Shoop v. Twyford

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-511
• Parties: Tim SHOOP, Warden, Petitioner v. Raymond A. TWYFORD, III
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 2037

213 L.Ed.2d 318

Tim SHOOP, Warden, Petitioner

v.Raymond A. TWYFORD, III

No. 21-511

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued April 26, 2022

Decided June 21, 2022

Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, for the petitioner.

Nicole F. Reaves for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting neither party.

David A. O'Neil, Washington, DC, for the respondent.

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Counsel of Record, Ohio Solicitor General, Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner.

David A. O'Neil, Counsel of Record, Anna A. Moody, Jehan A. Patterson, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Washington, D.C., John Gleeson, Matthew Specht, Anagha Sundararajan, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y., Michael J. Benza, Law Office of Michael J. Benza,Inc., Chagrin Falls, Ohio, Stephen C. Newman, Alan C. Rossman, Sharon A. Hicks, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In this case, the District Court ordered the State to transport a prisoner in its custody to a hospital for medical testing. The prisoner argued that the testing could reveal evidence helpful in his effort to obtain habeas corpus relief. The question is whether the District Court's order is "necessary or appropriate in aid of " the federal court's resolution of the prisoner's habeas case. We hold that it is not, and therefore reverse.

I

On the evening of September 23, 1992, Raymond Twyford and his co-conspirator lured Richard Franks to a remote location, and shot and killed him. To hide their crime, the pair mutilated Franks's body and pushed it into a pond. But a sheriff found the body a few days later, and his investigation led to Twyford. Twyford confessed, claiming that Franks had raped his girlfriend's daughter and that he had killed Franks out of revenge. A jury convicted Twyford of aggravated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and other charges, and he was sentenced to death. The Ohio appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, State v. Twyford , 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 763 N.E.2d 122, and this Court denied certiorari, 537 U.S. 917, 123 S.Ct. 302, 154 L.Ed.2d 203 (2002).

Twyford then sought postconviction relief in Ohio state court. Relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury

Twyford sustained as a teenager during a suicide attempt. That injury, Twyford argued, left him "unable to make rational and voluntary choices." State v. Twyford , 2001 WL 301411, *10 (Ohio App. 7th, Mar. 19, 2001). The Ohio trial court and Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits, concluding that "a finding of ineffective assistance cannot be based upon the trial counsel's choice of one competing psychological explanation over another." Id., at *13. The Court of Appeals noted that Twyford's counsel had called a psychologist who testified in support of a completely different theory: that Twyford's "commission of the murder was his way of protecting the alleged rape victim from the same type of abusive behavior [he] had experienced when he was young." Ibid.

Unlike the head injury theory, this one explained Twyford's seemingly deliberate and rational actions: planning a fake hunting trip as a ruse to lure Franks to a remote location, dismembering his body, and disposing of it in such a way as would conceal his identity. This theory was also consistent with Twyford's own written confession, which described his plan in detail. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review. State v. Twyford , 95 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2002-Ohio-2084, 766 N.E.2d 1002 (Table).

In 2003, Twyford filed a petition in federal court for habeas relief, from which this case stems. Despite the passing of two decades, relatively little has happened. The State moved in 2008 to dismiss many of Twyford's claims on the ground that he failed to raise them in state court. The District Court did not rule on that motion for nine years. Eventually, it dismissed most of Twyford's claims as procedurally defaulted but allowed a few, including some ineffective assistance of counsel claims, to proceed. Twyford v. Bradshaw , No. 2:03–cv–906, 2017 WL 4280955 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 27, 2017).

Twyford then moved for an order compelling the State "to transport [him] to The Ohio State University Medical Center for medical testing necessary for the investigation, presentation, and development of claims." Motion to Transport for Medical Testing in No. 2:03–cv–906 (SD Ohio), p. 1 (Motion to Transport). Twyford explained that such testing could not be conducted at the prison, and argued that it was necessary to determine whether he suffers neurological defects due to childhood physical abuse, alcohol and drug use, and the self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head. Id., at 3. In support of his motion, he attached a letter from a neurologist stating that "a CT/FDG-PET scan would be a useful next step to further evaluate [him] for brain injury

," in part because previous scans revealed 20 to 30 metal fragments in his skull. App. to Pet. for Cert. 272a. Twyford argued that it was "plausible" that the testing was "likely to reveal evidence in support of " claims and that it "could plausibly lead to the development of evidence and materials" that could counter arguments of "procedural default or exhaustion." Motion to Transport 8. He also urged the court to disregard, at least for now, the question whether the results of the brain testing would be admissible.

The District Court granted Twyford's motion and ordered the State to transport him to the Medical Center. It determined that the order was appropriate under the All Writs Act, which authorizes federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The District Court did not address whether it would be able to consider the evidence that Twyford hoped to develop.

The District Court stayed the transportation order pending appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 11 F.4th 518 (C.A.6 2021). That court first concluded that transportation orders to gather evidence are "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." § 1651(a). It then determined that Twyford's transportation to gather evidence was "necessary or appropriate" under the Act because the desired evidence "plausibly relate[d]" to his claims for relief. 11 F.4th at 526–527. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was not required to "consider the admissibility of any resulting evidence" before ordering the State to transport Twyford to gather it. Id., at 527.

Judge Batchelder dissented, contending that such an order is "necessary or appropriate in aid of " a court's jurisdiction only if "(1) the petitioner has identified specific claims for relief that the evidence being sought would support or further; and (2) the district court has determined that if that evidence is as the petitioner proposed or anticipated, then it could entitle the petitioner to habeas relief." Id., at 529. The majority's approach, she argued, allowed Twyford to "proceed in reverse order by collecting evidence before justifying it." Ibid.

We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 857, 211 L.Ed.2d 533 (2022).

II

The State argues that the lower courts erred for two independent reasons. First, the State contends that the All Writs Act does not authorize the issuance of transportation orders for medical testing at all. Second, the State argues that the transportation order was not "necessary or appropriate in aid of" the District Court's jurisdiction because Twyford failed to show that the evidence he hoped to find would be useful to his habeas case. We agree with the State's second argument and thus need not address the first.¹

A

A federal court's power to grant habeas relief is restricted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which provides that the writ may issue "only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To understand the propriety of the transportation order the District Court entered while adjudicating Twyford's habeas corpus action, it is necessary to review the limits AEDPA imposes on federal courts.

Congress enacted AEDPA "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases," Woodford v. Garceau , 538 U.S. 202, 206, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003), and to advance "the principles of comity, finality, and federalism," Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ( Michael Williams ). It furthered those goals "in large measure [by] revising the standards used for evaluating the merits of a habeas application." Garceau , 538 U.S. at 206, 123 S.Ct. 1398. Pertinent here, § 2254(d) provides that if a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court cannot grant relief unless the state court (1) contradicted or unreasonably applied this Court's precedents, or (2) handed down a decision "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." The question under AEDPA is thus not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect, but whether that determination was unreasonable—"a substantially higher threshold" for a prisoner to meet. Schriro v. Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) ; see also Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102–103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

AEDPA also restricts the...