Shortridge v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 2-1085A330
| Decision Date | 08 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-1085A330,2-1085A330 |
| Citation | 498 N.E.2d 82 |
| Parties | Bonnie M. SHORTRIDGE, Claimant-Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, John C. Mowrer, David L. Adams, and Joe A. Harris, as members of and as constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Detroit Diesel Allison Division of General Motors Corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Nora L. Macey, Segal & Macey, Indianapolis, for claimant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cheryl L. Greiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.
Shortridge appeals from a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denying in part her request to reopen her claim for unemployment compensation benefits during a period of pregnancy in 1977. The Review Board decision involved interpretation and application of the Order of the United States District Court in UAW v. Indiana Employment Security Board (S.D.Ind.) No. IP 76-705-C which declared unconstitutional former provisions of the Indiana Employment Security Act which disqualified pregnant women from receiving unemployment compensation benefits and ordered the Indiana Employment Security Board to accept or reopen claims on behalf of a specific class of women. Shortridge sought to reopen a claim she had filed in 1977 under authority of this Order. The Review Board denied in major part her reopened claim based on its finding that Shortridge impliedly accepted a leave of absence from her employer. Shortridge argues that the Review Board's original 1977 findings of fact that she did not apply for or accept a leave are binding upon the Review Board in later proceedings. We agree. We reverse the Review Board's decision and remand with instruction to apply res judicata to the facts as found in the 1977 proceedings and to reconsider whether Shortridge was otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation in 1977 and is a member of subclass (B)(1) and therefore entitled to unemployment compensation.
Bonnie M. Shortridge began working for Detroit Diesel Allison Division of General Motors (Allison) on October 8, 1973. On January 10, 1977, Shortridge informed her foreman she was approximately two and a half months pregnant and had been restricted by her doctor to lifting no more than ten pounds. While she was unable to perform her job as grinder operator because it required regular heavy lifting of objects weighing up to 120 pounds, Shortridge was able to perform other jobs within the plant. On January 14, 1977 her foreman advised her that there was no work available within her department that she could perform with the ten pound lifting restriction and issued a layoff slip, telling Shortridge to report to personnel for reassignment.
On January 18, 1977, the personnel manager told Shortridge no work was available and placed her on involuntary layoff, pending an opening which she could perform with the lifting restriction. The personnel manager suggested Shortridge take an unpaid maternity leave. Under the company insurance policy in effect at that time, a woman could draw only six weeks of disability insurance benefits during pregnancy. Shortridge refused to use the six weeks of benefits so early in her pregnancy and informed Allison that she was not disabled, wanted to continue working, and desired to be called for any job available within the lifting restriction. She was placed on regular layoff for lack of work. 1
On February 28, 1977, Allison's records indicate the company unilaterally placed Shortridge on medical leave of absence without notifying her. Shortridge, unaware the company had already placed her on leave in February, later elected to utilize her six weeks disability insurance benefits and applied for maternity leave on July 8, 1977, stating she was disabled from work as of June 27, 1977. Her application was accepted by Allison and she was paid six weeks of benefits from the week ending July 2, 1977 through August 12, 1977. Her baby was born on August 5, 1977. Shortridge's last day of work was January 14, 1977. She was not called back to Allison until September, 1977, six weeks after her baby's birth, when she declined to return and voluntarily quit.
On January 20, 1977, two days after her layoff, Shortridge applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The deputy found Shortridge was eligible and satisfied the statutory requirements that she be able to work, available for work, and actively seeking work. Shortridge drew $81.00 per week in benefits for the weeks ending January 29, 1977 through June 4, 1977. During this time, she reported weekly and remained able and available for work and actively seeking work.
Allison appealed the deputy's determination of eligibility first to an appeals referee, who ruled Shortridge was eligible, and then to the Review Board, which ruled Shortridge was disqualified for benefits under Section 15-1(4) of the Indiana Employment Security Act because she had separated from her employment due to pregnancy and failed to apply for a leave of absence. The Decision of the Review Board issued on June 10, 1977 provided:
'An individual who is separated from employment because of pregnancy shall be subject to disqualification under this section only if she fails to apply for or to accept a leave of absence under a plan provided by the separating employer.'
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The Review Board finds that the claimant last worked for this employer on January 14, 1977, at which time, because of pregnancy, she was ordered by her doctor to avoid lifting over ten pounds of weight while at work. It further finds that the claimant was informed by the employer that she could apply for a pregnancy leave of absence but she chose not to do so.
The Review Board concludes that Chapter 15-1(4) of the Act is clear on its face and that the claimant, who was separated from her employment because of pregnancy, did not apply for a leave of absence and therefore is disqualified under the Section of the Act.
DECISION: The decision of the referee in Case No. 77-A-1511 is hereby reversed this 9 day of June 1977. It is held that claimant is disqualified for benefits under Chapter 15-1(4) of the Act and that the statutory penalties provided under the above-cited statute are imposed.
(Emphasis added).
The Review Board's sole reason for denying eligibility to Shortridge was its finding that she had not applied for a leave of absence and its application of the statutory provision automatically disqualifying any pregnant woman who did not apply for or accept leave from her employer from receiving unemployment benefits. Although Allison was present at the Review Board hearing and introduced Shortridge's personnel records, the Review Board was not told of the unilateral leave imposed by Allison on February 28, 1977. Shortridge remained unaware that Allison considered her status to be on medical leave of absence. As a result of the decision, Shortridge's benefits were immediately suspended as of June 4, 1977 and a notice of overpayment was issued for all benefits paid from January 29 through June 4, 1977, totaling $1,539.00. The effect of the Review Board decision was to deny Shortridge benefits for the entire period.
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in UAW v. Indiana Employment Security Board (7th Cir.1979), 600 F.2d 118, held former Indiana Employment Security Act provisions 2 denying benefits to all women who are unemployed because of pregnancy without regard to whether individual pregnant women have the physical capacity to work was invalid, and the provisions denying unemployment compensation to women who were willing and able to work but were denied the opportunity to do so because of pregnancy, violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
As a result of this litigation, on September 21, 1983 the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ordered the Indiana Employment Security Board to open, reopen, hear, rehear, consider, and reconsider the claims of all women employees in one of four classes who were disqualified from receiving Indiana unemployment compensation benefits between December 8, 1971 and July 1, 1977 by application of the statutory presumptions relating to pregnancy. Shortridge claims to be a member of...
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