Shook v. Dist. of Columbia Fin. Respon. & Manag., Civ.A. No. 96-2601 (GK).
| Decision Date | 30 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civ.A. No. 96-2601 (GK). |
| Citation | 964 F.Supp. 416 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | Karen SHOOK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
Barbara S. Wahl, Jeanine A. Worden, Evan S. Stolove, Arent, Fox, Kitner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, DC, Ronald C. Jessamy, Joanne Doddy Fort, Jessamy, Fort & Botts, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Daniel Reznick, D.C. Financial Responsibility and Management Assisitance Authority, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [# 10] and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 11]. Plaintiffs, members of the District of Columbia Board of Education, brought this action in their official and individual capacities.
This case presents enormously significant issues concerning the statutory relationship and structural tensions between the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (commonly referred to as the "Control Board"), created and appointed by Congress in 1995, and the Board of Education, which Congress created in 1906 as an appointive body but subsequently modified, in 1968, to be a body elected by the voters of the District of Columbia. While understandable concerns about preservation of Home Rule1 permeate Plaintiffs' pleadings, the legal question before the Court is a good deal narrower than the parties' rhetoric would suggest. Put simply, the question is whether the Control Board had the authority — both statutory and constitutional — to issue its Order of November 15, 1996. For all the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that the answer is "yes".
Plaintiffs initially requested that the Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Control Board from taking any action affecting the structure or responsibilities of the Board of Education. After a hearing on November 15, 1996, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The Parties agreed to consolidate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction with a hearing on the merits pursuant to Fed. P. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). An expedited briefing schedule was set pursuant to section 105(d) of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.L. 104-8, D.C.Code § 47-291.5(d). Several Washington, D.C.-based organizations2 filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion.
The Court has considered the parties' Motions, the amicus brief, the Oppositions thereto, the Replies, the supplemental memoranda submitted by Defendant, and the excellent oral arguments presented by counsel on February 14, 1997. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [# 10] is granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 11] is denied.
In April 1995, in response to the District's well-documented continuing fiscal crisis, Congress established the Control Board. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.L. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 ("FRMAA"). In section 2 of FRMAA, labeled "Findings; Purpose", Congress laid out the significant problems that faced the District because of "accumulated operating deficits, cash shortages, management inefficiencies, and deficit spending". FRMAA § 2(a)(1). Congress also recognized that "the District of Columbia government fails to provide its citizens with effective and efficient services in areas such as education, health care, crime prevention, trash collection, drug abuse treatment and prevention, human services delivery, and the supervision and training of government personnel". Id. § 2(a)(2).
FRMAA gave the Control Board oversight of the financial activities of the District of Columbia government. The only part of the District government explicitly exempted from Control Board authority was the District of Columbia court system. Id. § 2(c)(3). FRMAA gave the Control Board sweeping powers with respect to the District's budget, including planning and enforcing a budget id. §§ 201-203, approving the District's attempts to borrow funds, id. § 204, making recommendations to various District and Federal officials to ensure compliance with the budget and to improve the efficient delivery of services to District residents, id. § 207, and issuing bonds, id. §§ 211-214.
In September 1996, Congress passed several amendments to FRMAA as part of a general appropriations bill. Act of September 30, 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 111 Stat. 3 (the "FRMAA Amendments"). The FRMAA Amendments gave the Control Board new and expanded powers to issue orders, rules, and regulations. FRMAA Amendment § 5203(f) (enacting FRMAA Section 207(d)(1)), provides that:
the Authority may at any time issue such orders, rules, or regulations as it considers appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, to the extent that the issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation is within the authority of the Mayor or the head of any department or agency of the District government, and any such order, rule, or regulation shall be legally binding to the same extent as if issued by the Mayor or the head of any such department or agency.
In November 1995, the Control Board issued "Children in Crisis: A Report on the Failure of D.C.'s Public Schools." In more than 50 pages of text and 23 pages of graphs and supporting statistics, the Control Board detailed the deplorable condition of the District's public school system and the quality of education received by District of Columbia children. The Report concluded that the "lack of leadership from the District's elected Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools" was at the heart of "most of the problems in the school system". Crisis Report at 2.
On November 15, 1996, the Control Board issued a "Resolution, Order and Recommendation Concerning District of Columbia Public School System" (the "November Order"). This was the first action taken by the Control Board pursuant to its powers under FRMAA section 207(d). The November Order established a new body, the Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees ("Board of Trustees") and the position of CEO-Superintendent. The Board of Trustees consists of nine members: five appointed by the Control Board; one member selected by the Control Board from a list of three parents of District school children provided by the Mayor; one member selected by the Control Board from a list of three District teachers provided by the City Council; the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")-Superintendent; and the President of the District of Columbia Board of Education.3 The initial appointment of the CEO-Superintendent was to be made by the Board of Trustees; all later appointments are to be made by the Board of Trustees with the Control Board's approval. The CEO-Superintendent's duties are coextensive with those of the Superintendent of Schools.
The November Order transferred most of the powers and duties of the Board of Education to the Board of Trustees. Despite Defendant's attempt to characterize the situation differently, the reality is that the November Order gave the Board of Trustees "all the authority, powers, functions, duties, responsibilities, exemptions, and immunities of the Board of Education ... including but not limited to the District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995."4 November Order ¶ 6. Further, the Board of Trustees is directed to oversee "all facility planning, construction, improvement, repair, rehabilitation, and maintenance ... with respect to school buildings and grounds." Id. ¶ 9. The Board of Trustees also approves the CEO-Superintendent's appointments and proposed annual budget, and may establish procurement and labor policies. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 14-16. The duties delineated as Board of Education responsibilities under the School Reform Act are, in the November Order, assigned jointly to the Board of Trustees and the CEO-Superintendent. Id. ¶ 13.
The Board of Education, through its President, may cast one vote on the Board of Trustees. Its role under the November Order is limited to providing "input, advice, counsel, guidance, reports and recommendations on general educational policy", all of which are to be given "due and appropriate weight" by the Board of Trustees and the CEO-Superintendent. The Board of Education also retains authority to act as a chartering authority under the School Reform Act of 1995.
Plaintiffs in this case are current and former elected members of the Board of Education who are also registered voters who voted in the November 1996 election to elect members of the Board of Education. Suing in both their official capacities and in their individual capacities as District of Columbia voters, Plaintiffs bring several statutory and constitutional challenges to the Control Board's November Order. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment.
Congress has, and has always had, a special relationship with the District of Columbia. The Constitution grants Congress the authority "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may ... become the Seat of the Government of the United States...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. It is undisputed that Congress' power over the District is plenary, which means that:
The Congress of the United States, being empowered by the constitution `to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever' over the seat of the national government, has the entire control over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government — national or local. It may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a state might exercise within the state....
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Shook v. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
...Board, standing in the Board of Education's shoes, must also be lawful under FRMAA § 207(d). Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 964 F.Supp. 416, 429 (D.D.C.1997) (emphasis added). II. The Control Board contends, prompted by our own request that both parties d......
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University of Dist. Columbia v. Bd. of Trustees, CIV.A. 97-01080 (HHK).
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