State ex rel. Cittadine v. Dept. of Transp., 20S03-0306-CV-260.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 20S03-0306-CV-260.,20S03-0306-CV-260.
• Citation: 790 N.E.2d 978
• Parties: STATE of Indiana on the Relation of Jack P. CITTADINE, Petitioner/Appellant, Relator Below, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent/Appellee, Respondent Below, Michigan Southern Railroad Company, et. al., Respondent/Appellees, Intervenors Below.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

790 N.E.2d 978

STATE of Indiana on the Relation of Jack P. CITTADINE, Petitioner/Appellant, Relator Below, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent/Appellee, Respondent Below, Michigan Southern Railroad Company, et. al., Respondent/Appellees, Intervenors Below.

No. 20S03-0306-CV-260.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 24, 2003.

Nancy A. McCaslin, McCaslin & McCaslin, Elkhart, IN, Attorney for Appellant. Steve Carter, Attorney General, Janet L. Parsanko, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Indiana Dept. of Transportation.

William G. Lavery, Ian J. Forte, Whisler & Lavery, Elkhart, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Michigan Southern Railroad Company.

DICKSON, Justice.

The relator-appellant Jack Cittadine appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for an emergency and permanent writ of mandamus to require the Indiana Department of Transportation ("INDOT") to enforce Indiana's Clear View Statute¹ against Michigan Southern Railroad ("Michigan Southern") and any other railroad in violation of the statute.² The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Cittadine lacked standing to bring this action. Cittadine v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 750 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). We grant transfer to acknowledge the availability of the public standing doctrine in Indiana courts.

Our standing requirement is a matter of Indiana jurisprudence. The judicial doctrine of standing is intended to assure that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested. Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind.1990). It focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the court's power. Id. Unlike the language of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution contains no "case or controversy" requirement. We have observed that an analogous function is fulfilled by the distribution of powers provision in Article 3, Section 1, of the Indiana Constitution.³ See Dept. of Environmental Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331 (Ind.1994). While noting this source of judicial restraint, however, we stated: "While this Court respects the separation of powers, we do not permit excessive formalism to prevent necessary judicial involvement. Where an actual controversy exists we will not shirk our duty to resolve it." Id. at 337.

Under our general rule of standing, only those persons who have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and who show that they have suffered or were in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct will be found to have standing. Oman v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ind. 2000); Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1029-30 (Ind.1995); Shourek v. Stirling, 621 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.1993); Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind. 1985). Absent this showing, complainants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 101. It is generally insufficient that a plaintiff merely has a general interest common to all members of the public. Terre Haute Gas Corp. v. Johnson, 221 Ind. 499, 505, 45 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1942). Cittadine seeks to avoid this general rule by invoking the public standing exception. He does not contend that he has suffered a specific injury, but argues that, because the object of the mandate is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, he has standing under Indiana's public standing doctrine. Br. of Appellant at 6. As we recently noted in Schloss:

Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met. This Court held in those cases that when a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official.

Schloss, 553 N.E.2d at 1206 n. 3 (quoting Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 101

). Specifically, the public standing doctrine eliminates the requirement that the relator have an interest in the outcome of the litigation different from that of the general public. Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 101.

The public standing doctrine has been recognized in Indiana case law for more than one hundred and fifty years. In Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452 (1852), a citizen and taxpayer of Marion County urged that a 15% increase in the county's land valuation by the State Equalization Board was invalid because it was made in the absence of a representative from the Sixth District. Ordering a peremptory mandamus to issue commanding the Marion County Auditor to disregard the increase, this Court addressed the relator's right to bring the claim:

Were this a case merely for private relief, the relator would have to show some special interest in the subject-matter. But here the case is different. The defendant, who was County Auditor, refused to issue the legal duplicate for the collection of the taxes, and a mandamus was applied for to compel him to discharge this duty of his office. It is a case for the enforcement, not of a private, but of a public right; and it is not necessary, in such cases, that the relator should have a special interest in the matter, or that he should be a public officer. That the defendant should discharge, correctly, the duties of his office, was a matter in which Bates, as a citizen of the county, had a general interest; and that interest was, of itself, sufficient to enable him to obtain the mandamus in question, and have his name inserted as the relator.

