Short v. City of Grand Junction
| Decision Date | 09 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-01169-STA-jay |
| Parties | LARRY ZANE SHORT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GRAND JUNCTION, TENNESSEE and CURTIS LANE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER TO EFFECT SERVICE OF PROCESS
On October 28th, 2021, Plaintiff Larry Zane Short filed this pro se Complaint against Defendant Grand Junction and Defendant Curtis Lane. Docket Entry “D.E.” 1. On January 25th, 2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay the required filing fee or file an in forma pauperis affidavit. D.E. 5. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on February 28th, 2022. D.E. 6. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion on March 10th, 2022. D.E. 7.
This case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management of all pretrial matters and for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate. Admin. Order 2013-05. The Court is required to conduct a screening of the Complaint because Plaintiff sought and received in forma pauperis status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, the Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to issue process in this matter and deliver that process to the Marshal for service.
Plaintiff brings this action against the City of Grand Junction and Curtis Lane, the city's mayor. D.E. 1. Plaintiff is a resident of Lexington, Tennessee. D.E. 1. Plaintiff's Complaint outlines the following sequence of events. Plaintiff owned the property located at 233 Virginia Street in Grand Junction, Tennessee. D.E. 1 at 2. Apparently, there was an agreement with either a rental tenant or someone living nearby to mow the lawn at that address as Plaintiff lived two hours away. D.E. 1 at 2. This agreement existed in “the Spring of 2020.” D.E. 1 at 2. However, the person intended to mow the lawn failed to do so, and Plaintiff's “mower would not do it.” D.E. 1 at 2. According to the Plaintiff, approximately one week after attempting to mow the lawn himself, “the city had cut the grass.” D.E. 1 at 2.
Although the Complaint does not identify why Plaintiff believed he might have been required to appear before a court, it does state that Plaintiff “visited the office of Grand Junction THREE TIMES over the next [two] months and inquired if [he] was on the court docket.” D.E. 1 at 2 (capitalization in original). Apparently, Plaintiff was informed that he was not scheduled for an appearance or hearing. D.E. 1 at 2. He also alleges that he was “NEVER notified of a trial.” D.E. 1 at 2. The house at the aforementioned address was then “auctioned off.” D.E. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff further alleges that the Mayor authorized private persons, in essence, to steal personal property located in the house. D.E. 1 at 3. These individuals informed others they were “friends of the mayor” and “he gave them permission to take anything they wished.” D.E. 1 at 3.
Plaintiff explicitly claims the above conduct amounted to a violation of his Procedural Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. D.E. 1 at 2. The Court will also consider a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for the value of the home as well as the personal property allegedly stolen from the home. D.E. 1 at 3. He also seeks $100,000 in punitive damages. D.E. 1 at 3.[1]
The Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-79 (2009), and in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied (Jan. 19, 1990). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court has the discretion to refuse to accept allegations in a complaint that are “‘clearly baseless,' a term encompassing claims that may be described as fanciful, fantastic, delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational.” Bumpas v. Corr. Corp. of America, 2011 WL 3841674, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2011) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)). Furthermore, a court may “at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Litigants must establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over their claims through federal question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, or supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331-1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Federal question jurisdiction is present when a party asserts a cause of action arising under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction is present when there is “complete diversity [of citizenship] between all plaintiffs and all defendants” and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005). A party's citizenship is determined by their domicile. Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 11260 (6th Cir. 1973). A corporation is a citizen of “every State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims it does not otherwise have jurisdiction to hear independently. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). Supplemental jurisdiction is available where there is at least one claim over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction, and the supplemental claim constitutes part of the same “case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Where a federal court dismisses the underlying federal law claims, the court “should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims.” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006). Retaining jurisdiction over state law claims once the federal claims are dismissed “should be exercised only in cases where the ‘interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation' outweigh . . . concern[s] over ‘needlessly deciding state law issues.'” Moon, 465 F.3d at 728 (quoting Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993)).
This suit is within the Court's federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiff asserts federal causes of action under the United States Constitution and federal statute. Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
However, in order to proceed, a claim must also have been timely brought before the court. The federal law claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the federal statute does not include a limitations period, these actions borrow the state law limitations period. Guba v. Huron County, 600 Fed.Appx. 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2015). In Tennessee, the statute of limitations for “civil actions . . . brought under the federal civil rights statutes” is one year. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104. Although state law determines what the statute of limitations is, federal law governs when the statute of limitations begins to run. Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations begins to run “when plaintiff[] knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of [her] claim[].” Ruff, 258 F.3d at 500 (citing Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991)). Moreover, federal law establishes that “[a] plaintiff has reason to know of [her] injury when [she] should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. at 501 (quoting Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)).
In Sevier, the Sixth Circuit held that a “person exercising reasonable diligence would expeditiously attempt to determine” their legal rights after a state court adjudicated claims against them. 742 F.2d at 273. The court...
To continue reading
Request your trial