Short v. Grossman

• Decision Date: 13 January 1971
• Docket Number: No. 39811,39811
• Citation: 245 So.2d 217
• Parties: Thomas B. SHORT, Petitioner, v. Julius L. GROSSMAN, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 217

245 So.2d 217

Thomas B. SHORT, Petitioner, v. Julius L. GROSSMAN, Respondent.

No. 39811.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 13, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1971.

Edward G. Rubinoff, of Preddy, Haddad, Kutner & Hardy, Miami, for petitioner.

Brian T. Gaine, of Gaine & Gaine, Miami, for respondent.

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District (Grossman v. Short, 235 So.2d 11), which allegedly conflicts with a prior decision of this Court (Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So.2d 641 (Fla.1964)) on the same point of law. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4 (F.S.A.)

For clarity, the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. Petitioner was the Defendant and Respondent was the Plaintiff.

While Plaintiff's automobile was stopped at a traffic light, Defendant's automobile, traveling in the opposite direction, struck the front of Plaintiff's automobile. Liability was admitted by the Defendant and the parties stipulated that the amount of Plaintiff's property damage was $125.00. The cause was submitted to the jury on the question of personal injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff, as well as his medical expenses, and a verdict was returned in the amount of $125.00. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied and an appeal was taken to the District Court of Appeal. The District Court reversed the trial court's order denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. After denial of petition for rehearing, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. The writ was granted.

In its opinion, the District Court in the case Sub judice relied heavily upon Griffis v. Hill, 230 So.2d 143 (Fla.1969), and concluded that the verdict rendered in this case was not one which a jury of reasonable men could have returned in view of the evidence disclosed in the record. In its opinion, the Court said:

'Unless the jury could reasonably conclude there was no need for the plaintiff to be examined by a doctor, the verdict at least should have included some award to the plaintiff for medical expenses, although the jury would not be bound by the evidence as to the amount and reasonableness of the medical charges, and could determine upon the amount thereof which it found to be reasonably and necessarily incurred in the circumstances of the case. Also, there was evidence from the doctors, as well as from the plaintiff, that the latter suffered certain personal injuries as a result of the collision, for which the plaintiff (by virtue of the defendant's admission of liability) was entitled to recover unless the jury should disbelieve entirely that any bodily injury, pain and suffering or physical discomfort resulted to the plaintiff from the incident.

'On considering the record, we conclude on authority of Griffis v. Hill, supra, that the interest of justice would best be served by a new trial in this case on the issue of damages.'

In Shaw v. Puleo, Supra, as in the case Sub judice, the Plaintiff allegedly suffered a soft tissue injury and the jury returned a verdict of no damages. The District Court reversed on ground that the verdict was inadequate. This Court quashed the opinion of the District Court and reinstated the jury's verdict, saying:

'In reviewing a jury verdict in a case wherein the trial court has denied a motion for new trial alleging inadequacy of damages, an appellate court is bound to remember that the test of inadequacy of a verdict is not what the reviewing court would have decided had it tried the case, but whether it can be said that the jurors as reasonable men could not have found the verdict they did. Utley v. Southern Metal Products Co. (Fla. DCA 2nd, 1959) 116 So.2d 28. Thus, it should be kept in mind that the mere happening of an accident or even the fact that negligence is shown will not in and of itself produce a right to recover damages. Chomont v. Ward, (Fla., 103 So.2d 635) supra. Among the items which the party seeking to recover must prove, even when liability is clear, is the necessity and reasonableness of the charges for medical attendance and treatment. Schmidt v. Tracey, (Fla.App., 150 So.2d 275) supra.' (159 So.2d page 644)

In the past, the opinions of appellate courts have been subject to apparent ambiguity where inadequacy of damages was the question involved. In Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154, 200 So. 376 (1941); Shaw v. Puleo, Supra; City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So.2d 748 (Fla.1964); and Hayes v. Hatchell, 166 So.2d 146 (Fla.1967), the opinions apparently gave the impression that the appellate court was precluded from reviewing verdicts on the basis of inadequacy. This dilemma was pointed out in Roberts v. Bushore, 183 So.2d 708 (Fla.App. 1st, 1966), where the District Court said:

'From the foregoing the clear and unmistakable inference arises that the Supreme Court, by its several decisions referred to above, intended to promulgate a rule of law to the effect that although a trial judge has the privilege and duty under Cloud v. Fallis, (Fla., 110 So.2d 669) supra, and Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, (146 Fla. 154, 200 So.2d 376) supra, to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial under proper circumstances, such duty and privilege may be exercised by district courts of appeal only under exceptional circumstances not yet clearly defined by the decisional law of this State. The conclusion seemed inescapable that for all practical purposes the Supreme Court intended to withdraw from appellate courts the right to interpret and evaluate the evidence in determining whether a new trial should be granted on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate.' (page 711)

The District Court in Griffis v. Hill, 217 So.2d 358 (Fla.App. 1st, 1968), in affirming an appeal based upon inadequacy of damages, said:

'Inasmuch as the jury fixed the amount of its verdict at a figure in excess of proven medical expenses, presumably for any and all other damages accruing to the claimant, including pain and suffering and loss of earnings, We feel compelled to affirm under the authority of City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So.2d 748 (Fla.1964) and Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So.2d 641 (Fla.1964).' (page 359) (Emphasis supplied).

When the Griffis case was brought to this Court, we pointed out that the District Court was not precluded from a review on the ground of inadequate damages. In the opinion, this Court said:

'The test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict. This test is simply stated but may be difficult to apply in a particular case. We are aware of the difficulties and frustrations courts experience in the search for the mythical jury of reasonable men. The appellate court must be ever alert against the temptation to substitute its 'verdict' for that of the jury. On the other hand, we must not refuse to act to relieve the injustice of either a grossly inadequate or excessive verdict.'

The opinion of the District Court was quashed with...