Blackwell v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Employment and Training Services

• Decision Date: 10 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-8911-EX-00616,93A02-8911-EX-00616
• Parties: Sherry L. BLACKWELL, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SERVICES, Michael K. Bonnell, Joe A. Harris, and Nanette L. McDermott, and Whitestone Products, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 674

560 N.E.2d 674

Sherry L. BLACKWELL, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SERVICES, Michael K. Bonnell, Joe A.

Harris, and Nanette L. McDermott, and

Whitestone Products, Appellees.

No. 93A02-8911-EX-00616.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Fourth District.

Oct. 10, 1990.

Donald R. Lundberg, Gregory L. Volz, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Preston W. Black, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

MILLER, Presiding Judge.

Sherry L. Blackwell was refused unemployment benefits by the Review Board after her employment with Whitestone Products, in Bloomington, was terminated. The Board determined that, by leaving her work station before the end of the shift because of illness, she had quit her job without good cause. Blackwell appeals the decision, claiming the Board erred in finding that she voluntarily left her employment. She raises several issues, but, because we reverse, we address only the following issues:

I. Whether there is sufficient evidence that Blackwell intended to quit her employment when she left her work station before the end of her shift because of illness;

II. Whether the employer's rule defining an employee's conduct as voluntary abandonment of employment is sufficient to support the Board's finding that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause; and

III. Whether the Board's decision can be upheld on the basis that Blackwell was discharged for just cause.

We reverse because the Board's finding that Blackwell voluntarily terminated her employment is unreasonable in light of the circumstances. At the outset, we observe that the issue before the Board (on which the Board found in favor of the employer) was whether Blackwell quit her job--not whether she was discharged. With that in mind, we now review the facts and our decision.

FACTS

On June 27, 1989, Sherry Blackwell had been employed as a packer for Whitestone Products for almost four years, working the night shift. On that date, Blackwell was lifting heavy boxes off of the top of a skid when she strained herself, causing a hemorrhoid. ¹ Before leaving work that night, she told her supervisor, Rick McGlothlin, that she had developed a medical problem and described the problem in general terms. Due to the nature of the injury, she was having some difficulty explaining clearly to her male supervisor exactly how she had injured herself. Although Blackwell described the injury as being a hemorrhoid at the hearing, the appeals referee chose to describe the injury euphemistically as a "strained back." (R.6-7).

On the following evening, June 28, the claimant returned to work and her hemorrhoid problem bothered her as she was doing her work. She spoke to McGlothlin, reminding him of the medical problem, and requested that she be placed on a different job. She then asked Mona Lawson, who functioned in some type of supervisory capacity, to tell McGlothlin that she was going On the following day, June 29, she went to see her doctor about the hemorrhoid. Her doctor gave her a statement advising that she should be on a light lifting restriction for one day since she would be off work on the following weekend. At her doctor's request, she called Whitestone and asked if she could be put on a light duty job that evening. She was then informed over the telephone that Whitestone considered her as having quit when she left the premises the night before. Blackwell gave the doctor's statement to Whitestone at a subsequent interview.

to have to leave after her break, that he should try to find someone to relieve her on her job, and that she would obtain a doctor's statement. Mona Lawson conveyed this information to McGlothlin. McGlothlin made adjustments to the break schedule in light of the information that Blackwell was planning to leave. After Blackwell had worked between two and two and one-half hours and just before she was to have taken her break, McGlothlin came out to Blackwell's job station. The record is in conflict as to exactly what was said during the conversation, but the version most favorable to the findings of the Board is that Blackwell told McGlothlin that she was experiencing pain and wanted to know what would happen to her if she left at the break. McGlothlin told Blackwell that he could not give her permission to go home and made no commitment as to what the disciplinary consequences would be if she left, indicating that it would depend upon her record of attendance. However, Blackwell did leave the job premises at her break.

