Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. Bernhard

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02-0254 (TFH)
• Citation: 486 F.Supp.3d 61
• Parties: SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF the FORT HALL RESERVATION, Plaintiff, v. David BERNHARD, Acting Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

486 F.Supp.3d 61

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF the FORT HALL RESERVATION, Plaintiff,

v.David BERNHARD, Acting Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 02-0254 (TFH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 10, 2020

Anne Doris Noto, Mary J. Pavel, Frank Sharp Holleman, IV, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry LLP, Washington, DC, Jeannette Wolfley, Mark A. Eco Hawk, Pro Hac Vice, Pocatello, ID, William F. Bacon, Pro Hac Vice, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Fort Hall, ID, for Plaintiff.

Kristofor R. Swanson, U.S. Department of Justice Natural Resources Section, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Thomas F. Hogan, Senior United States District Judge Pending before the Court is the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ ("the Tribes") Motion for Clarification of the Settlement Agreement that the Tribes signed with the United States in 2012, [ECF No. 90], along with their Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, [ECF No. 103]. The United States opposes the motions. [ECF Nos. 95 & 104].

I. Background

The Tribes sued the Departments of Interior and Treasury in February 2002 seeking an "accounting and reconciliation of its trust fund accounts and non-monetary trust assets or resources" held in trust by the United States. Proposed Joint Stip. of Settlement [ECF No. 84] (the "Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement"). The parties settled their dispute for $60 million via a Settlement Agreement that the Court approved on May 16, 2012. Minute Order, May 16, 2012.

In 2018, the Tribes sued the United States, federal officials, the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the City of Pocatello in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho over several plots of land in Pocatello, Idaho. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Fort Hall Res. v. United States , No. 18-cv-285-DCN (D. Idaho 2018). According to the Tribes, the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger guaranteed the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, which originally included Pocatello, to the Tribes as their permanent home. Mem. in Supp. Mot. for Clar. at 2 ("Mot. for Clar."). In 1882 and 1888, the Tribes granted the United States an interest in land around Pocatello to allow the United States to establish easements for railroads. Id. at 3. According to the Tribes, Congress ratified the easements and granted the Tribes a reversionary interest in the land when it was no longer used for railroad purposes. Id. The Tribes allege that they now have a present possessory interest in five parcels of land in Pocatello that the Union Pacific Railroad is no longer using for railroad purposes.¹ Id. at 2; id. Ex. D (Am. Compl. ¶ 25, ¶ 310). Amongst their claims against the United States, they seek a declaratory judgment that the Tribes have a present possessory interest in the parcels, Am. Compl. ¶ 310 (Count 1); they seek to quiet title to the parcels, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 316-409 (Counts II-VI); and they seek a writ of mandamus to compel the United States to transfer the parcels to the property inventory of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to hold in trust for the Tribes, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 410-424 (Counts VII).

The federal defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that, inter alia , the Tribe's claims are barred by the Settlement Agreement's waiver provisions. Opp'n to Mot. for Clar. at 5 [ECF No. 95]. Because the Settlement provides that this Court retains jurisdiction to interpret and enforce it, on March 12, 2019, the Tribes filed a Motion for Clarification of Settlement Agreement in this Court. [ECF No. 90]. Since that time, the Idaho district court found that because the Agreement's language retained jurisdiction in this Court " ‘for the limited purpose of interpreting and enforcing’ " the Settlement, the language "denotes that the D.C. District Court retains exclusive control over both interpretation and enforcement."

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. United States , No. 18-cv-285, 2019 WL 2307437 at *1 (D. Idaho Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting the Settlement Agreement). The Idaho district court then stay the litigation pending this Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. Id. at *2-3. Back in this Court, the Tribes subsequently filed their Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement [ECF No. 103].

II. The Settlement Agreement

The parties contest the meaning of the Settlement's waiver provision, which provides the following:

4. Full Settlement, Waiver, Release, and Covenant Not to Sue.

In consideration of the payment required by Paragraph 2 above, Plaintiff hereby waives, releases, and covenants not to sue in any administrative or judicial forum on any and all claims, causes of action, obligations, and/or liabilities of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, regardless of legal theory, for any damages or any equitable or specific relief, that are based on harms or violations occurring before the date of this Court's entry of this Joint Stipulation of Settlement as an Order and that relate to Defendants’ management or accounting of Plaintiff's trust funds or Plaintiff's non-monetary trust assets or resources.

