Shoop v. Cassano
| Decision Date | 21 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-679 |
| Parties | Tim SHOOP, Warden v. August CASSANO |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
In 1997, respondent August Cassano was serving a life sentence in Ohio for aggravated murder. The prison assigned Cassano a new cellmate, Walter Hardy. A few days later, Cassano murdered Hardy by stabbing him 75 times with a prison shank. An Ohio jury convicted Cassano of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. Yet, more than 20 years later, the Sixth Circuit granted Cassano habeas relief because it thought that the state trial court had ignored Cassano when he purportedly invoked his right to represent himself at trial. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit failed to treat the state-court adjudication of Cassano's self-representation claim with the deference demanded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
To correct this manifest error, I would grant Ohio's petition and summarily reverse the Sixth Circuit. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari.
Cassano is no stranger to violence. In 1976, he and an accomplice shot bartender Donald Pinto through the heart during a heist in Akron, Ohio. An Ohio jury convicted Cassano of aggravated murder and robbery, and he received a life sentence. State v. Cassano , 1976 WL 188932, *1–*2 (Ohio App., Nov. 10, 1976). Over his first 21 years in custody, Cassano participated in over 100 fights and stabbed four people. Once, he stabbed a fellow inmate approximately 32 times before the victim escaped. State v. Cassano , 96 Ohio St. 3d 94, 98, 2002-Ohio-3751, ¶¶3, 25, 772 N.E.2d 81, 87, 89.
In 1997, prison officials assigned Walter Hardy to be Cassano's cellmate. That decision angered Cassano, who said he " ‘didn't want that snitching ass faggot in his cell.’ " Id., at 95, 772 N.E.2d at 87. Cassano told other inmates that if Hardy was not removed, he would " ‘remove [Hardy] himself.’ " Ibid . It was no bluff. A few days later, a corrections officer responded to a scuffle in the cell. He found Cassano standing over Hardy and stabbing him with a shank. Hardy pleaded for help, yelling, " ‘he's killing me, he's stabbing me.’ " Ibid., 772 N.E.2d at 88. As the officer waited for backup, he ordered Cassano to stop. Ibid . But Cassano kept stabbing Hardy until backup arrived and the officers entered the cell. Hardy later succumbed to the roughly 75 stab wounds Cassano inflicted on his head, neck, back, and chest. Id., at 96, 772 N.E.2d at 88. A nurse checked Cassano for injuries. Ibid. His only complaint was that his shoulder was tired. Ibid.
State prosecutors charged Cassano with capital murder in March 1998, and the state trial court appointed him defense counsel. But, by May 14, 1998, Cassano no longer approved of his appointed counsel. That day, he filed two pro se motions. One, labeled a "Waiver of Counsel," said that Cassano wanted to control his own defense. The other, labeled a "Motion for Appointment of Substitute Counsel," said that his counsel was ineffective and asked the court to appoint him another lawyer. When the old counsel withdrew, the trial court appointed the requested attorney along with two others. The court did not explicitly rule on the motion for waiver of counsel. See 1 F.4th 458, 462–463 (C.A.6 2021).
On September 25, 1998, Cassano filed another motion, this time requesting to participate in the trial as co-counsel alongside his new attorneys. During a hearing that day, he reiterated that he had "a right to be co-counsel with [his] attorneys." App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a. The trial court responded that Cassano was "not going to represent [himself] in this matter," and denied the motion. Ibid .
On April 23, 1999—three days before trial—Cassano told the trial court that he did not think his lead attorney had prepared adequately for trial. Cassano said: "I would like my lead counsel to be here and be prepared when my trial starts." Id. , at 264a. A short time later, the trial court asked whether Cassano had anything else to say. Cassano responded: Id., at 265a. The judge refused, explaining that he and Cassano had "talked about it before" and that he would "be doing [Cassano] a disservice by allowing that." Ibid. Neither the court nor the parties discussed self-representation again. See id., at 265a–271a. A jury then found Cassano guilty of aggravated murder, and he was sentenced to death.
