Shortz v. Farrell
| Citation | 327 Pa. 81,193 A. 20 |
| Decision Date | 25 June 1937 |
| Docket Number | 133 |
| Parties | Shortz et al. v. Farrell, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 13, 1937
Appeal, No. 133, Jan. T., 1937, from decree of C.P. Luzerne Co., July T., 1936, No. 15, in case of Edwin Shortz, Jr., et al., for themselves individually and as representing the Wilkes-Barre Law & Library Association, v. Ambrose E Farrell. Decree of court below modified, and, as modified affirmed.
Bill in equity for injunction. Before VALENTINE, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Decree entered against defendant. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, were dismissal of exceptions.
The decree of the court below is modified by striking out clause (a), which enjoins and restrains defendant "from preparing and filing pleadings in Workmen's Compensation cases." As thus modified the decree is affirmed. Costs to be paid by defendant.
Ira Jewell Williams, of Brown & Williams, with him John M. Kelly and Francis D. Mahon, for appellant.
Frank P. Slattery, with him John A. Gallagher and Edwin Shortz, Jr., propria persona, for appellees.
W. W. Montgomery, Jr., with him Robert T. McCracken and Edward G. Taulane, Jr., for Pennsylvania Bar Association and Berks County Bar Association, interveners.
Benjamin O. Frick, filed a brief on behalf of American Mutual Alliance, amicus curiae, under Rule 61.
Evan C. Jones and White & Clapp, filed a brief on behalf of Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Casualty Ins. Co., amicus curiae, under Rule 61.
Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.
Plaintiffs, members of a Committee of the Wilkes-Barre Law and Library Association of the Luzerne County Bar, brought a bill in equity in the court below to enjoin defendant from the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant is not an attorney at law, but is employed as a claim adjuster for the Globe Indemnity Company, and prepares and files "pleadings" in workmen's compensation cases in which that company is a party defendant; he also, on its behalf, appears at hearings before the referees, examines and cross-examines witnesses, and there, in general, conducts the "litigation."
The chancellor, in a decree nisi, enjoined defendant "(a) from preparing and filing pleadings in Workmen's Compensation cases; (b) from examining and cross-examining witnesses in any proceeding before Compensation Referees and (c) from acting as counsel for any party or insurance carrier in any proceeding before such Referees." The court in banc dismissed defendant's exceptions and entered a final decree, from which defendant appeals.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association, Philadelphia Bar Association, and the County Bar Associations of Allegheny, Berks, Dauphin, Erie, Fayette, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lebanon, Northampton and York, have intervened as parties plaintiff. The American Mutual Alliance, which is an association of mutual insurance companies, and the Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Casualty Insurance Company, filed briefs under Rule 61.
The Act of April 28, 1899, P.L. 117, as amended by the Acts of April 17, 1913, P.L. 80, and April 24, 1933, P.L. 66, provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person, . . . in any county in the State of Pennsylvania, to practice law, . . . without having first been duly and regularly admitted to practice law in a court of record of any county in this Commonwealth in accordance with the regularly established rules governing such admissions: . . ." [1]
The question for decision is whether the activities of defendant, as above enumerated, constitute the practice of law. [2]
There is no need for present purposes to venture upon a comprehensive survey of the boundaries -- necessarily somewhat obscure -- which limit the practice of law. An attempt to formulate a precise definition would be more likely to invite criticism than to achieve clarity. We know, however, that when a lawyer has, through patient years of study, acquired an understanding of the law and obtained a license to engage in its practice, he applies his knowledge in three principal domains of professional activity:
1. He instructs and advises clients in regard to the law, so that they may properly pursue their affairs and be informed as to their rights and obligations.
2. He prepares for clients documents requiring familiarity with legal principles beyond the ken of the ordinary layman, -- for example, wills and such contracts as are not of a routine nature. [3]
3. He appears for clients before public tribunals to whom is committed the function of determining rights of life, liberty and property according to the law of the land, in order that he may assist the deciding official in the proper interpretation and enforcement of the law. Since, in order to determine such rights, it is necessary first to establish the pertinent facts, which are frequently uncertain, controverted, and best ascertainable, as experience has demonstrated, by the application of rules of evidence tested by centuries of usage, a lawyer, being technically fitted for the purpose, examines and cross-examines witnesses, and presents arguments to jurymen to guide them to a proper determination of the facts. As ancillary to participation in trials and in legal argumentation, he prepares pleadings and other documents incidental to the proceedings.
In considering the scope of the practice of law mere nomenclature is unimportant, as, for example, whether or not the tribunal is called a "court," or the controversy "litigation." Where the application of legal knowledge and technique is required, the activity constitutes such practice even if conducted before a so-called administrative board or commission. It is the character of the act and not the place where it is performed which is the decisive factor.
Is then, a participation in hearings before workmen's compensation referees the practice of law? It would seem clearly to be included within the third field or category of a lawyer's functions as above formulated. We are not unmindful that the Workmen's Compensation Board has been denominated "an administrative tribunal, less formal than a court": Johnston v. Payne-Yost Construction Co., 292 Pa. 509, 514; and that established rules and principles of common law practice are not to be rigorously applied in its proceedings: Gairt v. Curry Coal Mining Co., 272 Pa. 494, 498; Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corporation, 83 Pa.Super. 173, 174; Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa.Super. 242, 247; Virtue v. Plummer, 111 Pa.Super. 476, 478, 479. But even in compensation cases the material findings must have a basis of legal proof on which to rest: Johnston v. Payne-Yost Construction Co., supra, pp. 514, 515. While neither the Board nor the referees are bound by technical rules of testimony, "all findings of fact shall be based only upon competent evidence": Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642, section 6, section 422 of [327 Pa. 86] the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736. Therefore, examination and cross-examination of witnesses require a knowledge of relevancy and materiality. It is true that section 417 of the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, section 6 of the Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642, permits the Board or a referee, of its or his own motion, either before, during, or after a hearing, to make an investigation of the facts set forth in the petition or answer, but this does not justify an award being based wholly or in part upon an ex parte investigation and unknown sources of information; whatever is thus ascertained must : Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48. The findings of fact made by a referee are final unless the Board grants a hearing de novo or a rehearing; [3a] the findings of fact made by the Board are final: section 6, (Art. IV, sec. 418) Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642; the Court cannot reverse such findings if there is any competent evidence to support them. The application of the Workmen's Compensation Act frequently involves delicate problems of law and fact. The Board considers legal questions, applies legal rules, and weighs facts in the light of legal principles. It has power to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and documents: Acts of July 21, 1919, P.L. 1077, section 20; June 26, 1919, P.L. 642, section 6 (Art. IV, sec. 418). The proceedings, though less technical, are conducted much as in court. They are essentially of a judicial character. Were they transferred to a court room and carried on before a judge, it would be readily perceived that they involve the same fundamental characteristics of the determination of property rights and obligations of parties as do other judicial proceedings. Indeed, in Alabama, [4] Alaska, [5] Louisiana,[6] New Hampshire, [7] New Mexico, [8] Rhode Island, [9] Tennessee, [10] and Wyoming, [11] controversies in compensation cases are adjudicated directly by the courts. It is argued that because the referees and member of the Board are not required by our Workmen's Compensation legislation to be learned in the law, the qualifications of those appearing on behalf of the parties should not be required to conform to a higher standard than those of the presiding officials, but in some measure the same contention would apply to the exclusive province of lawyers to argue cases before juries of laymen. The function of attorneys is to make sure that only proper evidence is admitted,...
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