University of Dist. Columbia v. Bd. of Trustees, CIV.A. 97-01080 (HHK).

Decision Date03 February 1998
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 97-01080 (HHK).,CIV.A. 97-01080 (HHK).
Citation994 F.Supp. 1
PartiesUNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FACULTY ASSOCIATION/NEA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Andrew Dean Roth, Jeffrey L. Gibbs, Bredhoff Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Samuel F. Carcione, William B. White.

Robin C. Alexander, University of the District of Columbia, School of Law, Washington, DC, Daniel A. Rezneck, D.C. Financial Responsibility & Management Asst. Author., Washington, DC, for University of the Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Trustees, Michele V. Hagans, District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority, Andrew F. Brimmer, District of Columbia, Marion Barry.

MEMORANDUM

KENNEDY, District Judge.

The matters presently before the court are the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs are University of the District of Columbia Faculty Association, NEA, a labor organization, and two tenured members of UDC's faculty (collectively "Faculty").1 The Faculty seeks injunctive relief and a declaration that the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority ("Control Board") acted beyond its authority when it issued an order that purports to provide UDC's Board of Trustees ("Trustees" or "Board of Trustees") with unilateral authority to modify provisions of UDC's NEA Master Agreement ("Agreement" or "collective bargaining agreement"), a collective bargaining agreement between the Faculty and UDC. The Faculty also seeks a declaration and judgment that UDC's action in implementing a reduction-in-force ("RIF") in accordance with the Control Board's Order constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Because the Control Board does not have the authority to issue an order that authorizes an agency of the District of Columbia to nullify provisions of a collective bargaining agreement with its employees and there are no material facts in dispute, the Faculty's motion for summary judgment must be granted and the defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied.2

I. BACKGROUND

The instrumentality popularly known as the Control Board was created by Congress in 1995 in response to Congress' determination that the District of Columbia is in the midst of a fiscal and management crisis. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.L.No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 ("FRMAA"). The Control Board was given wide-ranging oversight and powers over the District government's operations. Purporting to act pursuant to the powers provided by the FRMAA and the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub.L.No. 104-194, 110 Stat. 2356, the Control Board promulgated the Order that is the subject of this suit.

The pertinent circumstances preceding the issuance of the Control Board's Order are as follows. In July, 1996, Congress enacted Public Law 104-194, the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1997 ("Appropriations Act"), for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1996. In § 141(a)(1) of the Appropriations Act, Congress imposed a $74 million ceiling on both expenditures and the allowable deficit for the District of Columbia. As fiscal year 1997 unfolded, it became apparent that compliance with the deficit ceiling mandated by Congress was in jeopardy and that UDC was a major contributor to the rising deficit. On December 3, 1996, the Council of the District of Columbia reported, "[t]he University of the District of Columbia ("UDC") is projecting a current fiscal year deficit of at least $16.2 million. UDC was warned by its accrediting body that institutional accrediation [sic] is in jeopardy, and UDC will, in all likelihood, cease to operate in March 1997 if a gap closing plan is not finalized and implemented as soon as possible." D.C. Council Resolution 11-658, § 2(a).

On December 27, 1996, the Control Board acted to assure that the deficit ceiling was met, including making a $16.2 million "adjustment" to UDC's spending so that the University could operate within its budget. Notwithstanding this adjustment, UDC's deficit continued to mount. Concerned with UDC's continuing financial problems, Julius F. Nimmons, Jr., UDC's Acting President, apparently at the suggestion of the Control Board's chairman, by letter dated January 13, 1997, sought the Control Board's assistance, "with the crucial issues related to legal authority on [provisions of the collective bargaining agreement]" in connection with a budget plan that called for a reduction in UDC's faculty.3