Cassano appealed. As relevant here, he brought a claim that the trial court had violated his right to represent himself by denying what he argued were three motions requesting self-representation. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed in a published opinion. In a section labeled "Preliminary Issues: Self-representation," the court described the three alleged invocations before "reject[ing] Cassano's claim that his rights of self-representation were violated." Cassano , 96 Ohio St. 3d at 98, 100, 772 N.E.2d at 90, 91.
Cassano later filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His "First Claim for Relief " argued that the state trial court violated his right to self-representation in the lead-up to trial, in violation of Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See Amended Pet. for Habeas Corpus in Cassano v. Bradshaw , No. 1:03–cv–1206 (ND Ohio), ECF Doc. 138, p. 15. The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision rejecting Cassano's Faretta arguments on direct appeal. Applying AEDPA deference, the District Court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability on Cassano's Faretta claim. Cassano v. Bradshaw , 2018 WL 3455531, *18–*26, *57 (July 18, 2018).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and conditionally granted Cassano's petition. First, it found that the Supreme Court of Ohio had not, in fact, addressed Cassano's alleged invocation of the right to self-representation in his May 1998 waiver of counsel motion. 1 F.4th, at 467–468. The panel majority then held that Cassano had invoked his right to self-representation clearly and unequivocally despite the simultaneous, contradictory motion for substitute counsel. Id. , at 468–470. Second, regarding the September 1998 motion, the Court of Appeals conceded that Cassano had requested only "a form of hybrid representation," and so the Supreme Court of Ohio's "conclusion that Cassano failed to invoke his right to self-representation" in that motion was "reasonable." Id., at 471. Finally, the Court of Appeals reviewed the state high court's analysis of Cassano's April 1999 motion. The Court of Appeals purported to apply AEDPA deference, but still held that "nothing about Cassano's [April] request was unclear or equivocal, and no fairminded jurist could conclude otherwise." Id., at 473. The Court of Appeals conditionally granted habeas relief unless Ohio retried this quarter-century-old capital case within six months. Id., at 479.
Judge Siler dissented, arguing that the panel failed to properly apply AEDPA deference to the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision. See id., at 479–480. Judge Griffin and Judge Thapar (joined by Judge Nalbandian) dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. See 10 F.4th 695, 696 (C.A.6 2021). Judge Thapar maintained that the "panel disregarded federal law, spurned Supreme Court precedent, and trampled on Ohio's state courts" in order to "erroneously g[i]ve postconviction relief to a repeat murderer." Id., at 700. The State filed an application with Justice KAVANAUGH for a recall and stay of the Court of Appeals' mandate, which he granted pending the disposition of a writ of certiorari. 594 U.S. ––––, ––– S.Ct. ––––, 210 L.Ed.2d 1022 (2021).
AEDPA significantly limits federal courts' power to upset state criminal convictions. When a state court adjudicates a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court's decisions, or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As relevant here, a decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it "applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases." Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). A decision "involve[s] an unreasonable application of ... clearly established law" only if "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Under this Court's precedents, a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel and instead represent himself. See Faretta , 422 U.S., at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. To exercise that right, a defendant must " ‘knowingly,’ " "intelligently," "clearly[,] and unequivocally" invoke it before the trial court. Ibid. ; see also Raulerson v. Wainwright , 469 U.S. 966, 105 S.Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984) () (a defendant has a right "to proceed without counsel if he clearly and unequivocally asks to do so").
Applying AEDPA, this case is straightforward. To begin, the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly addressed and adjudicated the merits of Cassano's various Faretta arguments. The state high court labeled a section of its decision "Preliminary Issues: Self-representation." Cassano , 96 Ohio St. 3d, at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 90. It then described the May 1998 waiver of counsel and the dueling ...
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