Shuchat v. Town of Stratford

• Decision Date: 08 June 1939
• Citation: 125 Conn. 566,7 A.2d 387
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHUCHAT v. TOWN OF STRATFORD.

7 A.2d 387

125 Conn. 566

SHUCHAT v. TOWN OF STRATFORD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 8, 1939

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Edward J. Quinlan Judge.

Action by Herman Shuchat against the Town of Stratford, for personal injuries allegedly caused by defective sidewalk, brought to the superior court and tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Herbert L. Cohen, of Bridgeport, and Theodore I Koskoff, of Stratford, for appellant.

James Kenneth Bradley, of Bridgeport, for appellee.

Argued Before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.

AVERY Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries which he claimed to have received on January 22, 1938, at about 8:50 in the morning when, while walking on the sidewalk on the westerly side of Main Street at a point approximately adjacent to the Dennis Funeral Home, he slipped and fell and was injured. He claimed that his injury was caused by snow and ice upon the sidewalk. After a trial to the jury a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant town and the plaintiff has appealed. The only errors assigned relate to the charge of the court and a ruling upon evidence.

At the trial to the jury the plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved these facts: At the time in question while walking with due care on the sidewalk on the westerly side of Main Street in the defendant town at a point approximately adjacent to the Dennis Funeral Home where Southard Court intersects, he slipped because of an accumulation of ice and snow at that point which rendered the surface of the sidewalk uneven, slippery and dangerous, and which had been there at least three days prior. The town had failed to exercise due diligence to remedy this defective condition although it had reasonable notice thereof. As a result the plaintiff fell and was injured. The defendant offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved these facts: On January 16th it snowed from 4:30 to 6 p. m., a fall of one-eighth of an inch; on the 17th it snowed from 8 a. m. to 8 p. m., a fall of one and one-half inches. It was clear on the 18th, 19th and 20th. It rained on the afternoon of the 21st and snowed from 4 p. m. to 8 p. m., a fall of three inches. It snowed during the night and stopped some time during the night with a precipitation of two inches. For a period of several days prior to January 22d, there was a continual condition of thawing and freezing each day and the temperatures of localities exposed to the sun were often as high as forty-five degrees. There had been no accumulation of snow and ice at that point for three days prior to the time when the plaintiff was injured. Whatever accumulation of snow and ice there was, was the result of the rain storm and snow storm of January 21st.

The plaintiff claims error in the refusal of the court to charge the jury in accordance with three specific requests: ‘ A defendant town which makes no effort for several days after a snowstorm to render an icy and much travelled upon sidewalk reasonably safe for public travel save for the partial removal of the snow by the tenant of the adjoining land, cannot be said to have discharged the full measure of its duty.’ ‘ If the injuries resulted from the combined concurrence of the icy condition of the walk and the freshly fallen snow, as long as both contributed to the cause of the injuries then if all the other elements of the action are present, the jury find for the plaintiff.’ ‘ When once a defective condition of a sidewalk due to snow and ice has become established, the fact that thereafter and Before injury occurs to a traveler as a result of it, the condition varies in some slight degree by reason of intervening storms or melting, will not relieve the municipality of liability, nor will it, of itself, preclude a finding that the municipality had constructive notice of the existence of the defect.’ The first two of these requests were instructions which we held not erroneous under the circumstances of that case in Frechette v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 83, 93, 94, 132 A. 467, and the third was language taken from Keating v. New London, 104 Conn. 528, 531, 133 A. 586. It is well settled, however, that the trial court, ‘ is not bound to adopt and use the language of requests to charge; it is enough if the instructions upon the points involved are correct and adequate.’ Pickens v. Miller, 119 Conn. 553, 554, 177 A. 573, 574; Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 439, 135 A. 570; Rohde v. Nock, 101 Conn. 439, 442,26 A. 335; Woodward v. Waterbury, 113 Conn. 457, 462, 155 A. 825.

The trial court, after calling attention to testimony to the effect that the town had sent men to the place of the accident early that morning with a snow plow, informed the jury that it might consider this evidence in determining whether or not the town knew or should have known of the existence of the defect, if the jury found that there was one at...