Wood v. Credit One Bank

Citation277 F.Supp.3d 821
Decision Date21 September 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:15cv594
Parties David W. WOOD, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT ONE BANK, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Craig Carley Marchiando, Leonard Anthony Bennett, Susan Mary Rotkis, Consumer Litigation Associates, Newport News, VA, Casey Shannon Nash, Consumer Litgation Associates P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Lauren Cafferty Mahaffey, McGuireWoods LLP, Washington, DC, Christopher James Sears, Pro Hac Vice, Cipriani & Werner P.C., Charleston, WV, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

M. Hannah Lauck, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff David W. Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 55), Defendant Credit One Bank's ("Credit One") Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 57), and Wood's Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of James Lynn (the "Motion to Exclude"), (ECF No. 56). Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment and Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment were both filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 Wood's Motion to Exclude was filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 7022 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).3 Wood and Credit One have both responded to the motions for summary judgment, and both parties have replied. (ECF Nos. 67, 68, 70, 71.) Credit One responded to the Motion to Exclude, (ECF No. 66), and Wood replied, (ECF No. 69). The Court heard oral argument on all matters and ordered supplemental briefing, (ECF Nos. 78, 80).4 These matters are ripe for disposition. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13315 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.6 The Court entered an Order ruling on all motions. (ECF No. 86.) For the reasons that follow, the Court denied Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Wood's Motion to Exclude.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Procedural History

Wood filed his eight-count Complaint against Credit One, Midland Credit Management, Equifax Credit Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and TransUnion, LLC, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Only Credit One remains as a defendant, and Wood asserts only three counts of the Complaint against it. (See ECF Nos. 31, 40, 41, 44.) The gravamen of Wood's Complaint is that someone improperly opened a Credit One credit card account (the "Account") in Wood's name, and Credit One, despite numerous notifications from Wood that the Account was not his, failed to correct the error and continued to report the Account derogatorily on his credit report. Wood's Complaint alleges that Credit One violated the FCRA in the following ways:

Count VI: Credit One failed to fully and properly investigate Wood's disputes, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b)(1)(A) ;7
Count VII: Credit One failed to review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agencies ("CRAs") upon receiving Wood's disputes, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b)(1)(B) ;8 and,
Count VIII: Credit One failed to correctly report the results of an accurate investigation to each CRA, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s–2(b)(1)(C) & (D).9

Wood alleges that each violation was willful, rendering Credit One liable for punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n,10 and pleads alternatively that Credit One's violations were negligent, entitling him to recover under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.11 For each count, Wood seeks actual damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs and attorneys' fees.

Wood has moved for partial summary judgment. Wood urges this Court to: (1) grant summary judgment in his favor on Count VI, that Credit One failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Wood's disputes; (2) grant summary judgment in his favor on Count VIII, that Credit One failed to truthfully report the results of its investigation back to the CRAs; and, (3) find that Credit One inaccurately reported that Wood opened and was responsible for the Account, which applies to Counts VI, VII, and VIII. Wood does not seek summary judgment on Count VII.

Credit One has moved for summary judgment on all counts. Credit One asserts that the Court should grant summary judgment because: (1) Wood cannot show actual damages as a result of Credit One's investigations; and, (2) Wood cannot show that Credit One knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard of his rights. According to Credit One, because Wood can prove neither actual damages nor a willful violation of the FCRA, the Court must grant Credit One summary judgment and dismiss Wood's Complaint.12

B. Procedural Defects Within the Motions Before the Court

Before and during oral argument, procedural defects in some filings became evident. Because the flaws within some motions and supporting briefs affect this Court's evaluation of the case, the Court pauses to discuss them.

1. Credit One Failed to Comply with Local Rule 56(B)

In defiance of this Court's Local Civil Rule 56(B),13 Credit One's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment omits a section citing to the material facts not in dispute. Credit One instead scatters citations to the record throughout its memorandum, absent any reference to whether the facts are material or in dispute.