In response to President Nimmons' January 13th letter, the Control Board, on January 22, 1997, promulgated the "Resolution and Order Concerning Collective Bargaining Agreements" that is the subject of the Faculty's complaint. In its Resolution and Order, the Control Board, inter alia, recited that UDC was in a fiscal crisis with a projected budget deficit for fiscal year 1997; that UDC administrators had proposed a reasonable budget reduction plan for UDC which called for a significant reduction in UDC's faculty; that UDC had a collective bargaining agreement with the Faculty with provisions for severance pay, seniority based RIFs, and pension contributions; that implementing the proposed budget reduction plan without modifying these provisions of the collective bargaining agreement would mean that "the necessary savings to ensure that UDC remains within its budget for fiscal year 1997 could not be achieved" and would "adverse[ly] impact on [UDC's] accreditation standing and [UDC's] ability to maintain the integrity of its degree programs",4 and that Dr. Nimmons had requested the Control Board to take action to modify the collective bargaining agreement.

Accordingly, the Control Board stated that UDC should conduct a RIF in a manner allowing it to achieve its planned budget savings notwithstanding the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, including taking into consideration a faculty member's degrees or lack thereof in determining the order of separation and that contributions to retirement plans should be no more than seven percent (7 %) commencing March 1, 1997. The Control Board also directed the Board of Trustees to develop and approve, and submit to the Control Board, a RIF plan providing for reasonable notice and other terms of separation.

Acting pursuant to and in accordance with the directives of the Control Board's January 22 Order, the Trustees, on February 4, 1997, approved Resolution 97-3, which adopted a "Procedure [for] Reduction-in-Force for Faculty" ("Trustees' RIF Procedures"), and directed President Nimmons to submit the RIF Procedures to the Control Board.5 On February 14, 1997, acting pursuant to and in accordance with the Control Board's Order, Resolution 97-3, and the Trustees' RIF Procedures, UDC implemented a RIF, initiated by sending notices to 125 members of the faculty. Moreover, on March 1, 1997, UDC reduced its contributions to the faculty's pension plan on behalf of faculty members still employed by UDC. This suit followed.

II. THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Faculty's complaint challenges the Control Board's January 22 Order on several grounds, including its contention that implementation of the Order violates several of the Faculty's constitutional rights. However, the Faculty's motion for summary judgment and opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss are based on the straight-forward assertion that in ordering the Trustees to repudiate the collective bargaining agreement's RIF provisions and its provisions governing UDC's contributions to the faculty retirement plan, the Control Board acted ultra vires, the law's designation of acts that are taken by an entity which are beyond its authority as defined by its charter.

The Faculty argues that the Control Board's powers, while considerable, are limited to those set forth in its enabling act, the FRMAA. The Faculty points out that nowhere in the FRMAA's studiously detailed specification of the Control Board's powers is there any mention of a power to unilaterally repudiate unwanted provisions in collective bargaining agreements previously entered into by the District of Columbia or its agencies.

The Control Board mounts a vigorous response to the challenge to its January 22 Order, maintaining that both the FRMAA and the Appropriations Act, independently, and certainly when read together, provide authority for its actions.6 The Control Board relies most heavily on the United States District Court's opinion in Shook v. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (Shook I), 964 F.Supp. 416 (D.D.C.1997), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 132 F.3d 775 (D.C.Cir. 1998), and urges this court to follow Shook I's "approach"7 in determining the validity of its Order in this case. In Shook I (Kessler,J), the court held, inter alia, that Congress had delegated its plenary power to run the D.C. public schools to the Control Board and upheld a Control Board Order that transferred most of the powers and duties of the District's elected Board of Education to a body created by the Control Board, the Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees. The Control Board suggests that the Shook I court found the FRMAA's statement of findings and purposes8 to be imbued with particular significance and supportive of its authority because "[w]hen the [Control Board] acted to deal with an out-of-control budgetary situation at UDC, it was acting within the central core of the responsibilities confided to it by Congress." (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 16). Consequently, the Control Board asserts that this court should follow the approach it ascribes to Shook I and view the Congressional findings and...

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