Shrine v. Shrine
| Decision Date | 12 April 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. AM-407,AM-407 |
| Citation | 429 So.2d 765 |
| Parties | Virginia S. SHRINE, Appellant, v. Bertram SHRINE, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard H. May, Orange Park, for appellant.
Charles E. Waite of Cobb & Waite, Orange Park, for appellee.
Appellant/wife appeals an order modifying a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial judge's increase in permanent alimony by only $100 per month and his refusal to extend the period of appellant's exclusive use of the marital home. Appellee/husband cross appeals, challenging the trial court's extension of rehabilitative alimony for an additional twenty-four months even though appellant did not specifically plead for that extension. We reverse and remand for reconsideration of the amount of increase in permanent alimony and affirm as to the other points raised.
The parties were divorced in 1980 after twenty-three years of marriage and being blessed with seven offspring. At the time of the divorce, four children were still minors and lived with appellant. In the final judgment, appellant was awarded $200 per month permanent alimony, $300 per month rehabilitative alimony for twenty-four months, and $125 per minor child per month for child support. She was also awarded exclusive use of the marital home until July 1, 1982, on which date the youngest child was approximately nine years old. No appeal was taken from the final judgment.
At the time of the divorce, appellee, a retired Navy captain, was employed as a realtor. His gross monthly income was approximately $1,240, plus $2,160 in retirement benefits, but with deductions his net monthly income was approximately $2,600. Appellant had a part-time job in a card shop earning approximately minimum wage.
After the divorce, appellee moved from Clay County to Pensacola where he began working with his present employer, Burnside-Ott, serving as director for the Division of Military Aviation, earning $3,335 per month plus bonuses. In 1981, his bonus was $1,750 plus a television valued at $1,000. His monthly retirement income has increased to $2,575, giving him a net income of approximately $4,500 per month. The husband has remarried and his new wife has custody of her three minor children by her previous marriage. Appellee has bought a $100,000 five-bedroom home and has acquired some investment property.
Appellant now earns approximately $4.10 per hour in her part-time job and has acquired another nine-hour a week job, making $4 per hour. Five of the seven children still live with her despite three having attained their majority. In her motion for modification, she stated that she is not able to maintain a standard of living even close to that enjoyed by the family during the marriage and that she is unable to keep the marital home in good repair.
On modification, the trial court increased child support to $200 per month for each of the two remaining minor children, increased permanent alimony to $300 per month and extended the $300 per month rehabilitative alimony for an additional two years. The court did not extend the right to use of the marital home beyond July 1, 1982.
Upon reviewing the record, we find that the trial court had adequate justification for refusing to extend the period of use and possession of the marital home. The record indicates that the home is in bad repair and would require the expenditure of a large sum of money for the needed repairs and maintenance, an amount not affordable by the parties. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to extend appellant's possession of the home so that the home may be sold and the financial burden of restoring the house transferred to the buyers.
The record reveals a marked disparity in the financial status of the parties, to the extent that we find that appellant has been "shortchanged" under the principles of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). We recognize that appellee has accepted some financial responsibility for the children who have attained majority. Also, we do not require that the cash flow available to the parties necessarily be equalized. However, considering the age of the parties, the length of the marriage, and the wife's limited earning ability, the imbalance in livelihood is of such magnitude as to result in inequity in this case. An example is appellee's military retirement rights that accrued almost entirely during the marriage of the parties, when the parties' efforts at supporting and maintaining their family were a joint venture. The total payments to appellant from appellee, even with the...
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Smith v. Smith
...did not object to that portion of the statement, and alimony issue was argued in opening and closing statements); Shrine v. Shrine, 429 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). "The essence of the broad test generally applied to determine whether an issue has been tried by implied consent is whe......
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Bryan v. Bryan, 1D99-3492.
...review. See Purvis v. Purvis, 732 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Hemraj v. Hemraj, 620 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Shrine v. Shrine, 429 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). "This court has held that rehabilitative alimony cannot be awarded absent a rehabilitative plan." Fullerton, 709 So.2d ......
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Kooser v. Kooser, BO-240
...appellant has been shortchanged under the principles of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Cf. Shrine v. Shrine, 429 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), on appeal after remand, 454 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. rev. denied, 461 So.2d 116 (Fla.1984). The evidence shows that the al......
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Davis v. Davis
...1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Thornton v. Thornton, 433 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983); Shrine v. Shrine, 429 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Ludemann v. Ludemann, 317 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); P. Padavano, Florida Appellate Practice section 16.5, at 269 (1......