Shoshone Bannock Tribes of Fort Hall Reservation v. United States
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:18-cv-00285-DCN |
| Parties | SHOSHONE BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Pending before the Court is the Government's Renewed Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). Dkt. 77. Defendant City of Pocatello partially joined the Motion as it pertains to Count V of the Amended Complaint. Dkt. 78. On September 28, 2021, the Court held a hearing and took the Motion under advisement. For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Motion.
This case has a lengthy factual history. In short, it concerns land in Pocatello, Idaho, that 1882 and 1888 treaties between the United States and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (the “Tribes”) created conditional right of ways for railroad use. The treaties were ratified by congressional acts-the 1882 Act and 1888 Act. According to the Tribes, these Acts left the Tribes a reversionary interest so that they would regain the land if it was no longer used for the railroad.[1]
The land is no longer used for the railroad, so the Tribes would like to see that land returned to them. What complicates this equation is a 2012 settlement agreement (the “Settlement”) between the Tribes and the Government. The relevant waiver provision in the Settlement outlines:
In consideration of the payment . . ., Plaintiff hereby waives, releases, and covenants not to sue in any administrative or judicial forum on any and all claims, causes of action, obligations, and/or liabilities of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, regardless of legal theory, for any damages or any equitable or specific relief, that are based on harms or violations occurring before the date of this Court's entry of this Joint Stipulation of Settlement as an Order and that relate to Defendants' management or accounting of Plaintiff's trust funds or Plaintiff's non-monetary trust assets or resources.
Dkt. 77-3, at ¶ 4. The Tribes are the Plaintiff in the Settlement Agreement and the Government is the Defendants.
The Settlement was entered into on May 16, 2012, and the overarching question before the Court in this suit is whether the injuries alleged by the Tribes arose before or after that date.
Prior to this Motion, the Tribes moved for clarification of the Settlement in the D.C. District Court.[2] That court held that the Settlement unambiguously waived the Tribe's right-of-way claims arising before May 16, 2012, against the United States. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Fort Hall Reservation v. Bernhard, 486 F.Supp.3d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2020). But it left to this Court to determine whether the Tribes' claims are based on harms occurring before that date. Id. at 67.
The Government argues that the harms occurred before the Settlement, and the Tribes argue that they occurred after the Settlement. In addition, the Government makes alternative arguments for many of the claims to be dismissed even if the Court finds that the harms occurred after the Settlement.[3]
After the D.C. District Court decision, the Tribes voluntarily dismissed some of their claims.[4] Dkt. 73. Additionally, some of the claims the Tribes brought are not against the Government and so are not addressed in the Government's Motion.[5] See Dkt. 77-1, at 11. At issue here then are Counts I-VII, IX, and XVI. Count I is a claim for declaratory judgment. Counts II-VI are Quiet Title Act claims regarding the five parcels of land in question-the Parking Lot, the Bus Depot, the Credit Union, the City Creek Trail, and the 3.27 Acres, respectively. Pocatello joins the Government's Motion as to Count V, which regards the City Creek Trail. Count VII is a claim for a writ of mandamus. Count IX is a breach of trust claim brought under the APA. And finally, Count XVI is a claim for ejectment. The Government moves to dismiss these counts under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). A party who brings a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) ().
If the jurisdictional attack is facial, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to establish federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When considering this type of jurisdictional attack, a court must consider the allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
“By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations, and may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory' or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (cleaned up). “This is not an onerous burden.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, ” but it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability, ” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 682 (2009) (cleaned up).
In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations made in the pleading under attack. Id. at 678. A court is not, however, “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
In cases decided after Iqbal and Twombly, the Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the rule that a dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend is inappropriate unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment. See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Court first reviews the Government's argument that the Settlement waives all of the Tribes' claims. Then the Court will address the Government's alternative arguments for why it believes Counts I, V, VI, VII, IX, and XVI should be dismissed.
The Government argues that the Settlement waived all of the Tribes' claims, and for that reason, this case should be dismissed outright. In support, the Government points to the D.C. District Court's decision on the motion to clarify the Settlement.
The Government's first argument is that the D.C. District Court decision bars the Tribes from bringing these claims.
“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated in previous litigation between the same parties.” Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 816 F.3d 1216, 1225 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992)). “For the doctrine to apply: (1) the issue must be identical to the one alleged in prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been ‘actually litigated' in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been ‘critical and necessary' to the judgment.” Id. (quoting Clark, 966 F.2d at 1320).
The Government contends that “[t]he applicability of the 2012 Settlement to the Tribes' rights of way claims against the United States was precisely the issue litigated and decided by the D.C. District Court.” Dkt. 77-1, at 17. However, that court expressly refused to take up the issue of whether the alleged harms occurred before or after May 16, 2012. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Fort Hall Reservation v. Bernhard, 486 F.Supp.3d 61, 67- 68 (D.D.C. 2020). It noted that “[t]he Idaho district court is better suited to resolve these issues in context, and can do so while adjudicating the United States's other bases for its motion to dismiss.” Id. at 68. The issue resolved by that court was whether the Settlement waived right-of-way claims arising before the...
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