Shrink Missouri Government Pac v. Adams

• Decision Date: 12 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 4:98CV357 CDP.,4:98CV357 CDP.
• Citation: 5 F.Supp.2d 734
• Parties: SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard ADAMS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

5 F.Supp.2d 734

SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard ADAMS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:98CV357 CDP.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

May 12, 1998.

Douglas Bruce La Pierre, St. Louis, MO, Patric A. Lester, Lester and Associates, St.

Louis, MO, for Shrink Missouri Government PAC.

James R. Layton, Paul Maguffee, Attorney General of Missouri, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Richard Adams, Patricia Flood, Robert Gardner, Ervin Harder, John Howald, Elaine Spielbusch, Jeremiah W. Nixon.

Andrew J. Minardi, Sr. Assoc. Cty. Counsel, Patricia J. Redington, Assoc., Cty. Counselor, St. Louis County Counselor Office, Clayton, MO, for Robert P. McCullough.

Gerald P. Greiman, Dankenbring and Greiman, Clayton, MO, for Joan Bray.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PERRY, District Judge.

This case draws into question the validity of Missouri's limits on contributions to candidates for state elected office. Contending that those limits violate their first amendment rights, plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing enforcement of the following provisions of Senate Bill 650, codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032 (West Supp.1998):

1. Provisions that limit "the amount of contributions made by or accepted from any person other than the candidate in any one election" to a maximum of (a) $1,075.00 to elect an individual to the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor, or attorney general, or any other office if the population of the relevant electoral unit is at least 250,000, (b) $525.00 to elect an individual to the office of state senator or any other office if the population of the relevant electoral unit is at least 100,000 but less than 250,000, (c) $275.00 to elect an individual to the office of state representative or any other office if the population of the relevant electoral unit is less than 100,000. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032.1.

2. A provision adjusting the above-mentioned limits for inflation. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032.2.

3. A provision making "candidate committees, exploratory committees, campaign committees and continuing committees, other than those continuing committees which are political party committees" subject to the above-mentioned limits. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032.3.

4. A provision imposing on committees found in violation of the above-mentioned limits a penalty of an amount equal to the nonallowable contribution plus a $1,000 surcharge per such nonallowable contribution. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.032.7.

On March 4, 1998, the Court heard oral argument from all parties on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court denied the motion on March 9, concluding that on the record before it, plaintiffs had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of harms and public interest weighed in their favor. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc).

On March 18, the Court entered a case management order. In that order, the Court, generally adopting a proposal jointly submitted by the parties, established an expedited briefing schedule for dispositive motions. In accordance with that schedule, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Based on the undisputed facts and the relevant case law, the Court concludes that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It will enter judgment accordingly, and will deny plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief.¹

I. Background

This action comes as the perhaps inevitable consequence of the Eighth Circuit's 1995 decision in Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 116 S.Ct. 2579, 135 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1996), a case that invalidated the campaign contribution limits contained in Proposition A, an initiative passed by the Missouri electorate in the November 1994 election. Proposition A placed "per election cycle"² limits on contributions by individuals or committees (other than candidate committees) to a candidate or his or her candidate committee. Those limits were as follows: (1) $100 per candidate in districts with fewer than 100,000 residents, (2) $200 per non-statewide candidate in districts of 100,000 or more residents, and (3) $300 per statewide candidate (i.e., candidates seeking election to the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State).

Prior to the November 1994 election, the Missouri General Assembly enacted a campaign finance law, known as Senate Bill 650, which contained the campaign contribution limits set forth in the first paragraph of this memorandum. Senate Bill 650's limits were to take effect on January 1, 1995. After Proposition A's passage, however, the Missouri attorney general determined that the initiative's lower limits controlled.

Following the attorney general's determination, Carver, a political contributor, brought suit to enjoin Proposition A's enforcement, arguing that the law unconstitutionally interfered with his ability to support political candidates. The district court denied the injunction, Carver v. Nixon, 882 F.Supp. 901 (W.D.Mo.1995), and the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court of appeals concluded that the district court had erred in extending the Supreme Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam), "to the infinitely broader interest of limiting all, not just large, campaign contributions."³ 72 F.3d at 639. Quoting the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981), the court stated, "`Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate ....'" Carver, 72 F.3d at 638 (quoting 454 U.S. at 296, 102 S.Ct. 434) (emphasis added by the Carver court).

Describing Proposition A's limits as "dramatically lower" than those approved in Buckley, id. at 641-42, and lower, in fact, than those of any other state, id. at 642, the Carver court concluded that the initiative's limits were "not closely drawn to reduce corruption or the appearance of corruption associated with large campaign contributions." Id. at 644. The court found the following factors relevant: (1) after adjusting for inflation, Proposition A's limits represented between two and six percent of the $2,000 per election cycle limit approved of in Buckley, id., at 642 n. 8,⁴ (2) other states had larger contribution limits, id. at 641-42, (3) Senate Bill 650 provided a "back-up" in the event of Proposition A's invalidation, id. at 642 ("The question is not simply that of some limits or none at all, but rather Proposition A as compared to those in Senate Bill 650 ...."),⁵ and (4) the impact of Proposition A's limits affected a much higher percentage of contributors than did the federal $1,000 limit. Id. at 643. As a result of the Carver decision, Proposition A's limits were supplanted by those contained in Senate Bill 650.

II. Facts

Plaintiff Shrink Missouri Government PAC ("Shrink PAC") is a political action committee. Plaintiff Zev David Fredman is a candidate in the August 1998 Republican primary for the office of Missouri state auditor. Fredman, who has never before run for statewide political office, has formed a candidate committee ("Fredman for Auditor"), filed for office, and paid the required filing fee. The defendants in this matter are the Missouri Ethics Commission's chairman (John Howald) and members (Richard Adams, Patricia Flood, Robert Gardner, Ervin Harder, and Elaine Spielbusch), who are responsible for administering the provisions of the Missouri campaign finance laws, the state attorney general (Jeremiah W. Nixon), who advises the ethics commission and enforces the campaign finance laws, and the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis County (Robert P. McCullough), who is also responsible for enforcing those laws.

Shrink PAC raises money from Missouri voters and contributes those funds to candidates for Missouri elective office. It made contributions to certain of those candidates in the 1994, 1996, and 1997 elections. On June 23, 1997, it made a $1,025 contribution to "Fredman for Auditor," and made an additional $50 contribution on February 25, 1998. Shrink PAC states that but for Missouri's campaign contribution limitations, it would make additional contributions to Fredman's campaign. Fredman believes that he can wage an effective campaign for auditor only if he can garner contributions in excess of those provided for under current Missouri law.

III. Discussion

In determining whether summary judgment should issue pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court views the facts and any inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The moving party bears the burden of both establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In this case, the facts are undisputed. The issue is purely legal: do Missouri's limits on campaign contributions violate the first amendment?

It is firmly settled that regulation of first amendment rights is "always subject to exacting judicial review." Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294, 102 S.Ct. 434. "Exacting review" means "strict scrutiny." A court must strike a challenged regulation that is not "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995); Carver, 72 F.3d at 638.

Plaintiffs argue that...