Shugars v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 17 April 1906
• Citation: 122 Ky. 606,92 S.W. 564
• Parties: SHUGARS, Police Judge, v. HAMILTON.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

92 S.W. 564

122 Ky. 606

SHUGARS, Police Judge, v. HAMILTON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 17, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, Garrard County.

"To be officially reported."

Action between William Shugars, police judge, and H. C. Hamilton. From a judgment for the latter, the former appeals. Reversed.

G. B Swinebroad, for appellant.

R. H Tomlinson, for appellee.

CARROLL C.

To test the validity of an ordinance enacted by the city council of Lancaster, Kentucky, a city of the fifth class, this action was instituted. The ordinance in question provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the occupation or trade of merchant tailoring without first having obtained a license therefor and paying the license tax of $50 per year, and its validity is assailed: First. Upon the ground that Ky. St. 1903, § 3636, requires an ordinance of this character to be introduced into the council five days before it is passed, and that the meeting at which this ordinance was first introduced was a called meeting, at which only four of the six members of the council were present, two members and the mayor and clerk being absent; that this special meeting was not called either by the mayor or by three members, nor was written notice of the meeting delivered to each of the members, as required by section 3633, of the Kentucky Statutes of 1903. Second. That this special meeting was not held at the place where the city had designated by ordinance that meetings of the council shall be held. Third. That it is in violation of section 180 of the Constitution providing in part that "every ordinance or resolution passed by any county, city, town, or municipal board, or local legislative body, levying a tax shall specify distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied," as the ordinance fails to specify the purpose for which the tax was levied. On hearing, the circuit court adjudged the ordinance void, and the city appeals.

Under the admitted allegations of the petition it may be conceded that, if this ordinance was required by the statute to be introduced at a meeting of the council held five days before its final passage, it would be invalid, as the meeting at which it was first considered was not called in the manner provided by the statute, nor held at the place designated for meetings of the council. Ky. St. 1903, § 3633, provides that the city council "shall hold regular meetings once in each month, at such times as they shall fix by ordinance. Special meetings may be called at any time by the mayor, or by three members by written notice delivered at least three hours before the time specified for the proposed meeting. All meetings of the city council shall be held within the limits of the city, and at such places as may be designated by ordinance, and shall be public." The purpose of the statute in requiring the city council to hold its meetings at the time and place fixed by ordinance was to give the citizens of the town an opportunity to be present, if they desire, at the deliberations of the council, and to make such suggestions as they deem wise and proper for the government of the city.

The council is the legislative body of the city, and occupies towards it the same general relation as the General Assembly of the state does towards the people of the state, and it is important for the well-being of the city and the proper administration of its affairs that the people of the city who are interested in its governmental affairs shall know when and where their local legislative body is to meet, and when special meetings of the council are called, as they may be each member of the council who can be notified is entitled to have written notice of the time and place of the meeting, so that all of the council may be present and participate in the deliberations of the municipal body. It is true that a quorum of the council may transact its business, but it is the duty of each member of the council who can attend its meetings to do so, and to give advice and counsel touching the business pending before the body, and the people of the city are entitled to have the joint and collective judgment of all their representatives at the meeting. Statutory provisions requiring notice of special meetings given to each member in the manner provided by the statute are held in Dillon on Municipal Corporations, §§ 263-267, to be mandatory,...