Shoreham-Wading River Sch. v. NYS Bd. Prop.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2001
• Docket Number: SHOREHAM-WADING,No. 2,No. 1,1,2
• Citation: 724 N.Y.S.2d 525
• Parties: (A.D. 3 Dept. 2001) In the Matter ofRIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF REAL PROPERTY SERVICES, Respondent. (Proceeding) In the Matter of NORTH SHORE PUBLIC LIBRARY DISTRICT, Appellant, v NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF REAL PROPERTY SERVICES, Respondent. (Proceeding) 86967A, 86967B : THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 525

724 N.Y.S.2d 525 (A.D. 3 Dept. 2001)

In the Matter of SHOREHAM-WADING RIVER

CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF REAL PROPERTY

SERVICES, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.)

In the Matter of NORTH SHORE PUBLIC

LIBRARY DISTRICT, Appellant, v NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF REAL PROPERTY

SERVICES, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)

86967A, 86967B

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION: THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

May 3, 2001

Michael J. Englert, Poughkeepsie, for Shoreham-Wading River Central School District, appellant.

Robert J. Cimino, County Attorney (Robert L. Garfinkle of counsel), Hauppauge, for County of Suffolk, appellant.

Sapienza & Frank (Salvatore A. Sapienza of counsel), Massapequa, for Wading River Fire District, appellant.

Hamburger, Maxson & Yaffe (Richard C. Hamburger of counsel), Melville, for North Shore Public Library District, appellant.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney-General (Frank K. Walsh of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before: Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello, Mugglin and Rose, JJ.

Rose, J.

Appeals from two judgments of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered March 21, 2000 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' applications, in two proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78, to, inter alia, review a determination of respondent establishing transition assessments pursuant to RPTL 545.

These CPLR article 78 proceedings arise out of the effects on real property taxation caused by the February 28, 1992 transfer of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant (hereinafter Shoreham) from the Long Island Lighting Company (hereinafter LILCO) to the Long Island Power Authority (hereinafter LIPA). The background of the present proceedings is described in Matter of Town of Brookhaven v New York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment (88 N.Y.2d 354, 645 N.Y.S.2d 436, 668 N.E.2d 407) and other prior litigation (see, Long Is. Power Auth. v Shoreham-Wading Cent. School Dist., 88 N.Y.2d 503; Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v Assessor for Town of Brookhaven, 246 A.D.2d 156, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 819).

In Matter of Town of Brookhaven v New York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment (supra), the Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to RPTL 545, taxing jurisdictions such as petitioners may seek transition assessments, decreased by any payments in lieu of taxes (hereinafter PILOTs), when taxable property such as Shoreham becomes tax exempt as a result of acquisition by LIPA. However, the matter was "remitted to Supreme Court, with directions to remand to the State Board of Equalization and Assessment [hereinafter SBEA] for further proceedings in accordance with [the] opinion including a determination of what effect, if any, judicial reductions in the assessed valuation of Shoreham will have on entitlement to transition assessments and the amounts thereof" (id., at 362). Thereafter, in the consolidated tax assessment review proceedings pursuant to RPTL article 7, Supreme Court (Stark, J.) reduced Shoreham's assessed value from $156,579,980 to $452,745 for the 1991 assessment roll, a determination that was ultimately affirmed on appeal (Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v Assessor for Town of Brookhaven, supra). Taking this reduction into account, respondent, formerly the SBEA, issued a certificate of transition assessments calculating the value of the portion of Shoreham acquired by LIPA at $451,160, certifying transition assessments for the 1992 assessment roll in the amount of $45,120, and determining that there would be no transition assessments in subsequent years.¹

Petitioners then commenced these proceedings seeking judgments annulling respondent's certificate of transition assessments as arbitrary and capricious, and directing respondent to recompute those assessments. Respondent moved for dismissal on the ground that the petitions failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, concluding that respondent properly determined the transition assessments to reflect the judicially reduced assessed value for the 1991/1992 tax year. Petitioners now appeal.

Petitioners argue that respondent improperly calculated the transition assessments and negated the intent of RPTL 545 by adopting the judicially reduced assessment which considered the State's actions leading to the acquisition of Shoreham. They contend that the intent of the statute requires that they be held harmless from any such preacquisition...