Shortridge v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 01 February 1984
• Citation: 198 Cal.Rptr. 749,151 Cal.App.3d 611
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Byron D. SHORTRIDGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT for the Yolo County Judicial District of Yolo County, Defendant, PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 22494.

Page 749

198 Cal.Rptr. 749

151 Cal.App.3d 611

Byron D. SHORTRIDGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT for the Yolo County Judicial District of Yolo County, Defendant PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 22494.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 1, 1984.

Hearing Denied Feb. 29, 1984.

Robert McDermand, III, West Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

No appearance for defendant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Gregory W. Baugher and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attys. Gen., for real party in interest and respondent.

SPARKS, Associate Justice.

The question in this case is whether it is possible to commit the crime of being an accessory in violation of Penal Code section 32 when the principal is a minor. That question turns on whether a minor can commit a felony. We hold that, in the absence of some other statutory disability, all minors 14 years of age and older are capable of committing felonies as a matter of law. Consequently anyone who, with the requisite intent and knowledge, harbors, conceals or aids these youthful principals after the commission of a felony is guilty of being an accessory.

A complaint was filed in the Yolo County Municipal Court charging appellant Byron D. Shortridge with the misdemeanor offense of being an accessory to a felony. (Pen.Code, § 32.) ¹ Appellant demurred to the complaint on the ground that facts which are judicially noticeable establish that the principal was a 15 year old minor at the time of the offense and was therefore legally incapable of committing a felony. ² The municipal court overruled the demurrer and appellant petitioned the Superior Court of Yolo County for a writ of mandate directing the municipal court to sustain the demurrer. The superior court denied the petition and this appeal followed. We dismiss the appeal and treat it as an original petition for a writ of mandate in this court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(4). We then deny the petition for a writ of mandate.

I

The notice of appeal in this case was filed on December 17, 1982. At that time appellant could appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate as a matter of statutory right. Effective January 1, 1983, and operative July 1, 1983, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(4) was enacted to preclude an appeal from a judgment granting or denying a petition for the issuance of a writ of mandate or prohibition directed to a municipal or justice court concerning a matter pending before it. Instead, the appellate court is statutorily authorized, in its discretion, to review a judgment granting or denying a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition upon petition for an extraordinary writ. ³ The amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 is applicable to unresolved appeals filed before its effective date and we must therefore dismiss the appeal in this case and treat it as a petition for an extraordinary writ. (Andrus v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045, 192 Cal.Rptr. 341. See also Avila v. Municipal Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 807, 810-811, 196 Cal.Rptr. 286.)

II

Appellant is alleged to have committed the crime of being an accessory to a felony in violation of Penal Code section 32 in that he "willfully and unlawfully harbored, concealed, or aided William Everette N., ... a principal in the commission of a felony, in the burglary of a trailer home ...." Penal Code section 32 provides: "Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony." ⁴ Appellant does not dispute that the charging allegations of the criminal complaint filed against him are sufficient. He argues, however, that facts which are judicially noticeable, and which are conceded by the prosecution, establish that William, the principal he is alleged to have harbored, concealed or aided, was just 15 years of age at the time of the burglary and at the time he is alleged to have provided assistance to him. According to appellant's argument, William's minority prevents him from being capable of committing a felony and hence from being a principal. Since it is impossible as a matter of California law for a 15 year old minor to be a principal, it is equally impossible, so the argument goes, for appellant to be guilty of the crime of being an accessory to such a nonexistent principal. The complaint, it is claimed, is therefore demurrable because the facts stated and judicially noticed do not constitute a public offense. Pen.Code, § 1004, subd. 4.).

Preliminarily, we note that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of the principal's age. In civil cases a demurrer to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answers may be taken on any ground that either "appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, ..." (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also Code Civ.Proc., § 430.70.) In criminal cases, by contrast, a demurrer to an accusatory pleading is limited to defects which "appear upon the face" of the pleading. (Pen.Code, § 1004.). Since a demurrer raises a question of law as to the sufficiency of the accusatory pleading and only tests those defects appearing on its face (People v. McConnell (1890) 82 Cal. 620, 23 P. 40; People v. Williams (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 382, 387-388, 158 Cal.Rptr. 778), it follows that a trial court may not judicially notice matters for the purpose of ruling upon a demurrer in a criminal case. ⁵ Nevertheless, because the Attorney General has conceded that the principal was a minor at all relevant times and since the question has been fully briefed and argued and is likely to reoccur, in the interest of judicial economy we reach the issue. (See People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 766, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1.)

Turning to the merits, we find appellant's contention clearly unacceptable. Penal Code section 26 expressly provides that "All persons are capable of committing crimes ...." That section then excepts from its general rule "Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." ⁶ Under the specific terms of section 26, the 15 year old principal whom appellant is alleged to have harbored, concealed or aided is capable of committing a crime. The enactment of a juvenile justice system in California did not by implication repeal section 26. (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 863-864, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127.) That section "embodies a venerable truth, which is not less true for its extreme age, that a young child cannot be held to the same standard of criminal responsibility as his more experienced elders." (Id., at p. 864, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127.) Therefore, "California rebuttably presumes all minors under the age of 14 incapable of committing a crime, but does not totally exclude any child from criminal responsibility." (Id., at pp. 863-864, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127.)

Appellant points to Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 in support of his argument. That section provides: "An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding." Contrary to appellant's suggestion, that provision does not provide that a minor is incapable of committing a crime. "When the wrongdoing of the minor is not simply a tort but amounts to a crime ... a special system of juvenile courts has been created to deal with such cases in an essentially nonpenal manner, for the protection and benefit of the minor ... As to the questions of liability, all minors of 14 or over are deemed 'capable of committing crimes'; and those under 14 are excepted from this general rule, 'in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.' (Pen.Code § 26, subd. One.) [p] ... In short, with respect to tortious or criminal acts of minors, the law extends no blanket presumption of incapacity. Rather, while the minor's immaturity will often result in his undergoing different methods of adjudication and treatment, it is simply one element, although an important one, to be weighed with many others in determining the issue of his liability." (People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 380-381, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202.)

Our juvenile court law explicitly recognizes that minors are capable of committing crimes. Indeed, the violation of a law defining crime is the basis for an adjudication of wardship under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. A petition alleging that a minor is a person described under section 602 "shall specify as to each count whether the crime charged is a felony or a misdemeanor." (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 656.1.) The minor cannot be adjudged a ward of the court except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime of which he is charged. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 1074, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 377-378; see also Welf. & Inst.Code, § 701.) This includes proof that the minor is a person capable of committing a crime under Penal Code section 26. (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 862-867, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127.) If the minor is found to have committed an offense which in the case of an adult would be punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, then the juvenile court must declare whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 702.)

From these authorities it is...