In his response in opposition, Wood strongly objects to Credit One's approach. Wood denounces Credit One's summary judgment motion as stepping over more than procedural boundaries. According to Wood, Credit One's avowals that Wood has no case because he cannot prove either actual damages or willfulness—without citing disputed or material facts per this Court's rules—amounts to an improper trial brief demanding that Wood "[p]rove [his] case now." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1–2.)

Despite Wood's challenge—and Credit One's clear failure—Credit One made no attempt to remedy its violation of this Court's Local Rules. Instead, in a short statement in its reply brief, Credit One sought forgiveness for its "noncompliance" with Local Civil Rules. Credit One acknowledged that "a court's response to a violation of the Local Rules generally varies in proportion to the seriousness of the violation," and that a court "may deny a motion for summary judgment outright" when a "movant's violation of Local Rule 56(B) is blatant." (Def.'s Reply 2.) It then added the following non-sequitur: "[G]iven the short 10–page length of Credit One's brief, [its failure to present the undisputed facts] should not, in any real sense, impede this Court's ability to fairly and expeditiously consider Credit One's motion." (Id. at 1, 3.) Credit One further asserted that its "brief in support of its motion for summary judgment contains the appropriate and sufficient citation to the record to support the requested ruling." (Id. at 2.)

Credit One's self-assurance is misplaced. Courts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including this one, weigh adherence to procedural rules seriously. "In response to a movant's blatant violation of Local [Civil] Rule 56(B), the Court may deny a motion for summary judgment outright." CertusView Techs., LLC v. S & N Locating Servs., LLC , No. 2:13cv346, 2015 WL 4717256, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2015) (citing Mitchell v. Angelone , 82 F.Supp.2d 485, 487 (E.D. Va. 1999) ). "[F]or more minor violations of Local [Civil] Rule 56(B), courts sometimes will refuse to ‘elevate form over substance’ and, instead, will excuse the party's failure to comply with the rule." Id. (quoting White v. Golden Corral of Hampton, LLC , No. 4:13cv27, 2014 WL 1050586, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2014) ). On the other hand, as Credit One acknowledged, "the Court has the inherent equitable authority to ‘resolve the substantive issues raised and alleviate the need to consider them at trial.’ " Id. (quoting Williams v. Gradall Co. , 990 F.Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) ).

Local [Civil] Rule 56(B) serves two salutary purposes. It notifies non-moving parties of the facts that the movant contends are undisputed and support the movant's alleged entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and it provides the Court with an organized analytical framework to assess whether any material factual dispute exists and whether the movant is entitled to the relief sought. A party that ignores Local [Civil] Rule 56(B) undermines those dual purposes and impedes the Court's ability to fairly and expeditiously resolve a motion for summary judgment.

Id. at *5.

Overall, the policy behind Local Civil Rule 56 counsels enforcement of and strict adherence to the Rule by the courts. "[W]hile a court occasionally may forgive a litigant for failing to strictly comply with mere procedural formalities in the Local Rules, a violation of Local [Civil] Rule 56(B) lies at the more serious end of the spectrum of noncompliance ...." Id.

Credit One's original error, and its failure to mitigate its error, offends on many grounds. First, Credit One's ten-page brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment stands in stark contrast to hundreds of pages of evidence, including partial transcripts of seven depositions, submitted by the parties. (See ECF Nos. 55–71.) A summary judgment motion with such an extensive record requires the parties to adhere to Local Rule 56(B) with special care. See CertusView Techs., LLC , 2015 WL 4717256, at *5 (stating that an important purpose of Rule 56(B) is to provide the Court with "an organized analytical framework to assess whether any material factual dispute exists and whether the movant is entitled to the relief sought"). Neither party can unilaterally ignore rules based on its own view of what the Court needs in order to decide a case. Not without consequence, at least.

Second, Credit One "mitigates" its error in a wholly improper manner. In its reply, Credit One lists the number of every...

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