Sholes v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 17 February 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-494-MMH-PDB
• Parties: Ronald E. Sholes, P.A., Plaintiff, v. Charlene Campbell et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Ronald E. Sholes, P.A., Plaintiff,
v.
Charlene Campbell et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-494-MMH-PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

February 17, 2022

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Patricia D. Barksdale United States Magistrate Judge

This is an interpleader action. Doc. 4. Before the Court is a motion for default judgment against ten of fifteen defendants. Doc. 31. The defendants who have appeared have no objection. Doc. 31 at 4. No. one has responded to the motion.

Background

Following a car accident, Charlene Campbell retained lawyers with the firm of Ronald E. Sholes, P.A., to represent her in a personal injury lawsuit. Doc. 4 ¶ 18. She settled for $100, 000. Doc. 4 ¶ 19. She owes $56, 200 in attorney's fees and costs to the firm and $223, 694.73 in medical bills to fourteen entities. Doc. 4 ¶¶ 20, 21. The firm brought this action in state court against her and the entities to resolve entitlement to the settlement proceeds. One entity-Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (“Florida Blue”)- removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Doc. 1.

1

In the “wherefore” clause of the complaint, the firm requests an order

[1.] requiring Defendants to interplead in this cause to settle the respective rights to the sum that is not in the possession of [the firm]

[2.] authorizing and directing [the firm] to pay into the Registry of the Court the sum of $100, 000.00, less attorney's fees and costs to which the Court deems [the firm] entitled

[3.] restraining each and every Defendant from commencing any court action against [the firm] or any Defendant, or either of them, in any manner to seek to recovery there [sic] reference settlement money, or any part of the sum, or to recover from [the firm] any damages for failure of [the firm] to deliver the sum of money to any Defendant;

[4.] forever releasing and discharging [the firm] from all liability to Defendants in this cause on account of the matters relating to this cause;

[5.] delineating how much of the remaining sum each Defendant is entitled to and distribute the funds as this Court[] finds equitable[; and]

[6.] awarding [the firm] its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees for this action, to be paid from the funds deposited into the Court Registry[.]

Doc. 4 at 5-6.

Following removal, this Court conducted a status conference. Doc. 18. At the conference, the Court stayed discovery and ordered the firm to deposit the settlement proceeds, plus interest, into the Court's registry. Doc. 18. The firm deposited $100, 000 into the Court's registry. Doc. 22.

Based on failures to appear or otherwise defend, clerk defaults were entered against ten defendants:

1. Medig, LLC;

2. Associates MD Billing & Management, LLC;

3. Surgical Device Exchange, LLC (doing business as Sierra Surgical);

2

4. Collection Associates, LTD;

5. Starke Family Medical Centers, Inc.;

6. Neurology Associates of Starke, Inc.;

7. Graymont Equipment Distribution, LLC;

8. Advance Diagnostic Group, LLC;

9. Radiology Imaging Specialists, LLC; and

10. South Florida Anesthesia & Pain Treatment, P.A.

Docs. 26-28, 31-1, 31-2, 31-4-31-8. Campbell has not appeared, and the firm has not requested default against her. Another defendant, Sea Spine Orthopedic Institute, LLC, answered, Doc. 5, but since has “dropp[ed] all claims” to the settlement proceeds, Doc. 10.

The firm and the three appearing defendants have tentatively agreed on allocation of the settlement proceeds. Doc. 32. The agreement is tentative “because the appearing parties rest their positions on the assumption that all non-appearing parties' rights (if any) will be extinguished upon the entry of Final Default Judgments.” Doc. 32 at 2. Campbell is not part of the agreement. See generally Doc. 32. At the status conference, the Court advised counsel that any motion for a consent judgment must “include Ms. Campbell in some way.”

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, ” possessing “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Courts must consider questions of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if not raised by the parties.” Hakki v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

3

The statute on which Florida Blue relies for jurisdiction-§ 1442(a)(1)- permits removal of an action “against or directed to … [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

“Section 1442(a) … is a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a defendant.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). Thus, “regardless of whether the federal court would have had jurisdiction over the matter had it originated in federal court, once the statutory prerequisites to § 1442(a)(1) are satisfied, § 1442(a)(1) provides an independent jurisdictional basis.” Florida v. Cohen, 887 F.2d 1451, 1454 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969) (“[T]he right of removal under [§] 1442(a)(1) is made absolute whenever a suit in a state court is for any act ‘under color' of federal office, regardless of whether the suit could originally have been brought in a federal court.”); IMFC Pro. Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1982) (“There is no indication in [§] 1442 that the federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against the federal officer. To the contrary, [§] 1442 itself grants independent jurisdictional grounds over cases involving federal officers where a district court otherwise would not have jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)); Morse v. United States, No. 2:07-cv-249-MMH-DNF, 2007 WL 4287535, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2007) (“[Section] 1442 provides both a right of removal and an independent basis for federal jurisdiction in cases where a district court would otherwise not have jurisdiction.”).

4

If the removing party is neither a federal officer nor a federal agency, removal under § 1442(a)(1) is proper if the removing party (1) is “a person within the meaning of the statute who acted under a federal officer, ” (2) establishes there is “a causal connection between what the [removing party] has done under asserted official authority and the action against [it]” and (3) advances a “colorable” federal defense. Caver v. Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop., 845 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2017).

On the first requirement, “[t]he words ‘acting under' are broad, and [the Supreme] Court has made clear that the statute must be ‘liberally construed.'” Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007). The “person's ‘acting under' must involve an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted). The assistance must go “beyond simple compliance with the law[.]” Id. at 153. “In other words, the private person must help federal officers fulfill a basic governmental task that the government otherwise would have had to perform.” Caver, 845 F.3d at 1143...