Id. at 458. Similarly, in Bd. of Com'rs of Decatur County v. State ex rel. Hamilton, 86 Ind. 8 (1882), this Court stated that:

[W]here the question is one of public concern, and the object of the mandate is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result sought to be accomplished. In such a case it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen, and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

Id. at 12-13. In Wampler v. State ex rel. Alexander, 148 Ind. 557, 47 N.E. 1068 (1897), the Court expressed the principle as follows:

Where the question involved in a mandamus proceeding is of a public concern, as is the one herein, and the object of the action is to enforce the performance of a public duty or right in which the people in general are interested, the applicant for the writ is not required to show any legal or special interest in the result sought to be obtained.

Id. at 571-72, 47 N.E. at 1072. In determining that "the relators are shown to have the requisite degree of interest to enable them to maintain this action[,]" the Court relied not upon their status as trustees, but as citizens "interested in common with other citizens in the execution of the law." Id. at 572, 47 N.E. at 1071-72. See also, Brooks v. State, ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904); Meyer v. Town of Boonville, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N.E. 146 (1904); Zuelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 455, 67 N.E. 103 (1903); State ex rel. Cutter v. Kamman, 151 Ind. 407, 51 N.E. 483 (1898); Bd. of Comm'rs of Clarke County v. State ex rel. Lewis, 61 Ind. 75 (1878); Bd. of Comm'rs of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96 (1874).

In addition to cases involving the enforcement of a public right or duty, the principles embodied in the public standing doctrine have also frequently been applied in cases challenging the constitutionality of governmental action, statutes, or ordinances. In Bd. of Comm'rs of Clay County v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96 (1874), nine residents, citizens, taxpayers, and voters charged that a statute and county-seat relocation proceedings predicated thereon were unconstitutional. Id. at 100. In response to the defendants' claims that the plaintiffs' injuries were in common with other taxpayers, citizens, and voters of the county, the Court analyzed not only Indiana case law, but also that of Iowa,⁴ Illinois,⁵ Maryland,⁶ and New Hampshire,⁷ concluding that "remedy may be had by any tax-payer in his own name." Id. at 104 (citing City of Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38 (1854); Oliver v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514 (1865)). Similarly, in Brooks v. State, ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904), this Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative apportionment act of 1903 upon the request of a resident, citizen, and voter of Ripley County. Id. at 570, 70 N.E. at 980. The Court stated:

We entertain no doubt of the right of the relator to maintain this action. Every male inhabitant of the State, over the age of twenty-one years at the time the last preceding enumeration of such inhabitants was taken, has a direct interest in the constitutional apportionment of senators and representatives throughout the State, and if, by an apportionment act, his rights in this respect are denied or impaired, he may obtain redress by proper action in the courts.

Id. at 577, 70 N.E. at 983. In Davis Const. Co. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629 (1921), a township resident and taxpayer challenged both a county contract and the act of 1919 upon which it was based. The Court rejected the Board of Commissioners' argument that the taxpayer had no standing to challenge the statute's constitutionality:

And a taxpayer clearly has sufficient interest to question the constitutionality of the statute under which it is sought to impose a burden upon the property of a taxing district in which he lives and owns property subject to assessment, where the action seeking to impose a burden under such statute remains otherwise undefended.

Id. at 147, 132 N.E. at 630. The public standing doctrine was also applied to permit constitutional challenges in Graves v. City of Muncie, 255 Ind. 360, 264 N.E.2d 607 (1970), Mitsch v. City of Hammond, 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21 (1955), Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930), Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912), Fesler v....