The decision of the appeals referee, adopted by the Board, follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

--that the claimant was employed by the instant employer for approximately 4 years as a laborer.

--that on June 7, ² 1989, the claimant "strained" her back while at work lifting an object.

--that the claimant reported the strain to her supervisor.

--that on June 28, 1989, the claimant was, at her request, placed on a different job which would not put such a strain on her back.

--that the claimant did not initially see a physician concerning her back "strain".

--that on June 28, 1989, the claimant requested permission to leave work based upon back pain.

--that permission was not granted.

--that the claimant never specifically notified her supervisor of her intent to leave work.

--that the claimant presents no evidence before this referee in support of the fact that employer specifically knew that the claimant was leaving work based upon her "strained" back.

--that the claimant walked off the job.

--that the employer considered the claimant to have abandoned her job when she "walked off" without notice to the employer.

--that the claimant was discharged the day she "walked off the job".

--that June 29, 1989, the next day, the claimant went to see a doctor concerning her injury.

--that there existed an employer rule which established as grounds for discharge leaving the job site without permission of supervisor.

--that the rule was uniformly enforced.

--that the claimant was subject to the rule.

--that the reason for the rule was to maintain production and insure a stable work force.

CONCLUSION

Initially, this referee would note that upon voluntary termination of employment, an employee must establish "good cause" for separation before he/she is eligible for benefits under the Act. "Good cause" has been defined by the courts to mean: first, that the reason for --that the claimant voluntarily left employment.

leaving employment is such that a reasonable, prudent person, under similar circumstances would quit; second, that the reason for leaving was "objectively" related to the job. Here, using this definition, and the above cited findings, it is the conclusion of this referee as follows:

--that the claimant, by leaving employment without notice to her employer, abandoned her employment.

--that the claimant, before this referee, and to her employer, failed to establish good cause for leaving employment.

--that, had the claimant not been determined to have voluntarily left employment, the claimant could have been charged with violation of an employer rule to which she was subject by leaving employment without notice to the employer and have been, therefore, discharged for just cause.

--that, based upon the information presented to this referee, the claimant has failed to establish good cause for leaving employment and is, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Act.

(Record 6-7).

DECISION

On review we must determine whether the decision of the Review Board is reasonable in light of its findings. Shortridge v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div. (1986), Ind.App., 498 N.E.2d 82, 87. In Shortridge, this court observed:

"As a general rule, as to all questions of fact, the decision of the Review Board is conclusive and binding. The Court of Appeals is limited to examination of evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which would support the Board's decision. The court must accept the facts as found by the Review Board unless its findings fall within one of the exceptions for which the court may reverse."

Id. at 87 (citations omitted). Those exceptions include:

(1) The evidence on which the Review Board based its finding was devoid of probative value;

(2) The quantum of legitimate evidence was so proportionately meager as to lead to the conviction that the finding does not rest upon a rational basis;

(3) The result of the hearing before the Review Board was substantially influenced by improper considerations;

(4) There was no substantial evidence supporting the findings of the Review Board;

(5) The order of the Review Board, its judgment or finding, is fraudulent, unreasonable or arbitrary;

(6) The Review Board ignored competent evidence.

Id. at 87, n. 5, citing Williamson v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div. (1969), 145 Ind.App. 266, at 270, 250 N.E.2d 612, at 616. See also Arrendale v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div. (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 128.

Issue I

Blackwell contends there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that she voluntarily left her employment. We agree. Voluntarily leaving employment is not defined in the Indiana Employment Security Act. However, our courts have held that some manifestation of intent to quit is necessary to show that a claimant voluntarily left employment. Cheatem v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div. (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 888; Moore v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div. (1984), Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 737.

The Board's decision is devoid of any findings that Blackwell manifested an intention to quit and ignores competent testimony to the contrary. Blackwell's actions were consistent only with a desire and an intent to maintain her employment relationship. She informed her employer when the injury occurred; requested...