Shryock v. Shryock

• Decision Date: 17 March 1897
• Citation: 50 Neb. 886,70 N.W. 515
• Parties: SHRYOCK ET AL. v. SHRYOCK ET AL.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

50 Neb. 886

70 N.W. 515

SHRYOCK ET AL.

v.SHRYOCK ET AL.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 17, 1897.

Syllabus by the Court.

A mutual benefit association, whose declared object is “to give moral and material aid to its members by assisting them in business,” etc., and “to establish a benefit fund, from which not exceeding $3,000 shall be paid at the death of a member, to whomsoever he shall designate, or, if a legatee be not mentioned, then to the heirs at law of the deceased,” in the year 1881 issued a certificate of membership to one S. Said certificate is in form similar to those in common use by associations of like character, with the exception of the beneficiary clause, viz.: “It is my will that the benefit fund named in this certificate be paid to _____, legal heirs, subject to revocation or assignment at pleasure, on presentation of this certificate to the supreme secretary,” etc. The insured about 10 years previous to his death, which occurred in the year 1892, intending to make provision for his parents, indorsed said certificate as follows: “Two thousand dollars of this policy to be paid to my father and mother, if living at the time of my death. [Signed] W. B. S.” In a proceeding by the widow and daughter of the insured, against his father and mother, to determine the rights of the parties with respect to the fund realized upon said certificate, held: (1) The act of the insured in directing payment to his father and mother was an original designation, and not a change of beneficiaries, within the meaning of the certificate and laws of the association. Hanson v. Association, 60 N. W. 1091, 59 Minn. 123. (2) Viewing said transactions as a change of beneficiaries, it sufficiently answers the requirements of the certificate and by-laws in that regard. (3) If it was necessary to present the certificate to the supreme secretary as a condition precedent to the right of the insured to designate his parents as beneficiaries thereunder, such presentation will be presumed from the designation actually made, accompanied by an intention to provide for the beneficiaries named, and the subsequent payment by the insured during his lifetime of assessments for their benefit.

Error to district court, Cass county; Chapman, Judge.

Separate petitions by Celia V. Shryock, widow of William B. Shryock, deceased, and by Lillian J. Shryock, by her guardian, for the proceeds of policies of life insurance, and by Thomas W. Shryock and another for the removal of Celia V. Shryock as executrix of deceased. The causes were consolidated, and there was a judgment in the county court for petitioners Thomas W. Shryock and another, from a judgment of the district court reversing which they bring error. Reversed.Beeson & Root, for plaintiffs in error.

A. N. Sullivan, for defendants in error.

POST, C. J.

This is a petition in error to review a judgment of the district court for Cass county reversing an order of the county court in the settlement of the estate of William B. Shryock, deceased. The primary question of the controversy relates to the disposition of the sum of $2,805, the proceeds of a certificate of membership held by deceased in the Equitable Aid Union, a benevolent fraternal society issuing insurance to members thereof upon the so-called assessment plan. The object of the order named, according to its constitution, which was introduced in evidence, is “* * * (4) to give all moral and material aid in its power to members by assisting each other in business in obtaining employment and in sickness; (5) to establish a benefit fund, from which not exceeding $3,000 shall be paid at the death of a member, to whomsoever the member shall designate, or if a legatee be not mentioned, then to the heirs at law of the deceased.” The certificate in question bears date of February 26, 1881, and is in form substantially similar to those in common use by fraternal and mutual benefit associations, with the exception of the beneficiary clause, which reads as follows: “To the Officers and Members of the Supreme Union E. A. U.: It is my will that the benefit fund named in this certificate be paid to _____, legal heirs, subject to revocation or assignment at pleasure on presentation of this certificate to the supreme secretary of the Equitable Aid Union. William Shryock.” The deceased, who was at the date of said certificate a single man, subsequently married the defendant in error Celia V. Shryock, and from which union was born the latter's co-defendant, her infant daughter, Lillian J. Shryock. Deceased, previous to his marriage and 10 years or more before his death, over his own signature, indorsed said certificate as follows: “Two thousand dollars of this policy to be paid to my father and mother, if living at the time of my death. Wm. B. Shryock.” It does appear affirmatively that the certificate was presented to the supreme secretary upon the execution of the foregoing direction, and the presumption arising from the facts stated will be considered in another connection. The deceased left a will executed a short time before his death, containing this among other provisions: “After paying my debts, I wish the following disposition to be made of my property and life insurance. One thousand dollars to be paid to my mother, and one thousand dollars to be paid to my father.” Said will having been proved as provided by law, the said Celia V. Shryock, Thomas W. Shryock, and Frank E. White in due form qualified as executors, and, as such executors, subsequently received from the Equitable Aid Union the benefit fund in controversy.

The issues below were presented by...