Shreve v. Franklin County
| Decision Date | 14 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No.2:10-cv-644 |
| Parties | ROBERT SHREVE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Presently before the Court are interested party the United States of America's Motion to Intervene (Doc. 45), Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 66). Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel (Doc. 4), and the National Fraternal Order of Police's Motion to File an Amicus Brief on Behalf of Defendants (Doc. 62). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby GRANTS these motions. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Inspection (Doc. 14). Because the Parties have represented that this motion is moot, it is hereby DISMISSED.
Plaintiffs Robert Shreve, Michael Worley, Michael Reed, and Dawn Fiore-Bruno bring the instant class action lawsuit against Franklin County, Ohio, Sheriff Jim Karnes, and various sheriff deputies, alleging a pervasive practice wherein prisoners at the Franklin County Corrections Centers are subjected to excessive force through the use of stun guns manufactured by TASER International, Inc. (commonly known as and referred to hereinafter as "tasers"). The Franklin County Sheriffs Office ("Sheriffs Office") operates the two Franklin County Corrections Centers ("FCCCs"). Plaintiffs Shreve, Reed, and Fiore-Bruno were all formallyincarcerated in one of the FCCCs and have since been released. ( Plaintiff Worley remained incarcerated at the time Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on August 27, 2010 ( ), but Plaintiffs have indicated that he has since been released. (See Doc. 23 at 9.)
Each of the four named Plaintiffs alleges that he or she was subjected to excessive force while incarcerated at the FCCCs through the use of tasers by sheriff's deputies. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-237.) Each brings individual claims for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-237.) Additionally, Plaintiffs Shreve and Worley also bring claims for injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of themselves and a prospective class consisting of "[a]ll persons who, now or at any future time during the pendency of this litigation, are or will be placed in the custody of the Franklin County Sheriff's Department at the Franklin County Corrections Centers." (Am. Compl. ¶240.) By Order dated July 20, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiffs permission to move immediately for class certification and appointment of class counsel. (See Doc. 3.)
On November 2, 2010, the United States of America, acting through the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division ("Department of Justice"), filed a statement of interest in this action (Doc. 42). The next day, following a telephone status conference involving all parties, the Department of Justice formally filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (Doc. 45), claiming an interest in this action arising from the Attorney General's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b). Additionally, the National Fraternal Order of Police ("NFOP") has sought permission to file an amicus brief in this matter (Doc. 62). Finally, on December 10, 2010, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint for the second time (Doc. 66). The Court now considers each of these motions in turn.1
As the motion of the NFOP for leave to file an amicus brief (Doc. 62) is unopposed, it is hereby granted.
Plaintiffs have requested leave to file a second amended complaint that provides the names of Defendants heretofore referred to as John and Jane Does. As this motion (Doc. 66) is unopposed, it is hereby granted.
The Department of Justice seeks to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 24(a), and in the alternative, seeks permission to intervene under Rule 24(b). The Court finds that the Department of Justice has timely established its right to intervene. Additionally, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) would be appropriate in this case,
Rule 24(a) provides that::
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
... (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
FED. R. ClV. P. 24(a). The Sixth Circuit has extrapolated the following four elements from Rule 24(a) that must be satisfied to establish a right to intervene: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed intervener's ability to protect their interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the parties already before the court cannot adequately protect the proposed intervenor's interest.
Coal, to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2007). The Department of Justice has met each of these factors.
"The determination of whether a motion to intervene is timely should be evaluated in the context of all relevant circumstances." Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990). Factors that should be considered in evaluating timelines include (1) the progression of the suit; (2) the purpose for intervention; (3) the amount of time before attempted intervention during which the intervening party was aware of its potential interest in the case; (4) prejudice to the original parties that could arise as a result of the intervenor's failure to intervene upon discovering its interest in the case; and (5) any unusual circumstances weighing for or against intervention. Id.
In the instant case, a balancing of these factors indicates that the Department of Justice's motion to intervene is timely. Prior to the Department of Justice's motion to intervene, the Court had not ruled on the pending motion for class certification and the parties were engaged in limited discovery in preparation for a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 6). Significantly, at the time of its proposed intervention, the Department of Justice indicated that it was prepared to participate at the then-scheduled preliminary injunction hearing, which was initially scheduled for November 8th (See Doc. 42 at 3.)
The Department of Justice's purpose in intervening is the enforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which makes it unlawful "for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or anyperson acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers" that deprive individuals of their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a). The Department of Justice also purports to intervene for purposes of judicial economy, as its claims essentially overlap with Plaintiffs' claims, and will rely on identical discovery. "The 'purposes of intervention' prong of the timeliness element normally examines only whether the lack of an earlier motion to intervene should be excused, given the proposed intervenor's purpose...." Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 479 n.15 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court will consider the second prong in relation to the third prong of the timeliness analysis.
The Department of Justice represents that it became aware of this action in July 2010, and indicated its intent to intervene approximately three and one half months later and less than one week before the scheduled preliminary injunction hearing�a hearing that had been set in early August. (See Doc. 10.) During that time, the Department of Justice represents that it was reviewing the case before making the determination as to whether to intervene. While attempted entry into the case on the eve of a preliminary injunction hearing that had been on the calendar for three months weighs against the timeliness of the Department of Justice's motion, the Department of Justice's purpose for intervening outweighs the delay, particularly given that it did not seek a delay of the hearing date (the Defendants properly sought additional time to depose the Department of Justice's witnesses and add an additional expert). The Attorney General is given the authority to enforce § 14141(a), a statute enacted to protect constitutional rights. Additionally, because the Department of Justice's claims overlap with those of Plaintiffs and similar relief is sought, judicial economy and efficiency are furthered by allowing the Department of Justice to intervene as opposed to filing a separate action against Defendants.
Turning now to the fourth factor, the Court finds that none of the parties would be prejudiced by allowing the Department of Justice to intervene at this point in the litigation. The Department of Justice's prospective involvement in this case has lead to an expansion of the discovery process, through the designation of additional expert witnesses. However, this has not been prejudicial to Defendants because they have also been afforded the opportunity to secure additional experts of their own, and to depose the Department of Justice's experts. The expanded discovery process has proceeded in a relatively orderly and timely manner. Similarly, as noted, the Department of Justice does not bring any claims in addition to those brought by Plaintiffs and seeks similar injunctive relief.
While the Court does not identify any unusual factors present in this case per the fifth prong, a balancing...
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