judgment or order of a district court pending appeal . . .
The Sixth Circuit has established that district courts, in considering whether to grant a stay pursuant to Rule 8(a), should consider the same four factors courts traditionally examine when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Michigan Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991). These four factors are:
Id. "These factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated considerations that must be balanced together." Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2012), reh'g denied (Dec. 5, 2012). Id.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the procedure for procuring relief from a final judgment. Rule 60(b) states:
The Sixth Circuit has held that relief under Rule 60(b) "is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgment and termination of litigation." Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Dassault Systemes, SA v. Childress, 663 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the party seeking such relief from a final judgment "bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence." Info-Hold, Inc. 538 F.3d at 454 (internal citations omitted).
The City argues that this Court's November 12, 2013, Opinion and Order must be stayed pending appeal, due to "a serious question on the merits." Specifically, the City asserts that the land in question—the berm1—is not owned by the City in "fee simple absolute," but rather is owned in a different manner. As Plaintiff "derives benefits from the berm," the City argues it can require Plaintiff to maintain the berm "just [like] other fee simple owners." As such, the City argues it has not violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and thus has a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its appeal.2 The Court does not agree.
At the outset, the Court must address the City's shifting position regarding ownership of the berm. As Plaintiff correctly points out, the City has asserted numerous positions as to which entity "owns" the berm and what type of ownership they possess. In its response to Plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment, the City took the position that it had an interest akin to an easement in the berm. See Dkt. # 29, pp. 2-5. When appearing before this Court to argue its motion for summary judgment, however, the City did not contest that it owned "the property at issue in this case." See Dkt. 34, p. 4. The City now once again is shifting its stance on whether the area in question is owned by Plaintiff or the City. Indeed, the City asserts no less than four different types of potential ownership in its underlying motion and response brief: the City claims its ownership of the berm is 1) "akin to an easement,"3 2) is a "base fee" interest,4 3) "more akin to nominal title,"5 and 4) property the City "holds in public trust."6 The Court does not find that this shotgun approach to ownership of the berm provides the City with any likelihood of success on the merits at appeal.
The City attempts to bolster these various ownership arguments with cases this Court has already rejected as irrelevant to the matter at hand. Further, the cases newly presented to the Court do not support the City's contention concerning ownership of the berm. In 2010 the Michigan Supreme Court defined the ownership of a state municipality that has "a strip of land dedicated to public use." 2000 Baum Family Trust v. Babel, 488 Mich. 136, 162 (2010). The Supreme Court found that Id (emphasis added). As the City in this matter clearly exercised a "voice concerning the use" of the berm—by ripping up Plaintiff's tree and replacing it with nine new trees—the Court finds the City's new case law provides no clarity regarding its confused and fluctuating ownership positions.
Additionally, the City's motion does not specifically address the Court's underlying finding that the City had violated Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process rights. Indeed, the City admits that its attempts to establish ownership of the berm goes only to the Court's substantive due process finding.7 The Court's November 12, 2013, Opinion and Order first held, however, that Ordinance § 622.02 was unconstitutional as it violated Plaintiff's procedural due process rights, finding that:
Plaintiff has demonstrated that he has been deprived of a protected property interest as a result of established City procedure. Plaintiff has further proven—and Defendant has failed to rebuke—that the City's procedure itself violates his due process rights . . . The City states that "the essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). The Court finds that, despite this correct assertion, the City has failed to afford Plaintiff either."
Dkt. # 34, pp. 11-14. The City attempts to upend the Court's detailed and thorough analysis by asserting in a lone paragraph...
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