Shourek v. Stirling, 37S05-9310-CV-1149

• Decision Date: 22 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 37S05-9310-CV-1149,37S05-9310-CV-1149
• Parties: Frank SHOUREK, in his capacity as Successor Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Jonas, Deceased, Appellant, (Plaintiff Below) v. Suzanne M. STIRLING and Jack Stirling, Appellee. (Defendant Below)
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1107

621 N.E.2d 1107

Frank SHOUREK, in his capacity as Successor Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Jonas, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff Below) v. Suzanne M. STIRLING and Jack Stirling, Appellee. (Defendant Below)

No. 37S05-9310-CV-1149.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 22, 1993.

Richard J. Rupcich, Blachly Tabor Bozik & Hartman, Valparaiso, for appellant.

Lewis D. Dellinger, Jr., Dellinger Dellinger & Smith, Monticello, for appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

KRAHULIK, Justice.

Frank Shourek (Plaintiff-Appellant below), in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Lillian Jonas ("Estate"), seeks transfer after the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment granted in favor of Suzanne and Jack Stirling (Defendants-Appellees below) on the Estate's claim of conversion. Shourek v. Stirling (1993), Ind.App., 607 N.E.2d 402.

The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute. Shortly after the death of her husband, Lillian Jonas added the name of her late husband's niece, Suzanne Stirling, to a checking account and four certificates of deposit ("CD's"). These transactions took place between April and July of 1990. Bank employees explained to Jonas the different types of ownership available; she chose joint ownership with rights of survivorship and an unrestricted right of withdrawal by either joint tenant. ¹ Suzanne made no contribution to the accounts or the CD's.

Jonas was found unconscious in her home on February 28, 1991, and was transported to White County Memorial Hospital where she remained in a coma until her death. Jonas' attending physician advised the Stirlings that Jonas had little chance of survival and that, if she did survive, she would likely be placed in a nursing home. On March 2, 1991, approximately four hours before Jonas died, the Stirlings withdrew approximately $65,000 from some of the joint accounts.

Jonas died intestate. As Jonas had requested, the Stirlings made the funeral arrangements and paid for them the day of the funeral. Jack Stirling was appointed administrator of the Estate and he filed the inventory of the Estate which included each joint account and CD. However, upon learning Jonas had a surviving blood relative, he voluntarily withdrew and Shourek, a nephew of Jonas, was appointed successor administrator of the Estate.

Shourek brought suit against the Stirlings alleging that they had converted the funds withdrawn from the joint accounts. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial court determined that Jonas intended that Suzanne Stirling receive the proceeds of the accounts and that, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent, the owner's wishes are paramount to other considerations and granted summary judgment in favor of the Stirlings.

Shourek appealed. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, determined that Shourek lacked standing because Jonas' interest in the account died with her. We grant transfer to address two issues, viz. (1) whether the Estate had standing to pursue the withdrawn funds, and (2) whether the withdrawal constituted conversion.

Standing

Shourek asserts that the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that, as administrator, he did not have standing to bring the action. Shourek argues that Ind.Code Sec. 29-1-13-3 empowers the Estate to step into the shoes of Jonas and bring an action that Jonas could have brought had Jonas survived. ² Shourek asserts that Jonas, as sole contributor to the account, could have demanded the return of the funds of the joint accounts and, consequently, the Estate, in her absence, may pursue the claim.

Standing is a judicial doctrine which focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper party to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Schloss v. City of Indianapolis (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206. The plaintiff "must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue." Higgins v. Hale (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 95, 101. Jonas had a personal stake in the outcome of the case because she was the sole contributor of the funds in the joint accounts. The action for conversion alleges that Jonas lost use of the funds in the joint accounts thus suffering a direct injury. Shourek, in the action for conversion, attempts to assert Jonas' right to ownership of the joint accounts. Ind.Code Sec. 29-1-13-1 permits Shourek to bring an action for the decedent. As a result, because Jonas may have been able to establish an action for return of the joint account proceeds had she survived, Shourek correctly asserts that the Estate has standing to bring the action.

Conversion

In order to maintain an action for conversion, the plaintiff must establish the appropriation of personal property by another for that party's own use and benefit in exclusion and defiance of the owner's rights. The essential elements of the plaintiff's claim are an immediate, unqualified right to possession resting on a superior claim of title. Yoder Feed Serv. v. Allied Pullets (1977), 171 Ind.App. 692, 695, 359 N.E.2d 602, 605.

Shourek's conversion argument contains a series of building blocks composed of the interplay of two statutes and the actions of the Stirlings. He begins with the premise that, as the sole contributor, Jonas owned all of the funds in the accounts until the moment she died. Shourek continues with the notion that the withdrawal of the funds from the accounts before Jonas' death severed the joint tenancy and removed the protection of the presumption of survivorship. Thus, asserts Shourek, this sequence of events gives rise to the action for conversion.

In response, the Stirlings assert that the Estate failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the account was created, Jonas did not intend Stirling to receive the funds upon Jonas' death. The Stirlings assert that the evidence supports a finding that Jonas' intent was to convey a gift of present interest to Suzanne subject only to Suzanne's keeping funds available for Jonas' immediate needs.

The Estate does not dispute that Suzanne had the right to withdraw funds from the account, but does...