Shroeder v. Spire, Inc., 4:19-CV-00623-DGK
| Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:19-CV-00623-DGK,4:19-CV-00623-DGK |
| Parties | GORDON SHROEDER, Plaintiff, v. SPIRE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
This case arises from Plaintiff Gordon Shroeder's allegations that Defendant Spire, Inc., and its subsidiary, Defendant Spire Missouri, Inc., (collectively, "Spire") discriminated against him based on disability and age and retaliated against him in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges a claim against Spire for breach of confidentiality after failing to keep his private medical records confidential. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and Spire removed it to this Court based on federal-question jurisdiction. Spire claims § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et. seq., completely preempts Plaintiff's claims.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 28). Finding that his claims are substantially dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with interpretation of the terms in the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), the motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff was an employee at Spire, a natural gas utility provider. Because of the nature of its work, Spire is subject to the safety regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, agencies within the Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The DOT regulations require Spire to implement a drug-testing policy for its employees in safety-sensitive positions. These regulations set the types and amounts of controlled substances included in the tests and require employees in safety-sensitive positions who are prescribed controlled substances to be certified as physically fit for duty by a DOT-certified medical examiner.
While working at Spire, Plaintiff was a member of the Gas Workers Metal Trades Local 781 (Kansas City) Union ("the Union"), and so his employment was subject to the CBA between Spire and the Union. The CBA included a drug-testing policy ("the Policy") that listed the controlled substances that would be tested, in compliance with the DOT regulations. The Policy also noted that if any provision of the Policy conflicted with the DOT regulations, the regulations would govern. If the DOT implemented new regulations, "the statutory and regulatory changes affecting th[e] [P]olicy shall be implemented after notice to the Unions" (Doc. 35-1 at 1 n.1). On November 10, 2017, the DOT issued a final rule adding synthetic opioids (e.g., hydrocodone and oxycodone) to the screening panel, and Spire promptly notified the Union that it would add the new drugs to the testing panel in 2018. Consistent with DOT regulations, the Policy required employees in safety-sensitive position prescribed a controlled substance to be certified as fit to perform their job by a company-designated physician.
In January 2018, Plaintiff was randomly drug tested, and the test detected the presence of synthetic opioids. Pursuant to the policy, a medical-review officer reviewed the test results and confirmed with Plaintiff's physician that Plaintiff was legally prescribed the drugs. The medical-review officer then informed Spire that Plaintiff's test was not positive for any illegal narcotics, but he had safety concerns about Plaintiff's ability to perform his safety-sensitive jobwhile using opioids.
Plaintiff was then seen by a DOT-qualified medical examiner who determined Plaintiff was not physically fit to perform his job. Spire temporarily permitted Plaintiff to perform available non-safety-sensitive tasks before placing him on leave. While on leave, Plaintiff did not bid into any non-safety-sensitive position nor was he released back to work in any safety-sensitive position by a DOT-certified medical examiner. Because he could not afford to live without any compensation, he retired.
In light of these events, the Union filed two grievances: 1) regarding the Policy and the decision to begin screening for synthetic opioids, and 2) regarding Plaintiff's employment. The grievance regarding the Policy went to arbitration, and the arbitrator held that Spire did not breach the CBA when it changed the Policy to include testing of synthetic opioids. After this ruling, the Union withdrew its grievance regarding Plaintiff's employment.
On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed this case in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, alleging Spire discriminated and retaliated against him, and disseminated his private medical information without his consent.1 Plaintiff filed an amended petition about a month later and served Spire on July 8, 2019. Spire removed this action to federal court on August 7, 2019, within its thirty-day deadline pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Plaintiff now seeks to remand this case back to state court.
Standard
The statute governing removal provides that "[a]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by thedefendant . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendants claim this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to its federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009).
The existence of federal-question jurisdiction typically depends on application of the "well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of [a] plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Boldt v. Northern States Power Co., 904 F.3d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017)). But there is an exception to this rule in cases of "complete" preemption, that is, where a federal statute "so completely pre-empt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal." Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
Section 301 of the LMRA provides that "[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has made clear that Section 301 completely preempts state-law claims founded on rights created by a CBA, as well as claims whose resolution is substantially dependent upon or "inextricably intertwined" with interpretation of a CBA's terms. Trs. of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 220 (1985)). A claim is substantially dependent on the CBA if it requires the interpretation of some specific provision of a CBA, including any documents incorporated by reference. Boldt, 904 F.3d at 590.
"While section 301 preempts claims founded directly on rights created by a CBA and claims substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA, not every dispute concerning employment or tangentially involving a provision of a CBA is preempted by section 301." Clark v. Kellogg Co., 205 F.3d 1079, 1082 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). When resolution of a state-law claim consists of "purely factual questions pertain[ing] to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer," there is no preemption because the claim does not require a court to interpret any term of a CBA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988) (). Thus, for there to be complete preemption, "the claim must require the interpretation of some specific provision of a CBA; it is not enough that the events in question took place in the workplace or that a CBA creates rights and duties similar or identical to those on which the state-law claim is based." Meyer v. Schnucks, Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998).
Discussion
Before addressing Plaintiff's main argument that remand is proper—that his claims are not preempted by the LMRA—this Court must first address Plaintiff's argument that Spire did not timely join Defendant Concerta in the notice of removal, and, therefore, violated the unanimity rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). The "rule of unanimity ordinarily requires that a case be remanded to the state court from which it was removed unless all defendants join in the motion for removal." Casey v. F.D.I.C., 583 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). Pursuant to § 1446(b)(2)(C), "[i]f defendants are served at different times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal eventhough that earlier-served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal." Although § 1446(b)(2)(C) does not describe the form or timeframe for consent when multiple defendants are involved, the Eighth Circuit has held that the unanimity rule is satisfied when a defendant files a "timely removal notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified pursuant to Rule 11," followed by the filing of "an indication of its consent." Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1186 (8th Cir. 2015) (...
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