Settlement ¶ 4. The Settlement also includes a list of exceptions to the waiver, including its exception for the wrongful use of railroad rights-of-ways:

6. Exceptions to Plaintiffs Release, Waiver, and Covenant Not to Sue.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 4 above, nothing in this Joint Stipulation of Settlement shall diminish or otherwise affect in any way: ...

i. Plaintiff's claims against third parties for the wrongful use of railroad rights-of-ways located off the Fort Hall Reservation; ...

Settlement ¶ 6(i) ("Paragraph 6(i)"). According to the Settlement, the Court retains "continuing jurisdiction only for the limited purpose of interpreting and enforcing the terms and conditions of this Joint Stipulation of Settlement." Settlement ¶ 23.

III. Motion for Clarification

In their motion for clarification, the Tribes ask that the Court clarify that Paragraph 6(i) of the Settlement does not waive their claims against the United States arising from the wrongful use of railroad rights-of-way. If it does waive them, the Tribes ask the Court to find that their claims arose after May 16, 2012, when the Court accepted the Settlement. Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Clar. at 1 (hereinafter "Mot. for Clar.").

A. Legal Standard

"As a general rule, ‘a party may ask the district court to issue an order clarifying ... a consent decree.’ " United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp. , 758 F.3d 330, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Nehmer v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs , 494 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2007) ) (edit accepted). "The general purpose of a motion for clarification is to explain or clarify something ambiguous or vague, not to alter or amend." United States v. All Assets Held, 315 F. Supp. 3d 90, 99 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 793 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (D.D.C. 2011) ). "[C]ourts in this circuit have encouraged parties to file motions for clarification when they are uncertain about the scope of a ruling." Id. (citing Volvo Powertrain Corp. , 758 F.3d at 344 ).

Courts "interpret a settlement agreement under contract law."

Gonzalez v. Dep't of Labor , 609 F.3d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The parties agree that federal common law governs their agreement. The federal common law of contracts "largely ‘dovetails’ with ‘general principles of contract law.’ " Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. , 109 F. Supp. 3d 179, 197 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting NRM Corp. v. Hercules, Inc., 758 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ). "Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intention of the parties." Mesa Air Grp., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp. , 87 F.3d 498, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting NRM Corp. , 758 F.2d at 681 ). "Only if the court determines as a matter of law that the agreement is ambiguous will it look to extrinsic evidence of intent to guide the interpretive process." NRM Corp. , 758 F.2d at 682. "[A] contract does not become ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on its interpretation." Johnson v. Reno , No. 93-cv-206, 1996 WL 33658687, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 1996).

B. The Settlement Unambiguously Waives the Tribe's Pre-2012 Right-of-Way Claims Against the United States.

Although Paragraph 6(i) retains the Tribes’ "claims against third parties for the wrongful use of railroad rights-of-ways located off the Fort Hall Reservation," Settlement ¶ 6(i) (emphasis added), the Tribes argue that the paragraph was not meant to foreclose the Tribes from asserting these claims against the United States. The Tribes point to extrinsic evidence to support their interpretation. The first document is a January 2012 letter from the Area Director for the Northwest Regional Office of the Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Union Pacific Railroad. Mot. for Clar. at 3, Ex. A (the "DOI Notice") [ECF No. 90-1]. The letter informed the Union Pacific Railroad that parcels of land that it no longer used for railroad purposes had reverted to the United States in trust for the Tribes. See id. at 2 (stating that "due to this automatic reversion, we believe that the areas within the [Congressional land] grant that are being used for purposes not authorized by the grants have reverted to the United States in trust for the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes."). According to the Tribes, the DOI Notice demonstrates that in 2012, the United States held the position that the land reverted to the United States in trust for the Tribes.

The second document is a letter sent by counsel for the Tribes during the settlement negotiations to counterparts at the Department of Justice. Id. Ex. B at 4 [ECF No. 90-2]. The letter includes a list of proposed exclusions from the Settlement's waiver, including a section addressing railroad rights-of-way. Referencing the DOI notice, the Tribes’ counsel wrote that "[w]e do not wish the settlement...